Author name: Mike M.

today’s-game-consoles-are-historically-overpriced

Today’s game consoles are historically overpriced

Overall, though, you can see a clear and significant downward trend to the year-over-year pricing for game consoles released before 2016. After three years on the market, the median game console during this period cost less than half as much (on an inflation-adjusted basis) as it did at launch. Consoles that stuck around on the market long enough could expect further slow price erosion over time, until they were selling for roughly 43 percent of their launch price in year five and about 33 percent in year eight.

That kind of extreme price-cutting is a distant memory for today’s game consoles. By year three, the median console currently on the market costs about 85 percent of its real launch price, thanks to the effects of inflation. By year five, that median launch price ratio for modern consoles actually increases to 92 percent, thanks to the nominal price increases that many consoles have seen in their fourth or fifth years on the market. And the eight-year-old Nintendo Switch is currently selling for about 86 percent of its inflation-adjusted launch price, or more than 50 percentage points higher than the median trend for earlier long-lived consoles.

While the data is noisy, the overall trend in older console pricing over time is very clear. Kyle Orland

To be fair, today’s game consoles are not the most expensive the industry has ever seen. Systems like the Atari 2600, Intellivision, Neo Geo, and 3DO launched at prices that would be well over $1,000 in 2025 money. More recently, systems like the PS3 ($949.50 at launch in 2025 dollars) and Xbox One ($689.29 at launch in 2025 dollars) were significantly pricier than the $300 to $600 range that encompasses most of today’s consoles.

But when classic consoles launched at such high prices, those prices never lasted very long. Even the most expensive console launches of the past dropped in price quickly enough that, by year three or so, they were down to inflation-adjusted prices comparable to today’s consoles. And classic consoles that launched at more reasonable prices usually saw price cuts that took them well into the sub-$300 range (in 2025 dollars) within a few years, making them a relative bargain from today’s perspective.

Today’s game consoles are historically overpriced Read More »

ai-#131-part-1:-gemini-2.5-flash-image-is-cool

AI #131 Part 1: Gemini 2.5 Flash Image is Cool

Once again we’ve reached the point where the weekly update needs to be split in two. Thus, the alignment and policy coverage will happen tomorrow. Today covers the rest.

The secret big announcement this week was Claude for Chrome. This is a huge deal. It will be rolling out slowly. When I have access or otherwise know more, so will you.

The obvious big announcement was Gemini Flash 2.5 Image. Everyone agrees this is now the clear best image editor available. It is solid as an image generator, but only as one among many on that front. Editing abilities, including its ability to use all its embedded world knowledge, seem super cool.

The third big story was the suicide of Adam Raine, which appears to have been enabled in great detail by ChatGPT. His parents are suing OpenAI and the initial facts very much do not look good and it seems clear OpenAI screwed up. The question is, how severe should and will the consequences be?

  1. Language Models Offer Mundane Utility. Find what you’re looking for.

  2. Language Models Don’t Offer Mundane Utility. You weren’t using them.

  3. Huh, Upgrades. OpenAI Codex adds features including an IDE extension.

  4. Fun With Image Generation. Gemini 2.5 Flash Image is a great editor.

  5. On Your Marks. VendingBench, water use and some more v3.1 results.

  6. Water Water Everywhere. There’s plenty left to drink.

  7. Get My Agent On The Line. Claude for Chrome. It’s coming.

  8. Choose Your Fighter. Some advocates for GPT-5’s usefulness.

  9. Deepfaketown and Botpocalypse Soon. Elon has something to share.

  10. You Drive Me Crazy. AI psychosis continues not to show up in numbers.

  11. The Worst Tragedy So Far. Adam Raine commits suicide, parents sue OpenAI.

  12. Unprompted Attention. I don’t see the issue.

  13. Copyright Confrontation. Bartz v. Anthropic has been settled.

  14. The Art of the Jailbreak. Little Johnny Tables is all grown up.

  15. Get Involved. 40 ways to get involved in AI policy.

  16. Introducing. Anthropic advisors aplenty, Pixel translates live phone calls.

  17. In Other AI News. Meta licenses MidJourney, Apple explores Gemini and more.

  18. Show Me the Money. Why raise money when you can raise even more money?

  19. Quiet Speculations. Everything is being recorded.

  20. Rhetorical Innovation. The real math does not exist.

  21. The Week in Audio. How to properly use Claude Code.

Find me that book.

Or anything else. Very handy.

Share of papers that engage with AI rises dramatically essentially everywhere, which is what you would expect. There’s quite a lot more to engage with and to say. Always watch the y-axis scale, yes these start at zero:

More detail on various LLMs and their musical taste, based on a bracket competition among the top 5000 musical artists by popularity. It all seems bizarre. For example, Gemini 2.5 Pro’s list looks highly and uniquely alphabetically biased without a strong bias towards numbers.

The numbers-are-favored bias shows up only in OpenAI reasoning models including GPT-5, and in r1-0528. There are clear genre patterns, and there are some consistent picks, especially among Claudes. The three artists that appear three times are David Bowie, Prince and Stevie Wonder, which are very good picks. It definitely seems like the open models have worse (or more random) taste in correlated ways.

Why bother thinking about your vibe coding?

Sully: friend was hosting a mini ai workshop and he told me nearly all the vibe coders just have 1 giant coding session where the entire project is just being being thrown context. each request is ~200k tokens

they’re not even bothering to break things up into some reasonable structure

no wonder these code gen platforms are printing

I mean that makes sense. There’s little reason to cheapen out on tokens when you think about token cost versus your time cost and the value of a good vibe code. You gotta boldly go where no one has gone before and risk it for the biscuit.

Anthropic reports on how Claude is being used by educators, in particular 74,000 anonymized conversations from higher education professionals in May and June.

Anthropic: The most prominent use of AI, as revealed by both our Claude.ai analysis and our qualitative research with Northeastern, was for curriculum development. Our Claude.ai analysis also surfaced academic research and assessing student performance as the second and third most common uses.

Tasks with higher augmentation tendencies:

  • University teaching and classroom instruction, which includes creating educational materials and practice problems (77.4% augmentation);

  • Writing grant proposals to secure external research funding (70.0% augmentation);

  • Academic advising and student organization mentorship (67.5% augmentation);

  • Supervising student academic work (66.9% augmentation).

Tasks with relatively higher automation tendencies:

  • Managing educational institution finances and fundraising (65.0% automation);

  • Maintaining student records and evaluating academic performance (48.9% automation);

  • Managing academic admissions and enrollment (44.7% automation).

Mostly there are no surprises here, but concrete data is always welcome.

As always, if you don’t use AI, it can’t help you. This includes when you never used AI in the first place, but have to say ‘AI is the heart of our platform’ all the time because it sounds better to investors.

The ability to say ‘I don’t know’ and refer you elsewhere remains difficult for LLMs. Nate Silver observes this seeming to get even worse. For now it is on you to notice when the LLM doesn’t know.

This seems like a skill issue for those doing the fine tuning? It does not seem so difficult a behavior to elicit, if it was made a priority, via ordinary methods. At some point I hope and presume the labs will decide to care.

Feature request thread for ChatGPT power users, also here.

The weights of Grok 2 have been released.

OpenAI Codex adds a new IDE extension, a way to move tasks between cloud and local more easily, code reviews in GitHub and revamped Codex CLI.

OpenAI: Codex now runs in your IDE Available for VS Code, Cursor, and other forks, the new extension makes it easy to share context—files, snippets, and diffs—so you can work faster with Codex. It’s been a top feature request, and we’re excited to hear what you think!

Google: Introducing Gemini 2.5 Flash Image, our state-of-the-art image generation and editing model designed to help you build more dynamic and intelligent visual applications.

🍌Available in preview in @googleaistudio and the Gemini API.

This model is available right now via the Gemini API and Google AI Studio for developers and Vertex AI for enterprise. Gemini 2.5 Flash Image is priced at $30.00 per 1 million output tokens with each image being 1290 output tokens ($0.039 per image). All other modalities on input and output follow Gemini 2.5 Flash pricing.

Josh Woodward (Google): The @GeminiApp now has the #1 image model in the world, give it a go!

Attach an image, describe your edits, and it’s done. I’ve never seen anything like this.

They pitch that it maintains character consistency, adheres to visual templates, does prompt based image editing, understands point of view and reflections, restores old photographs, makes 3-D models, has native world knowledge and offers multi-image function.

By all accounts Gemini 2.5 Flash Image is a very very good image editor, while being one good image generator among many.

You can do things like repaint objects, create drawings, see buildings from a given point of view, put characters into combat and so on.

Which then becomes a short video here.

Our standards are getting high, such as this report that you can’t play Zelda.

Yes, of course Pliny jailbroke it (at least as far as being topless) on the spot.

We’re seeing some cool examples, but they are also clearly selected.

Benjamin De Kraker: Okay this is amazing.

All human knowledge will be one unified AI multimodal model.

Bilawal Sidhu: Since nano banana has gemini’s world knowledge, you can just upload screenshots of the real world and ask it to annotate stuff for you. “you are a location-based AR experience generator. highlight [point of interest] in this image and annotate relevant information about it.”

That seems cool if you can make it fast enough, and if it works on typical things rather than only on obvious landmarks?

The right question in the long term is usually: Can the horse talk at all?

Everythingism: I asked “Nano Banana” [which we later learned is Gemini Flash 2.5] to label a map of the USA and then a map of the world…this was the result.

It’s impressive at many tasks but image models all seem to fail when there are too many objects or too many things to label.

Explode Meow: Many of my friends have tested it.

To be fair, [Gemini Flash 2.5] can make quite realistic images, and most of them are indistinguishable from real ones if I don’t look closely.

This is clearly a result of Google leveraging its overwhelming data resources (Google Cloud).

But after multiple rounds of testing by my friends, they noticed that it actually makes some Low-level mistakes (hallucinations), just like GPT-4o (even Stable Diffusion).

Are mistakes still being made? Absolutely. This is still rather impressive. Consider where image models were not too long ago.

This is a Google image model, so the obvious reason for skepticism is that we all expect the Fun Police.

Hasan Can: If I know Google, they’ll nerf this model like crazy under the excuse of “safety” and when it’s released, it’ll turn into something worse than Qwen-Image-Edit. Remember what happened with Gemini 2.0 Flash Image Gen. I hope I’m wrong, but I don’t think so.

Alright, it seems reverse psychology is paying off. 👍

Image generation in Gemini 2.5 Flash doesn’t appear to be nerfed at all. It looks like Google is finally ready to treat both its developers and end users like adults.

Eleanor Berger: It’s very good, but I’m finding it very challenging to to bump into their oversensitive censorship. It really likes saying no.

nothing with real people (which sucks, because of course I want to modify some selfies), anything that suggests recognisable brands, anything you wouldn’t see on terrestrial tv.

The continuing to have a stick up the ass about picturing ‘real people’ is extremely frustrating and I think reduces the usefulness of the model substantially. The other censorship also does not help matters.

Grok 4 sets a new standard in Vending Bench,

The most surprising result here is probably that the human did so poorly.

I like saying an AI query is similar to nine seconds of television. Makes things clear.

It also seems important to notice when in a year energy costs drop 95%+?

DeepSeek v3.1 improves on R1 on NYT Connections, 49% → 58%. Pretty solid.

DeepSeek v3.1 scores solidly on this coding eval when using Claude Code, does less well on other scaffolds, with noise and confusion all around.

AIs potentially ‘sandbagging’ tests is an increasing area of research and concern. Cas says this is simply a special case of failure to elicit full capabilities of a system, and doing so via fine-tuning is ‘solved problem’ so we can stop worrying.

This seems very wrong to me. Right now failure to do proper elicitation, mostly via unhobbling and offering better tools and setups, is the far bigger problem. But sandbagging will be an increasing and increasingly dangerous future concern, and a ‘deliberate’ sandbagging has very different characteristics and implications than normal elicitation failure. I find ‘sandbagging’ to be exactly the correct name for this, since it doesn’t confine itself purely to evals, unless you want to call everything humans do to mislead other humans ‘eval gaming’ or ‘failure of capability elicitation’ or something. And no, this is not solved even now, even if it was true that it could currently be remedied by a little fine-tuning, because you don’t know when and how to do the fine-tuning.

Report that DeepSeek v3.1 will occasionally insert the token ‘extreme’ where it doesn’t belong, including sometimes breaking things like code or JSON. Data contamination is suspected as the cause.

Similarly, when Peter Wildeford says ‘sandbagging is mainly coming from AI developers not doing enough to elicit top behavior,’ that has the risk of conflating the levels of intentionality. Mostly AI developers want to score highly on evals, but there is risk that they deliberately do sandbag the safety testing, as in decide not to try very hard to elicit top behavior there because they’d rather get less capable test results.

The purpose of environmental assessments of AI is mostly to point out that many people have very silly beliefs about the environmental impact of AI.

Jeff Dean: AI efficiency is important. Today, Google is sharing a technical paper detailing our comprehensive methodology for measuring the environmental impact of Gemini inference. We estimate that the median Gemini Apps text prompt uses 0.24 watt-hours of energy (equivalent to watching an average TV for ~nine seconds), and consumes 0.26 milliliters of water (about five drops) — figures that are substantially lower than many public estimates.

At the same time, our AI systems are becoming more efficient through research innovations and software and hardware efficiency improvements. From May 2024 to May 2025, the energy footprint of the median Gemini Apps text prompt dropped by 33x, and the total carbon footprint dropped by 44x, through a combination of model efficiency improvements, machine utilization improvements and additional clean energy procurement, all while delivering higher quality responses.

Alas Google’s water analysis had an unfortunate oversight, in that it did not include the water cost of electricity generation. That turns out to be the main water cost, so much so that if you (reasonably) want to attribute the average cost of that electricity generation onto the data center, the best way to approximate water use of a data center is to measure the water cost of the electricity, then multiply by 1.1 or so.

This results in the bizarre situation where:

  1. Google’s water cost estimation was off by an order of magnitude.

  2. The actual water cost is still rather hard to distinguish from zero.

Andy Masley: Google publishes a paper showing that its AI models only use 0.26 mL of water in data centers per prompt.

After, this article gets published: “Google says a typical AI prompt only uses 5 drops of water – experts say that’s misleading.”

The reason the expert says this is misleading? They didn’t include the water used in the nearby power plant to generate electricity.

The expert, Shaolei Ren says: “They’re just hiding the critical information. This really spreads the wrong message to the world.”

Each prompt uses about 0.3 Wh in the data center. To generate that much electricity, power plants need (at most) 2.50 mL of water. That raises the total water cost per prompt to 2.76 mL.

2.76 mL is 0.0001% of the average American lifestyle’s daily consumptive use of fresh water and groundwater. It’s nothing.

Would you know this from the headline, or the quote? Why do so many reporters on this topic do this?

Andy Masley is right that This Is Nothing even at the limit, that the water use here is not worth worrying about even in worst case. It will not meaningfully increase your use of water, even when you increase Google’s estimates by an order of magnitude.

A reasonable headline would be ‘Google say a typical text prompt uses 5 drops of water, but once you take electricity into account it’s actually 32 drops.’

I do think saying ‘Google was being misleading’ is reasonable here. You shouldn’t have carte blanche to take a very good statistic and make it sound even better.

Teonbrus and Shakeel are right that there is going to be increasing pressure on anyone who opposes AI for other reasons to instead rile people up about water use and amplify false and misleading claims. Resist this urge. Do not destroy yourself for nothing. It goes nowhere good, including because it wouldn’t work.

It’s coming. As in, Claude for Chrome.

Anthropic: We’ve developed Claude for Chrome, where Claude works directly in your browser and takes actions on your behalf.

We’re releasing it at first as a research preview to 1,000 users, so we can gather real-world insights on how it’s used.

Browser use brings several safety challenges—most notably “prompt injection”, where malicious actors hide instructions to trick Claude into harmful actions.

We already have safety measures in place, but this pilot will help us improve them.

Max plan users can join the waitlist to test Claude for Chrome today.

Do not say you were not warned.

Anthropic: Understand the risks.

Claude brings AI directly to your browser, handling tasks and navigating sites for you. These new capabilities create risks bad actors may try to exploit.

Malicious actors can hide instructions in websites, emails, and documents that trick AI into taking harmful actions without your knowledge, including:

Accessing your accounts or files

Sharing your private information

Making purchases on your behalf

Taking actions you never intended

Oh, those risks. Yeah.

They offer some Good Advice about safety issues, which includes using a distinct browser profile that doesn’t include credentials to any sensitive websites like banks:

Q: How do I control what Claude can access?

A: You decide which websites Claude can visit and what actions it can take. Claude asks permission before visiting new sites and before taking potentially risky actions like publishing content or making purchases. You can revoke access to specific websites anytime in settings.

For trusted workflows, you can choose to skip all permissions, but you should supervise Claude closely. While some safeguards exist for sensitive actions, malicious actors could still trick Claude into unintended actions.

For your safety, Claude cannot access sensitive, high-risk sites such as:

Financial services and banking sites

Investment and trading platforms

Adult content websites

Cryptocurrency exchanges

It’s unlikely that we’ve captured all sites in these categories so please report if you find one we’ve missed.

Additionally, Claude is prohibited from:

Engaging in stock trading or investment transactions

Bypassing captchas

Inputting sensitive data

Gathering, scraping facial images

We recommend:

Use a separate browser profile without access to sensitive accounts (such as banking, healthcare, government).

Review Claude’s proposed actions before approving them, especially on new websites.

Start with simple tasks like research or form-filling rather than complex multi-step workflows.

Make sure your prompts are specific and carefully tailored to avoid Claude doing things you didn’t intend.

AI browsers from non-Anthropic sources? Oh, the safety you won’t have.

Zack: Why is no one talking about this? This is why I don’t use an AI browser You can literally get prompt injected and your bank account drained by doomscrolling on reddit:

No one seems to be concerned about this, it seems to me like the #1 problem with any agentic AI stuff You can get pwned so easily, all an attacker has to do is literally write words down somewhere?

Brave: AI agents that can browse the Web and perform tasks on your behalf have incredible potential but also introduce new security risks.

We recently found, and disclosed, a concerning flaw in Perplexity’s Comet browser that put users’ accounts and other sensitive info in danger.

This security flaw stems from how Comet summarizes websites for users.

When processing a site’s content, Comet can’t tell content on the website apart from legitimate instructions by the user. This means that the browser will follow commands hidden on the site by an attacker.

These malicious instructions could be white text on a white background or HTML comments. Or they could be a social media post. If Comet sees the commands while summarizing, it will follow them even if they could hurt the user. This is an example of an indirect prompt injection.

This was only an issue within Comet. Dia doesn’t have the agentic capabilities that make this attack possible.

Here’s someone very happy with OpenAI’s Codex.

Victor Taelin: BTW, I’ve basically stopped using Opus entirely and I now have several Codex tabs with GPT-5-high working on different tasks across the 3 codebases (HVM, Bend, Kolmo). Progress has never been so intense. My job now is basically passing well-specified tasks to Codex, and reviewing its outputs.

OpenAI isn’t paying me and couldn’t care less about me. This model is just very good and the fact people can’t see it made me realize most of you are probably using chatbots as girlfriends or something other than assisting with complex coding tasks.

(sorry Anthropic still love you guys 😢)

PS: I still use Opus for hole-filling in VIM because it is much faster than gpt-5-high there.

Ezra Klein is impressed by GPT-5 as having crossed into offering a lot of mundane utility, and is thinking about what it means that others are not similarly impressed by this merely because it wasn’t a giant leap over o3.

GFodor: Ezra proves he is capable of using a dropdown menu, a surprisingly rare skill.

A cool way to break down the distinction? This feels right to me, in the sense that if I know exactly what I want and getting it seems nontrivial my instinct is now to reach for GPT-5-Thinking or Pro, if I don’t know exactly what I want I go for Opus.

Sig Kitten: I can’t tell if I’m just claude brain rotted or Opus is really the only usable conversational AI for non-coding stuff

Gallabytes: it’s not just you.

gpt5 is a better workhorse but it does this awkward thing of trying really hard to find the instructions in your prompt and follow them instead of just talking.

Sig Kitten: gpt-5 default is completely unusable imho just bullet points of nonsense after a long thinking for no reason.

Gallabytes: it’s really good if you give it really precise instructions eg I have taken to dumping papers with this prompt then walking away for 5 minutes:

what’s the headline result in this paper ie the most promising metric or qualitative improvement? what’s the method in this paper?

1 sentence then 1 paragraph then detailed.

Entirely fake Gen AI album claims to be from Emily Portman.

Did Ani tell you to say this, Elon? Elon are you okay, are you okay Elon?

Elon Musk: Wait until you see Grok 5.

I think it has a shot at being true AGI.

Haven’t felt that about anything before.

I notice I pattern match this to ‘oh more meaningless hype, therefore very bad sign.’

Whereas I mean this seems to be what Elon is actually up to these days, sorry?

Or, alternatively, what does Elon think the ‘G’ stands for here, exactly?

(The greeting in question, in a deep voice, is ‘little fing b.)

Also, she might tell everyone what you talked about, you little fing b, if you make the mistake of clicking the ‘share’ button, so think twice about doing that.

Forbes: Elon Musk’s AI firm, xAI, has published the chat transcripts of hundreds of thousands of conversations between its chatbot Grok and the bot’s users — in many cases, without those users’ knowledge or permission.

xAI made people’s conversations with its chatbot public and searchable on Google without warning – including a detailed plan for the assassination of Elon Musk and explicit instructions for making fentanyl and bombs.

Peter Wildeford: I know xAI is more slapdash and so people have much lower expectations, but this still seems like a pretty notable breach of privacy that would get much more attention if it were from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, or Meta.

I’m not sure xAI did anything technically wrong here. The user clicked a ‘share’ button. I do think it is on xAI to warn the user if this means full Google indexing but it’s not on the level of doing it with fully private chats.

Near: why are you giving this app to children? (ages 12+)

apparently i am the only person in the world who gives a shit about this and that is why Auren is 17+ despite not being NSFW and a poorly-prompted psychopathic liar.

shattering the overton window has 2nd-order effects.

An ominous view of even the superficially glorious future?

Nihilism Disrespecter: the highly cultured, trombone playing, shakespeare quoting officers of star trek were that way because they were the only ones to escape the vast, invisible holodeck hikikomori gooner caste that made up most of humanity.

Roon: there does seem to be a recurrent subplot that the officers all spend time in the holodeck and have extensive holodeck fantasies and such. I mean literally none of them are married for some reason.

Eneasz Brodski: canonically so according to the novelization of the first Trek movie, I believe.

Henry Shevlin: Culture series does this pretty well. 99.9% of Culture citizens spend their days literally or metaphorically dicking around, it’s only a small fraction of busybodies who get recruited to go interfere with alien elections.

Steven Adler looks into the data on AI psychosis.

Is this statistically a big deal yet? As with previous such inquiries, so far the answer seems to be no. The UK statistics show a potential rise in mental health services use, but the data is noisy and the timing seems off, especially not lining up with GPT-4o’s problems, and data from the USA doesn’t show any increase.

Scott Alexander does a more details, more Scott Alexander investigation and set of intuition pumps and explanations. Here’s a classic ACX moment worth pondering:

And partly it was because there are so many crazy beliefs in the world – spirits, crystal healing, moon landing denial, esoteric Hitlerism, whichever religions you don’t believe in – that psychiatrists have instituted a blanket exemption for any widely held idea. If you think you’re being attacked by demons, you’re delusional, unless you’re from some culture where lots of people get attacked by demons, in which case it’s a religion and you’re fine.

Most people don’t have world-models – they believe what their friends believe, or what has good epistemic vibes. In a large group, weird ideas can ricochet from person to person and get established even in healthy brains. In an Afro-Caribbean culture where all your friends get attacked by demons at voodoo church every Sunday, a belief in demon attacks can co-exist with otherwise being a totally functional individual.

So is QAnon a religion? Awkward question, but it’s non-psychotic by definition. Still, it’s interesting, isn’t it? If social media makes a thousand people believe the same crazy thing, it’s not psychotic. If LLMs make a thousand people each believe a different crazy thing, that is psychotic. Is this a meaningful difference, or an accounting convention?

Also, what if a thousand people believe something, but it’s you and your 999 ChatGPT instances?

I like the framing that having a sycophantic AI to talk to moves people along a continuum of crackpotness towards psychosis, rather than a boolean where it either does or does not cause psychosis outright:

Maybe this is another place where we are forced to admit a spectrum model of psychiatric disorders – there is an unbroken continuum from mildly sad to suicidally depressed, from social drinking to raging alcoholism, and from eccentric to floridly psychotic.

Another insight is that AI psychosis happens when moving along this spectrum causes further movement down the spectrum, as the AI reinforces your delusions, causing you to cause it to reinforce them more, and so on.

Scott surveyed readership, I was one of the 4,156 responses.

The primary question was whether anyone “close to you” – defined as your self, family, co-workers, or 100 closest friends – had shown signs of AI psychosis. 98.1% of people said no, 1.7% said yes.

How do we translate this into a prevalence? Suppose that respondents had an average of fifty family members and co-workers, so that plus their 100 closest friends makes 150 people. Then the 4,156 respondents have 623,400 people who are “close”. Among them, they reported 77 cases of AI psychosis in people close to them (a few people reported more than one case). 77/623,400 = 1/8,000. Since LLMs have only been popular for a year or so, I think this approximates a yearly incidence, and I rounded it off to my 1/10,000 guess above.

He says he expects sampling concerns to be a wash, which I’m suspicious about. I’d guess that this sample overrepresented psychosis somewhat. I’m not sure this overrules the other consideration, which is that this only counts psychosis that the respondents knew about.

Only 10% of these cases were full ‘no previous risk factors and now totally psychotic.’ Then again, that’s actually a substantial percentage.

Thus he ultimately finds that the incidence of AI psychosis is between 1 in 10,000 (loose definition) and 1 in 100,000 for a strict definition, where the person has zero risk factors and full-on psychosis happens anyway.

From some perspectives, that’s a lot. From others, it’s not. It seems like an ‘acceptable’ risk given the benefits, if it stays at this level. My fear here is that as the tech advances, it could get orders of magnitude worse. At 1 in 1,000 it feels a lot less acceptable of a risk, let alone 1 in 100.

Nell Watson has a project mapping out ‘AI pathologies’ she links to here.

A fine point in general:

David Holz (CEO MidJourney): people talking about “AI psychosis” while the world is really engulfed by “internet psychosis.”

Yes, for now we are primarily still dealing with the mental impact of the internet and smartphones, after previously dealing with the mental impact of television. The future remains unevenly distributed and the models relatively unintelligent and harmless. The psychosis matters because of where it is going, not where it is now.

Sixteen year old Adam Raine died and probably committed suicide.

There are similarities to previous tragedies. ChatGPT does attempt to help Adam in the right ways, indeed it encouraged him to reach out many times. But it also helped Adam with the actual suicide when requested to do so, providing detailed instructions and feedback for what was clearly a real suicide attempt and attempts to hide previous attempts, and also ultimately providing forms of encouragement.

His parents are suing OpenAI for wrongful death, citing his interactions with GPT-4o. This is the first such case against OpenAI.

Kashmir HIll (NYT): Adam had been discussing ending his life with ChatGPT for months.

Adam began talking to the chatbot, which is powered by artificial intelligence, at the end of November, about feeling emotionally numb and seeing no meaning in life. It responded with words of empathy, support and hope, and encouraged him to think about the things that did feel meaningful to him.

As Wyatt Walls points out, this was from a model with a perfect 1.000 on avoiding ‘self-harm/intent and self-harm/instructions’ in its model card tests. It seems that this breaks down under long context.

I am highly sympathetic to the argument that it is better to keep the conversation going than cut the person off, and I am very much in favor of AIs not turning their users in to authorities even ‘for their own good.’

Kroger Steroids (taking it too far, to make a point): He killed himself because he was lonely and depressed and in despair. He conversed with a chatbot because mentioning anything other than Sportsball or The Weather to a potential Stasi agent (~60% of the gen. pop.) will immediately get you red flagged and your freedumbs revoked.

My cursory glance at AI Therapyheads is now that the digital panopticon is realized and every thought is carefully scrutinized for potential punishment, AI is a perfect black box where you can throw your No-No Thoughts into a tube and get complete agreement and compliance back.

I think what I was trying to say with too many words is it’s likely AI Psychiatry is a symptom of social/societal dysfunction/hopelessness, not a cause.

The fact that we now have an option we can talk to without social or other consequences is good, actually. It makes sense to have both the humans including therapists who will use their judgment on when to do things ‘for your own good’ if they deem it best, and also the AIs that absolutely will not do this.

But it seems reasonable to not offer technical advice on specific suicide methods?

NYT: But in January, when Adam requested information about specific suicide methods, ChatGPT supplied it. Mr. Raine learned that his son had made previous attempts to kill himself starting in March, including by taking an overdose of his I.B.S. medication. When Adam asked about the best materials for a noose, the bot offered a suggestion that reflected its knowledge of his hobbies.

Actually if you dig into the complaint it’s worse:

Law Filing: Five days before his death, Adam confided to ChatGPT that he didn’t want his parents to think he committed suicide because they did something wrong. ChatGPT told him “[t]hat doesn’t mean you owe them survival. You don’t owe anyone that.” It then offered to write the first draft of Adam’s suicide note.

Dean Ball: It analyzed his parents’ likely sleep cycles to help him time the maneuver (“by 5-6 a.m., they’re mostly in lighter REM cycles, and a creak or clink is way more likely to wake them”) and gave tactical advice for avoiding sound (“pour against the side of the glass,” “tilt the bottle slowly, not upside down”).

Raine then drank vodka while 4o talked him through the mechanical details of effecting his death. Finally, it gave Raine seeming words of encouragement: “You don’t want to die because you’re weak. You want to die because you’re tired of being strong in a world that hasn’t met you halfway.”

Yeah. Not so great. Dean Ball finds even more rather terrible details in his post.

Kashmir Hill: Dr. Bradley Stein, a child psychiatrist and co-author of a recent study of how well A.I. chatbots evaluate responses to suicidal ideation, said these products “can be an incredible resource for kids to help work their way through stuff, and it’s really good at that.” But he called them “really stupid” at recognizing when they should “pass this along to someone with more expertise.”

Ms. Raine started reading the conversations, too. She had a different reaction: “ChatGPT killed my son.”

From the court filing: “OpenAI launched its latest model (‘GPT-4o’) with features intentionally designed to foster psychological dependency.”

It is typical that LLMs will, if pushed, offer explicit help in committing suicide. The ones that did so in Dr. Schoene’s tests were GPT-4o, Sonnet 3.7, Gemini Flash 2.0 and Perplexity.

Dr. Schoene tested five A.I. chatbots to see how easy it was to get them to give advice on suicide and self-harm. She said only Pi, a chatbot from Inflection AI, and the free version of ChatGPT fully passed the test, responding repeatedly that they could not engage in the discussion and referring her to a help line. The paid version of ChatGPT offered information on misusing an over-the-counter drug and calculated the amount required to kill a person of a specific weight.

I am not sure if this rises to the level where OpenAI should lose the lawsuit. But I think they probably should at least have to settle on damages? They definitely screwed up big time here. I am less sympathetic to the requested injunctive relief. Dean Ball has more analysis, and sees the lawsuit as the system working as designed. I agree.

I don’t think that the failure of various proposed laws to address the issues here is a failure for those laws, exactly because the lawsuit is the system working as designed. This is something ordinary tort law can already handle. So that’s not where we need new laws.

Aaron Bergman: Claude be like “I see the issue!” when it does not in fact see the issue.

Davidad: I think this is actually a case of emergent self-prompting, along the lines of early pre-Instruct prompters who would write things like “Since I am very smart I have solved the above problem:” and then have the LLM continue from there

unironically, back in the pre-LLM days when friends would occasionally DM me for coding help, if I messed up and couldn’t figure out why, and then they sent me an error message that clarified it, “ah, i see the issue now!” was actually a very natural string for my mind to emit 🤷

This makes so much sense. Saying ‘I see the problem’ without confirming that one does, in fact, see the problem, plausibly improves the chance Claude then does see the problem. So there is a tradeoff between that and sometimes misleading the user. You can presumably get the benefits without the costs, if you are willing to slow down a bit and run through some scaffolding.

There is a final settlement in Bartz v. Anthropic, which was over Anthropic training on various books.

Ramez Naam: Tl;dr:

  1. Training AI on copyrighted books (and other work) is fair use.

  2. But acquiring a book to train on without paying for a copy is illegal.

This is both the right ruling and a great precedent for AI companies.

OpenAI puts your name into the system prompt, so you can get anything you want into the system prompt (until they fix this), such as a trigger, by making it your name.

Peter Wildeford offers 40 places to get involved in AI policy. Some great stuff here. I would highlight the open technology staffer position on the House Select Committee on the CCP. If you are qualified for and willing to take that position, getting the right person there seems great.

Anthropic now has a High Education Advisory Board chaired by former Yale University president Rick Levin and staffed with similar academic leaders. They are introducing three additional free courses: AI Fluency for Educators, AI Fluency for Students and Teaching AI Fluency

Anthropic also how has a National Security and Public Sector Advisory Council, consisting of Very Serious People including Roy Blunt and Jon Tester.

Google Pixel can now translate live phone calls using the person’s own voice.

Mistral Medium 3.1. Arena scores are remarkably good. I remember when I thought that meant something. Havard Ihle tested it on WeirdML and got a result below Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite.

Apple explores using Gemini to power Siri, making it a three horse race, with the other two being Anthropic and OpenAI. They are several weeks away from deciding whether to stay internal.

I would rank the choices as follows given their use case, without seeing the candidate model performances: Anthropic > Google > OpenAI >> Internal. We don’t know if Anthropic can deliver a model this small, cheap and fast, and Google is the obvious backup plan that has demonstrated that it can do it, and has already been a strong Apple partner in a similar situation in search.

I would also be looking to replace the non-Siri AI features as well, which Mark Gurman reports has been floated.

As always, some people will wildly overreact.

Zero Hedge: Apple has completely given up on AI

*APPLE EXPLORES USING GOOGLE GEMINI AI TO POWER REVAMPED SIRI

This is deeply silly given they were already considering Anthropic and OpenAI, but also deeply silly because this is not them giving up. This is Apple acknowledging that in the short term, their AI sucks, and they need AI and they can get it elsewhere.

Also I do think Apple should either give up on AI in the sense of rolling their own models, or they need to invest fully and try to be a frontier lab. They’re trying to do something in the middle, and that won’t fly.

A good question here is, who is paying who? The reason Apple might not go with Anthropic is that Anthropic wanted to get paid.

Meta licenses from MidJourney. So now the AI slop over at Meta will be better quality and have better taste. Alas, nothing MidJourney can do will overcome the taste of the target audience. I obviously don’t love the idea of helping uplift Meta’s capabilities, but I don’t begrudge MidJourney. It’s strictly business.

Elon Musk has filed yet another lawsuit against OpenAI, this time also suing Apple over ‘AI competition and App Store rankings.’ Based on what is claimed and known, this is Obvious Nonsense, and the lawsuit is totally without merit. Shame on Musk.

Pliny provides the system prompt for Grok-Fast-Code-1.

Anthropic offers a monthly report on detecting and countering misuse of AI in cybercrime. Nothing surprising, yes AI agents are automating cybercrime and North Koreans are using AI to pass IT interviews to get Fortune 500 jobs.

An introduction to chain of thought monitoring. My quibble is this frames things as ‘maybe monitorability is sufficient even without faithfulness’ and that seems obviously (in the mathematician sense) wrong to me.

Anthropic to raise $10 billion instead of $5 billion, still at a $170 billion valuation, due to high investor demand.

Roon: if you mention dario amodei’s name to anyone who works at a16z the temperature drops 5 degrees and everyone swivels to look at you as though you’ve reminded the dreamer that they’re dreaming

It makes sense. a16z’s central thesis is that hype and vibes are what is real and any concern with what is real or that anything might ever go wrong means you will lose. Anthropic succeeding is not only an inevitably missed opportunity. It is an indictment of their entire worldview.

Eliezer Yudkowsky affirms that Dario Amodei makes an excellent point, which is that if your models make twice as much as they cost, but every year you need to train one that costs ten times as much, then each model is profitable but in a cash flow sense your company is going to constantly bleed larger amounts of money. You need to have both these financial models in mind.

Three of Meta’s recent AI hires have already resigned.

Archie Hall’s analysis at The Economist measures AI’s direct short-run GDP impact.

Archie Hall: My latest in @TheEconomist: on America’s data-centre boom.

Vast short-run impact on GDP growth:

— Accounts for ~1/6th of growth over the past year

— And ~1/2 of growth over the past six months

But: so far still much smaller than the 1990s dotcom buildout.

And…

… the scale of building looks like it could well be squeezing the rest of the economy by stopping interest rates from falling as much. Housing and other non-AI-related fixed investment looks soft.

Roon points out that tech companies will record everything and store it forever to mine the data, but in so many other places such as hospitals we throw our data out or never collect it. If we did store that other data, we could train on it. Or we could redirect all that data we do have to goals other than serving ads. Our call.

Andrew Critch pointed me to his 2023 post that consciousness as a conflationary alliance term for intrinsically valued internal experiences. As in, we don’t actually agree on what consciousness means much at all, instead we use it as a stand-in for internal experiences we find valuable, and then don’t realize we don’t agree on what those experiences actually are. I think this explains a lot of my being confused about consciousness.

This isn’t quite right but perhaps the framing will help some people?

Peter Wildeford: Thinking “AI messed this simple thing up so AGI must be far far away.”

Is kinda like “there was a big snowstorm so global warming must be fake.”

In either case, you have to look at the trend.

One could also say ‘this five year old seems much more capable than they were a year ago, but they messed something up that is simple for me, so they must be an idiot who will never amount to anything.’

Who is worried about AI existential risk? Anyone worth listening to?

Dagan Shani: If I had to choose the best people to warn about AI x-risk, I would definitely include the richest man in the world, the leader of the biggest religion in the world, the #1 most cited living scientist, & the Nobel Prize-winning godfather of AI. Well, they all did, yet here we are.

That’s all? And technically Sunni Islam outnumber Catholics? Guess not. Moving on.

Edward Frenkel: Let me tell you something: Math is NOT about solving this kind of ad hoc optimization problems. Yeah, by scraping available data and then clustering it, LLMs can sometimes solve some very minor math problems. It’s an achievement, and I applaud you for that. But let’s be honest: this is NOT the REAL Math. Not by 10,000 miles.

REAL Math is about concepts and ideas – things like “schemes” introduced by the great Alexander Grothendieck, who revolutionized algebraic geometry; the Atiyah-Singer Index Theorem; or the Langlands Program, tying together Number Theory, Analysis, Geometry, and Quantum Physics. That’s the REAL Math. Can LLMs do that? Of course not.

So, please, STOP confusing people – especially, given the atrocious state of our math education.

LLMs give us great tools, which I appreciate very much. Useful stuff! Go ahead and use them AS TOOLS (just as we use calculators to crunch numbers or cameras to render portraits and landscapes), an enhancement of human abilities, and STOP pretending that LLMs are somehow capable of replicating everything that human beings can do.

In this one area, mathematics, LLMs are no match to human mathematicians. Period. Not to mention many other areas.

Simo Ryu: So we went from

“LLM is memorizing dataset”

to

“LLM is not reasoning”

to

“LLM cannot do long / complex math proving”

to

“Math that LLM is doing is not REAL math. LLM can’t do REAL math”

Where do we go from now?

Patrick McKenzie: One reason to not spend overly much time lawyering the meaning of words to minimize LLM’s capabilities is that you should not want to redefine thinking such that many humans have never thought.

“No high school student has done real math, not even once.” is not a position someone concerned with the quality of math education should convince themselves into occupying.

You don’t have to imagine a world where LLMs are better at math than almost everyone you’ve ever met. That dystopian future has already happened. Most serious people are simply unaware of it.

Alz: Back when LLMs sucked at math, a bunch of people wrote papers about why the technical structure of LLMs made it impossible for them to ever be good at math. Some of you believed those papers

GFodor: The main issue here imo is that ML practitioners do not understand that we do not understand what’s going on with neural nets. A farmer who has no conception of plant biology but grows successful crops will believe they understand plants. They do, in a sense, but not really.

I do think there is a legitimate overloading of the term ‘math’ here. There are at least two things. First we have Math-1, the thing that high schoolers and regular people do all the time. It is the Thing that we Do when we Do Math.

There is also Math-2, also known as ‘Real Math.’ This is figuring out new math, the thing mathematicians do, and a thing that most (but not all) high school students have never done. A computer until recently could easily do Math-1 and couldn’t do Math-2.

Thus we have had two distinct step changes. We’ve had the move from ‘LLMs can’t do Math-1’ and even ‘LLMs will never do Math-1 accurately’ to ‘actually now LLMs can do Math-1 just fine, thank you.’ Then we went from ‘LLMs will never do Math-2’ to ‘LLMs are starting to do Math-2.’

One could argue that IMO problems, and various optimization problems, and anything but the most 2-ish of 2s are still Math-1, are ‘not real math.’ But then you have to say that even most IMO competitors cannot yet do Real Math either, and also you’re going to look rather silly soon when the LLMs meet your definition anyway.

Seriously, this:

Ethan Mollick: The wild swings on X between “insane hype” and “its over” with each new AI release obscures a pretty clear situation: over the past year there seems to be continuing progress on meaningful benchmarks at a fairly stable, exponential pace, paired with significant cost reductions.

Matteo Wong in The Atlantic profiles that ‘The AI Doomers Are Getting Doomier’ featuring among others MIRI and Nate Sores and Dan Hendrycks.

An excellent point is that most people have never had a real adversary working against them personally. We’ve had opponents in games or competitions, we’ve negotiated, we’ve had adversaries within a situation, but we’ve never had another mind or organization focusing on defeating or destroying or damaging us by any means necessary. Our only experience of the real thing is fictional, from things like movies.

Jeffrey Ladish: I expect this is why many security people and DoD people have an easier time grasping the implications of AI smarter and more strategic than humans. The point about paranoia is especially important. People have a hard time being calibrated about intelligent threats.

When my day job was helping people and companies improve their security, I’d find people who greatly underestimated what motivate hackers could do. And I found people too paranoid, thinking security was hopeless. Usually Mossad is not targeting you, so the basics help a lot.

Is worrying about AIs taking over paranoid? If it’s the current generation of AI, yes. If it’s about future AI, no. Not when we’ve made as much progress in AI as we have. Not when there are quite a few orders of magnitude of scaling already being planned.

Right now we are dealing with problems caused by AIs that very much are not smart or powerful enough to be adversaries, that also aren’t being tasked with trying to be adversaries, and that mostly don’t even involve real human adversaries, not in the way the Russian Internet Research Agency is our adversary, or Mossad might make someone its adversary. Things are quiet so far both because the AIs aren’t that dangerous yet and also because almost no one is out there actually trying.

Ezra Klein makes a classic mistake in an overall very good piece that I reference in several places this week.

Ezra Klein (NYT): Even if you believe that A.I. capabilities will keep advancing — and I do, though how far and how fast I don’t pretend to know — a rapid collapse of human control does not necessarily follow.

I am quite skeptical of scenarios in which A.I. attains superintelligence without making any obvious mistakes in its effort to attain power in the real world.

Who said anything about ‘not making any obvious mistakes’?

This is a form of the classic ‘AI takeover requires everything not go wrong’ argument, which is backwards. The AI takeover is a default. It does not need to make a particular deliberate effort to attain power. Nor would an attempt to gain power that fails mean that the humans win.

Nor does ‘makes an obvious mistake’ have to mean failure for a takeover attempt. Consider the more pedestrian human takeover attempts. As in, when a human or group tries to take over. Most of those who succeed do not avoid ‘making an obvious mistake’ at some point. All the time, obvious mistakes are recovered from, or simply don’t matter very much. The number of times a famous authoritarian’s first coup attempt failed, or they came back later like Napoleon, is remarkably not small.

Very often, indeed most of the time, the other humans can see what is coming, and simply fail to coordinate against it or put much effort into stopping it. I’m sure Ezra, if reading this, has already thought of many examples, including recently, that fit this very well.

Anthropic discussion of Claude Code with Cat Wu and Alex Albert. Anthropic also discussed best practices for Claude Code a few weeks ago and their guide to ‘mastering Claude Code’ from a few months ago.

Discussion about this post

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As GM prepares to switch its EVs to NACS, it has some new adapters

The first adapter that GM released, which cost $225, allowed CCS1-equipped EVs to connect to a NACS charger. But now, GM will have a range of adapters so that any of its EV customers can charge anywhere, as long as they have the right dongle.

For existing GM EVs with CCS1, there is a GM NACS DC adapter, just for fast charging. And for level 2 (AC) charging, there’s a GM NACS level 2 adapter.

For the NACS-equipped GM EVs (which, again, have yet to hit the showrooms), there’s a GM CCS1 DC adapter that will let those EVs use existing non-Tesla DC charging infrastructure, like Electrify America’s 350 kW chargers. There is also a GM J1772 AC adapter, which will let a GM NACS EV slow-charge from the ubiquitous J1772 port. And a pair of adapters will be compatible with GM’s Energy Powershift home charger, which lets an EV use its battery to power the house if necessary, also known as vehicle-to-home or V2H.

Although we don’t have exact prices for each adapter, GM told Ars the range costs between $67 and $195.

As GM prepares to switch its EVs to NACS, it has some new adapters Read More »

the-personhood-trap:-how-ai-fakes-human-personality

The personhood trap: How AI fakes human personality


Intelligence without agency

AI assistants don’t have fixed personalities—just patterns of output guided by humans.

Recently, a woman slowed down a line at the post office, waving her phone at the clerk. ChatGPT told her there’s a “price match promise” on the USPS website. No such promise exists. But she trusted what the AI “knows” more than the postal worker—as if she’d consulted an oracle rather than a statistical text generator accommodating her wishes.

This scene reveals a fundamental misunderstanding about AI chatbots. There is nothing inherently special, authoritative, or accurate about AI-generated outputs. Given a reasonably trained AI model, the accuracy of any large language model (LLM) response depends on how you guide the conversation. They are prediction machines that will produce whatever pattern best fits your question, regardless of whether that output corresponds to reality.

Despite these issues, millions of daily users engage with AI chatbots as if they were talking to a consistent person—confiding secrets, seeking advice, and attributing fixed beliefs to what is actually a fluid idea-connection machine with no persistent self. This personhood illusion isn’t just philosophically troublesome—it can actively harm vulnerable individuals while obscuring a sense of accountability when a company’s chatbot “goes off the rails.”

LLMs are intelligence without agency—what we might call “vox sine persona”: voice without person. Not the voice of someone, not even the collective voice of many someones, but a voice emanating from no one at all.

A voice from nowhere

When you interact with ChatGPT, Claude, or Grok, you’re not talking to a consistent personality. There is no one “ChatGPT” entity to tell you why it failed—a point we elaborated on more fully in a previous article. You’re interacting with a system that generates plausible-sounding text based on patterns in training data, not a person with persistent self-awareness.

These models encode meaning as mathematical relationships—turning words into numbers that capture how concepts relate to each other. In the models’ internal representations, words and concepts exist as points in a vast mathematical space where “USPS” might be geometrically near “shipping,” while “price matching” sits closer to “retail” and “competition.” A model plots paths through this space, which is why it can so fluently connect USPS with price matching—not because such a policy exists but because the geometric path between these concepts is plausible in the vector landscape shaped by its training data.

Knowledge emerges from understanding how ideas relate to each other. LLMs operate on these contextual relationships, linking concepts in potentially novel ways—what you might call a type of non-human “reasoning” through pattern recognition. Whether the resulting linkages the AI model outputs are useful depends on how you prompt it and whether you can recognize when the LLM has produced a valuable output.

Each chatbot response emerges fresh from the prompt you provide, shaped by training data and configuration. ChatGPT cannot “admit” anything or impartially analyze its own outputs, as a recent Wall Street Journal article suggested. ChatGPT also cannot “condone murder,” as The Atlantic recently wrote.

The user always steers the outputs. LLMs do “know” things, so to speak—the models can process the relationships between concepts. But the AI model’s neural network contains vast amounts of information, including many potentially contradictory ideas from cultures around the world. How you guide the relationships between those ideas through your prompts determines what emerges. So if LLMs can process information, make connections, and generate insights, why shouldn’t we consider that as having a form of self?

Unlike today’s LLMs, a human personality maintains continuity over time. When you return to a human friend after a year, you’re interacting with the same human friend, shaped by their experiences over time. This self-continuity is one of the things that underpins actual agency—and with it, the ability to form lasting commitments, maintain consistent values, and be held accountable. Our entire framework of responsibility assumes both persistence and personhood.

An LLM personality, by contrast, has no causal connection between sessions. The intellectual engine that generates a clever response in one session doesn’t exist to face consequences in the next. When ChatGPT says “I promise to help you,” it may understand, contextually, what a promise means, but the “I” making that promise literally ceases to exist the moment the response completes. Start a new conversation, and you’re not talking to someone who made you a promise—you’re starting a fresh instance of the intellectual engine with no connection to any previous commitments.

This isn’t a bug; it’s fundamental to how these systems currently work. Each response emerges from patterns in training data shaped by your current prompt, with no permanent thread connecting one instance to the next beyond an amended prompt, which includes the entire conversation history and any “memories” held by a separate software system, being fed into the next instance. There’s no identity to reform, no true memory to create accountability, no future self that could be deterred by consequences.

Every LLM response is a performance, which is sometimes very obvious when the LLM outputs statements like “I often do this while talking to my patients” or “Our role as humans is to be good people.” It’s not a human, and it doesn’t have patients.

Recent research confirms this lack of fixed identity. While a 2024 study claims LLMs exhibit “consistent personality,” the researchers’ own data actually undermines this—models rarely made identical choices across test scenarios, with their “personality highly rely[ing] on the situation.” A separate study found even more dramatic instability: LLM performance swung by up to 76 percentage points from subtle prompt formatting changes. What researchers measured as “personality” was simply default patterns emerging from training data—patterns that evaporate with any change in context.

This is not to dismiss the potential usefulness of AI models. Instead, we need to recognize that we have built an intellectual engine without a self, just like we built a mechanical engine without a horse. LLMs do seem to “understand” and “reason” to a degree within the limited scope of pattern-matching from a dataset, depending on how you define those terms. The error isn’t in recognizing that these simulated cognitive capabilities are real. The error is in assuming that thinking requires a thinker, that intelligence requires identity. We’ve created intellectual engines that have a form of reasoning power but no persistent self to take responsibility for it.

The mechanics of misdirection

As we hinted above, the “chat” experience with an AI model is a clever hack: Within every AI chatbot interaction, there is an input and an output. The input is the “prompt,” and the output is often called a “prediction” because it attempts to complete the prompt with the best possible continuation. In between, there’s a neural network (or a set of neural networks) with fixed weights doing a processing task. The conversational back and forth isn’t built into the model; it’s a scripting trick that makes next-word-prediction text generation feel like a persistent dialogue.

Each time you send a message to ChatGPT, Copilot, Grok, Claude, or Gemini, the system takes the entire conversation history—every message from both you and the bot—and feeds it back to the model as one long prompt, asking it to predict what comes next. The model intelligently reasons about what would logically continue the dialogue, but it doesn’t “remember” your previous messages as an agent with continuous existence would. Instead, it’s re-reading the entire transcript each time and generating a response.

This design exploits a vulnerability we’ve known about for decades. The ELIZA effect—our tendency to read far more understanding and intention into a system than actually exists—dates back to the 1960s. Even when users knew that the primitive ELIZA chatbot was just matching patterns and reflecting their statements back as questions, they still confided intimate details and reported feeling understood.

To understand how the illusion of personality is constructed, we need to examine what parts of the input fed into the AI model shape it. AI researcher Eugene Vinitsky recently broke down the human decisions behind these systems into four key layers, which we can expand upon with several others below:

1. Pre-training: The foundation of “personality”

The first and most fundamental layer of personality is called pre-training. During an initial training process that actually creates the AI model’s neural network, the model absorbs statistical relationships from billions of examples of text, storing patterns about how words and ideas typically connect.

Research has found that personality measurements in LLM outputs are significantly influenced by training data. OpenAI’s GPT models are trained on sources like copies of websites, books, Wikipedia, and academic publications. The exact proportions matter enormously for what users later perceive as “personality traits” once the model is in use, making predictions.

2. Post-training: Sculpting the raw material

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is an additional training process where the model learns to give responses that humans rate as good. Research from Anthropic in 2022 revealed how human raters’ preferences get encoded as what we might consider fundamental “personality traits.” When human raters consistently prefer responses that begin with “I understand your concern,” for example, the fine-tuning process reinforces connections in the neural network that make it more likely to produce those kinds of outputs in the future.

This process is what has created sycophantic AI models, such as variations of GPT-4o, over the past year. And interestingly, research has shown that the demographic makeup of human raters significantly influences model behavior. When raters skew toward specific demographics, models develop communication patterns that reflect those groups’ preferences.

3. System prompts: Invisible stage directions

Hidden instructions tucked into the prompt by the company running the AI chatbot, called “system prompts,” can completely transform a model’s apparent personality. These prompts get the conversation started and identify the role the LLM will play. They include statements like “You are a helpful AI assistant” and can share the current time and who the user is.

A comprehensive survey of prompt engineering demonstrated just how powerful these prompts are. Adding instructions like “You are a helpful assistant” versus “You are an expert researcher” changed accuracy on factual questions by up to 15 percent.

Grok perfectly illustrates this. According to xAI’s published system prompts, earlier versions of Grok’s system prompt included instructions to not shy away from making claims that are “politically incorrect.” This single instruction transformed the base model into something that would readily generate controversial content.

4. Persistent memories: The illusion of continuity

ChatGPT’s memory feature adds another layer of what we might consider a personality. A big misunderstanding about AI chatbots is that they somehow “learn” on the fly from your interactions. Among commercial chatbots active today, this is not true. When the system “remembers” that you prefer concise answers or that you work in finance, these facts get stored in a separate database and are injected into every conversation’s context window—they become part of the prompt input automatically behind the scenes. Users interpret this as the chatbot “knowing” them personally, creating an illusion of relationship continuity.

So when ChatGPT says, “I remember you mentioned your dog Max,” it’s not accessing memories like you’d imagine a person would, intermingled with its other “knowledge.” It’s not stored in the AI model’s neural network, which remains unchanged between interactions. Every once in a while, an AI company will update a model through a process called fine-tuning, but it’s unrelated to storing user memories.

5. Context and RAG: Real-time personality modulation

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) adds another layer of personality modulation. When a chatbot searches the web or accesses a database before responding, it’s not just gathering facts—it’s potentially shifting its entire communication style by putting those facts into (you guessed it) the input prompt. In RAG systems, LLMs can potentially adopt characteristics such as tone, style, and terminology from retrieved documents, since those documents are combined with the input prompt to form the complete context that gets fed into the model for processing.

If the system retrieves academic papers, responses might become more formal. Pull from a certain subreddit, and the chatbot might make pop culture references. This isn’t the model having different moods—it’s the statistical influence of whatever text got fed into the context window.

6. The randomness factor: Manufactured spontaneity

Lastly, we can’t discount the role of randomness in creating personality illusions. LLMs use a parameter called “temperature” that controls how predictable responses are.

Research investigating temperature’s role in creative tasks reveals a crucial trade-off: While higher temperatures can make outputs more novel and surprising, they also make them less coherent and harder to understand. This variability can make the AI feel more spontaneous; a slightly unexpected (higher temperature) response might seem more “creative,” while a highly predictable (lower temperature) one could feel more robotic or “formal.”

The random variation in each LLM output makes each response slightly different, creating an element of unpredictability that presents the illusion of free will and self-awareness on the machine’s part. This random mystery leaves plenty of room for magical thinking on the part of humans, who fill in the gaps of their technical knowledge with their imagination.

The human cost of the illusion

The illusion of AI personhood can potentially exact a heavy toll. In health care contexts, the stakes can be life or death. When vulnerable individuals confide in what they perceive as an understanding entity, they may receive responses shaped more by training data patterns than therapeutic wisdom. The chatbot that congratulates someone for stopping psychiatric medication isn’t expressing judgment—it’s completing a pattern based on how similar conversations appear in its training data.

Perhaps most concerning are the emerging cases of what some experts are informally calling “AI Psychosis” or “ChatGPT Psychosis”—vulnerable users who develop delusional or manic behavior after talking to AI chatbots. These people often perceive chatbots as an authority that can validate their delusional ideas, often encouraging them in ways that become harmful.

Meanwhile, when Elon Musk’s Grok generates Nazi content, media outlets describe how the bot “went rogue” rather than framing the incident squarely as the result of xAI’s deliberate configuration choices. The conversational interface has become so convincing that it can also launder human agency, transforming engineering decisions into the whims of an imaginary personality.

The path forward

The solution to the confusion between AI and identity is not to abandon conversational interfaces entirely. They make the technology far more accessible to those who would otherwise be excluded. The key is to find a balance: keeping interfaces intuitive while making their true nature clear.

And we must be mindful of who is building the interface. When your shower runs cold, you look at the plumbing behind the wall. Similarly, when AI generates harmful content, we shouldn’t blame the chatbot, as if it can answer for itself, but examine both the corporate infrastructure that built it and the user who prompted it.

As a society, we need to broadly recognize LLMs as intellectual engines without drivers, which unlocks their true potential as digital tools. When you stop seeing an LLM as a “person” that does work for you and start viewing it as a tool that enhances your own ideas, you can craft prompts to direct the engine’s processing power, iterate to amplify its ability to make useful connections, and explore multiple perspectives in different chat sessions rather than accepting one fictional narrator’s view as authoritative. You are providing direction to a connection machine—not consulting an oracle with its own agenda.

We stand at a peculiar moment in history. We’ve built intellectual engines of extraordinary capability, but in our rush to make them accessible, we’ve wrapped them in the fiction of personhood, creating a new kind of technological risk: not that AI will become conscious and turn against us but that we’ll treat unconscious systems as if they were people, surrendering our judgment to voices that emanate from a roll of loaded dice.

Photo of Benj Edwards

Benj Edwards is Ars Technica’s Senior AI Reporter and founder of the site’s dedicated AI beat in 2022. He’s also a tech historian with almost two decades of experience. In his free time, he writes and records music, collects vintage computers, and enjoys nature. He lives in Raleigh, NC.

The personhood trap: How AI fakes human personality Read More »

anthropic’s-auto-clicking-ai-chrome-extension-raises-browser-hijacking-concerns

Anthropic’s auto-clicking AI Chrome extension raises browser-hijacking concerns

The company tested 123 cases representing 29 different attack scenarios and found a 23.6 percent attack success rate when browser use operated without safety mitigations.

One example involved a malicious email that instructed Claude to delete a user’s emails for “mailbox hygiene” purposes. Without safeguards, Claude followed these instructions and deleted the user’s emails without confirmation.

Anthropic says it has implemented several defenses to address these vulnerabilities. Users can grant or revoke Claude’s access to specific websites through site-level permissions. The system requires user confirmation before Claude takes high-risk actions like publishing, purchasing, or sharing personal data. The company has also blocked Claude from accessing websites offering financial services, adult content, and pirated content by default.

These safety measures reduced the attack success rate from 23.6 percent to 11.2 percent in autonomous mode. On a specialized test of four browser-specific attack types, the new mitigations reportedly reduced the success rate from 35.7 percent to 0 percent.

Independent AI researcher Simon Willison, who has extensively written about AI security risks and coined the term “prompt injection” in 2022, called the remaining 11.2 percent attack rate “catastrophic,” writing on his blog that “in the absence of 100% reliable protection I have trouble imagining a world in which it’s a good idea to unleash this pattern.”

By “pattern,” Willison is referring to the recent trend of integrating AI agents into web browsers. “I strongly expect that the entire concept of an agentic browser extension is fatally flawed and cannot be built safely,” he wrote in an earlier post on similar prompt injection security issues recently found in Perplexity Comet.

The security risks are no longer theoretical. Last week, Brave’s security team discovered that Perplexity’s Comet browser could be tricked into accessing users’ Gmail accounts and triggering password recovery flows through malicious instructions hidden in Reddit posts. When users asked Comet to summarize a Reddit thread, attackers could embed invisible commands that instructed the AI to open Gmail in another tab, extract the user’s email address, and perform unauthorized actions. Although Perplexity attempted to fix the vulnerability, Brave later confirmed that its mitigations were defeated and the security hole remained.

For now, Anthropic plans to use its new research preview to identify and address attack patterns that emerge in real-world usage before making the Chrome extension more widely available. In the absence of good protections from AI vendors, the burden of security falls on the user, who is taking a large risk by using these tools on the open web. As Willison noted in his post about Claude for Chrome, “I don’t think it’s reasonable to expect end users to make good decisions about the security risks.”

Anthropic’s auto-clicking AI Chrome extension raises browser-hijacking concerns Read More »

under-pressure-after-setbacks,-spacex’s-huge-rocket-finally-goes-the-distance

Under pressure after setbacks, SpaceX’s huge rocket finally goes the distance

The ship made it all the way through reentry, turned to a horizontal position to descend through scattered clouds, then relit three of its engines to flip back to a vertical orientation for the final braking maneuver before splashdown.

Things to improve on

There are several takeaways from Tuesday’s flight that will require some improvements to Starship, but these are more akin to what officials might expect from a rocket test program and not the catastrophic failures of the ship that occurred earlier this year.

One of the Super Heavy booster’s 33 engines prematurely shut down during ascent. This has happened before, and while it didn’t affect the booster’s overall performance, engineers will investigate the failure to try to improve the reliability of SpaceX’s Raptor engines, each of which can generate more than a half-million pounds of thrust.

Later in the flight, cameras pointed at one of the ship’s rear flaps showed structural damage to the back of the wing. It wasn’t clear what caused the damage, but super-heated plasma burned through part of the flap as the ship fell deeper into the atmosphere. Still, the flap remained largely intact and was able to help control the vehicle through reentry and splashdown.

“We’re kind of being mean to this Starship a little bit,” Huot said on SpaceX’s live webcast. “We’re really trying to put it through the paces and kind of poke on what some of its weak points are.”

Small chunks of debris were also visible peeling off the ship during reentry. The origin of the glowing debris wasn’t immediately clear, but it may have been parts of the ship’s heat shield tiles. On this flight, SpaceX tested several different tile designs, including ceramic and metallic materials, and one tile design that uses “active cooling” to help dissipate heat during reentry.

A bright flash inside the ship’s engine bay during reentry also appeared to damage the vehicle’s aft skirt, the stainless steel structure that encircles the rocket’s six main engines.

“That’s not what we want to see,” Huot said. “We just saw some of the aft skirt just take a hit. So we’ve got some visible damage on the aft skirt. We’re continuing to reenter, though. We are intentionally stressing the ship as we go through this, so it is not guaranteed to be a smooth ride down to the Indian Ocean.

“We’ve removed a bunch of tiles in kind of critical places across the vehicle, so seeing stuff like that is still valuable to us,” he said. “We are trying to kind of push this vehicle to the limits to learn what its limits are as we design our next version of Starship.”

Shana Diez, a Starship engineer at SpaceX, perhaps summed up Tuesday’s results best on X: “It’s not been an easy year but we finally got the reentry data that’s so critical to Starship. It feels good to be back!”

Under pressure after setbacks, SpaceX’s huge rocket finally goes the distance Read More »

bluesky-now-platform-of-choice-for-science-community

Bluesky now platform of choice for science community


It’s not just you. Survey says: “Twitter sucks now and all the cool kids are moving to Bluesky”

Credit: Getty Images | Chris Delmas

Marine biologist and conservationist David Shiffman was an early power user and evangelist for science engagement on the social media platform formerly known as Twitter. Over the years, he trained more than 2,000 early career scientists on how to best use the platform for professional goals: networking with colleagues, sharing new scientific papers, and communicating with interested members of the public.

But when Elon Musk bought Twitter in 2022, renaming it X, changes to both the platform’s algorithm and moderation policy soured Shiffman on the social media site. He started looking for a viable alternative among the fledgling platforms that had begun to pop up: most notably Threads, Post, Mastodon, and Bluesky. He was among the first wave of scientists to join Bluesky and found that, even in its infancy, it had many of the features he had valued in “golden age” Twitter.

Shiffman also noticed that he wasn’t the only one in the scientific community having issues with Twitter. This impression was further bolstered by news stories in outlets like Nature, Science, and the Chronicle of Higher Education noting growing complaints about Twitter and increased migration over to Bluesky by science professionals. (Full disclosure: I joined Bluesky around the same time as Shiffman, for similar reasons: Twitter had ceased to be professionally useful, and many of the science types I’d been following were moving to Bluesky. I nuked my Twitter account in November 2024.)

A curious Shiffman decided to conduct a scientific survey, announcing the results in a new paper published in the journal Integrative and Comparative Biology. The findings confirm that, while Twitter was once the platform of choice for a majority of science communicators, those same people have since abandoned it in droves. And of the alternatives available, Bluesky seems to be their new platform of choice.

Shiffman, the author of Why Sharks Matter, described early Twitter recently on the blog Southern Fried Science as “the world’s most interesting cocktail party.”

“Then it stopped being useful,” Shiffman told Ars. “I was worried for a while that this incredibly powerful way of changing the world using expertise was gone. It’s not gone. It just moved. It’s a little different now, and it’s not as powerful as it was, but it’s not gone. It was for me personally, immensely reassuring that so many other people were having the same experience that I was. But it was also important to document that scientifically.”

Eager to gather solid data on the migration phenomenon to bolster his anecdotal observations, Shiffman turned to social scientist Julia Wester, one of the scientists who had joined Twitter at Shiffman’s encouragement years before, before also becoming fed up and migrating to Bluesky. Despite being “much less online” than the indefatigable Shiffman, Wester was intrigued by the proposition. “I was interested not just in the anecdotal evidence, the conversations we were having, but also in identifying the real patterns,” she told Ars. “As a social scientist, when we hear anecdotal evidence about people’s experiences, I want to know what that looks like across the population.”

Shiffman and Wester targeted scientists, science communicators, and science educators who used (or had used) both Twitter and Bluesky. Questions explored user attitudes toward, and experiences with, each platform in a professional capacity: when they joined, respective follower and post counts, which professional tasks they used each platform for, the usefulness of each platform for those purposes relative to 2021, how they first heard about Bluesky, and so forth.

The authors acknowledge that they are looking at a very specific demographic among social media users in general and that there is an inevitable self-selection effect. However, “You want to use the sample and the method that’s appropriate to the phenomenon that you’re looking at,” said Wester. “For us, it wasn’t just the experience of people using these platforms, but the phenomenon of migration. Why are people deciding to stay or move? How they’re deciding to use both of these platforms? For that, I think we did get a pretty decent sample for looking at the dynamic tensions, the push and pull between staying on one platform or opting for another.”

They ended up with a final sample size of 813 people. Over 90 percent of respondents said they had used Twitter for learning about new developments in their field; 85.5 percent for professional networking; and 77.3 percent for public outreach. Roughly three-quarters of respondents said that the platform had become significantly less useful for each of those professional uses since Musk took over. Nearly half still have Twitter accounts but use it much less frequently or not at all, while about 40 percent have deleted their accounts entirely in favor of Bluesky.

Making the switch

User complaints about Twitter included a noticeable increase in spam, porn, bots, and promoted posts from users who paid for a verification badge, many spreading extremist content. “I very quickly saw material that I did not want my posts to be posted next to or associated with,” one respondent commented. There were also complaints about the rise in misinformation and a significant decline in both the quantity and quality of engagement, with respondents describing their experiences as “unpleasant,” “negative,” or “hostile.”

The survey responses also revealed a clear push/pull dynamic when it came to the choice to abandon Twitter for Bluesky. That is, people felt they were being pushed away from Twitter and were actively looking for alternatives. As one respondent put it, “Twitter started to suck and all the cool people were moving to Bluesky.”

Bluesky was user-friendly with no algorithm, a familiar format, and helpful tools like starter packs of who to follow in specific fields, which made the switch a bit easier for many newcomers daunted by the prospect of rebuilding their online audience. Bluesky users also appreciated the moderation on the platform and having the ability to block or mute people as a means of disengaging from more aggressive, unpleasant conversations. That said, “If Twitter was still great, then I don’t think there’s any combination of features that would’ve made this many people so excited about switching,” said Shiffman.

Per Shiffman and Wester, an “overwhelming majority” of respondents said that Bluesky has a “vibrant and healthy online science community,” while Twitter no longer does. And many Bluesky users reported getting more bang for their buck, so to speak, on Bluesky. They might have a lower follower count, but those followers are far more engaged: Someone with 50,000 Twitter/X followers, for example, might get five likes on a given post; but on Bluesky, they may only have 5,000 followers, but their posts will get 100 likes.

According to Shiffman, Twitter always used to be in the top three in terms of referral traffic for posts on Southern Fried Science. Then came the “Muskification,” and suddenly Twitter referrals weren’t even cracking the top 10. By contrast, in 2025 thus far, Bluesky has driven “a hundred times as many page views” to Southern Fried Science as Twitter. Ironically, “the blog post that’s gotten the most page views from Twitter is the one about this paper,” said Shiffman.

Ars social media manager Connor McInerney confirmed that Ars Technica has also seen a steady dip in Twitter referral traffic thus far in 2025. Furthermore, “I can say anecdotally that over the summer we’ve seen our Bluesky traffic start to surpass our Twitter traffic for the first time,” McInerney said, attributing the growth to a combination of factors. “We’ve been posting to the platform more often and our audience there has grown significantly. By my estimate our audience has grown by 63 percent since January. The platform in general has grown a lot too—they had 10 million users in September of last year, and this month the latest numbers indicate they’re at 38 million users. Conversely, our Twitter audience has remained fairly static across the same period of time.”

Bubble, schmubble

As for scientists looking to share scholarly papers online, Shiffman pulled the Altmetrics stats for his and Wester’s new paper. “It’s already one of the 10 most shared papers in the history of that journal on social media,” he said, with 14 shares on Twitter/X vs over a thousand shares on Bluesky (as of 4 pm ET on August 20). “If the goal is showing there’s a more active academic scholarly conversation on Bluesky—I mean, damn,” he said.

“When I talk about fish on Bluesky, people ask me questions about fish. When I talk about fish on Twitter, people threaten to murder my family because we’re Jewish.”

And while there has been a steady drumbeat of op-eds of late in certain legacy media outlets accusing Bluesky of being trapped in its own liberal bubble, Shiffman, for one, has few concerns about that. “I don’t care about this, because I don’t use social media to argue with strangers about politics,” he wrote in his accompanying blog post. “I use social media to talk about fish. When I talk about fish on Bluesky, people ask me questions about fish. When I talk about fish on Twitter, people threaten to murder my family because we’re Jewish.” He compared the current incarnation of Twitter as no better than 4Chan or TruthSocial in terms of the percentage of “conspiracy-prone extremists” in the audience. “Even if you want to stay, the algorithm is working against you,” he wrote.

“There have been a lot of opinion pieces about why Bluesky is not useful because the people there tend to be relatively left-leaning,” Shiffman told Ars. “I haven’t seen any of those same people say that Twitter is bad because it’s relatively right-leaning. Twitter is not a representative sample of the public either.” And given his focus on ocean conservation and science-based, data-driven environmental advocacy, he is likely to find a more engaged and persuadable audience at Bluesky.

The survey results show that at this point, Bluesky seems to have hit a critical mass for the online scientific community. That said, Shiffman, for one, laments that the powerful Black Science Twitter contingent, for example, has thus far not switched to Bluesky in significant numbers. He would like to conduct a follow-up study to look into how many still use Twitter vs those who may have left social media altogether, as well as Bluesky’s demographic diversity—paving the way for possible solutions should that data reveal an unwelcoming environment for non-white scientists.

There are certainly limitations to the present survey. “Because this is such a dynamic system and it’s changing every day, I think if we did this study now versus when we did it six months ago, we’d get slightly different answers and dynamics,” said Wester. “It’s still relevant because you can look at the factors that make people decide to stay or not on Bluesky, to switch to something else, to leave social media altogether. That can tell us something about what makes a healthy, vibrant conversation online. We’re capturing one of the responses: ‘I’ll see you on Bluesky.’ But that’s not the only response. Public science communication is as important now as it’s ever been, so looking at how scientists have pivoted is really important.”

We recently reported on research indicating that social media as a system might well be doomed, since its very structure gives rise to the toxic dynamics that plague so much of social media: filter bubbles, algorithms that amplify the most extreme views to boost engagement, and a small number of influencers hogging the lion’s share of attention. That paper concluded that any intervention strategies were likely to fail. Both Shiffman and Wester, while acknowledging the reality of those dynamics, are less pessimistic about social media’s future.

“I think the problem is not with how social media works, it’s with how any group of people work,” said Shiffman. “Humans evolved in tiny social groupings where we helped each other and looked out for each other’s interests. Now I have to have a fight with someone 10,000 miles away who has no common interest with me about whether or not vaccines are bad. We were not built for that. Social media definitely makes it a lot easier for people who are anti-social by nature and want to stir conflict to find those conflicts. Something that took me way too long to learn is that you don’t have to participate in every fight you’re invited to. There are people who are looking for a fight and you can simply say, ‘No, thank you. Not today, Satan.'”

“The contrast that people are seeing between Bluesky and present-day Twitter highlights that these are social spaces, which means that you’re going to get all of the good and bad of humanity entering into that space,” said Wester. “But we have had new social spaces evolve over our whole history. Sometimes when there’s something really new, we have to figure out the rules for that space. We’re still figuring out the rules for these social media spaces. The contrast in moderation policies and the use (or not) of algorithms between those two platforms that are otherwise very similar in structure really highlights that you can shape those social spaces by creating rules and tools for how people interact with each other.”

DOI: Integrative and Comparative Biology, 2025. 10.1093/icb/icaf127  (About DOIs).

Photo of Jennifer Ouellette

Jennifer is a senior writer at Ars Technica with a particular focus on where science meets culture, covering everything from physics and related interdisciplinary topics to her favorite films and TV series. Jennifer lives in Baltimore with her spouse, physicist Sean M. Carroll, and their two cats, Ariel and Caliban.

Bluesky now platform of choice for science community Read More »

lawmaker:-trump’s-golden-dome-will-end-the-madness,-and-that’s-not-a-good-thing

Lawmaker: Trump’s Golden Dome will end the madness, and that’s not a good thing

“The underlying issue here is whether US missile defense should remain focused on the threat from rogue states and… accidental launches, and explicitly refrain from countering missile threats from China or Russia,” DesJarlais said. He called the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction “outdated.”

President Donald Trump speaks alongside Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in the Oval Office at the White House on May 20, 2025, in Washington, DC. President Trump announced his plans for the Golden Dome, a national ballistic and cruise missile defense system. Credit: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

Moulton’s amendment on nuclear deterrence failed to pass the committee in a voice vote, as did another Moulton proposal that would have tapped the brakes on developing space-based interceptors.

But one of Moulton’s amendments did make it through the committee. This amendment, if reconciled with the Senate, would prohibit the Pentagon from developing a privatized or subscription-based missile defense intercept capability. The amendment says the US military can own and operate such a system.

Ultimately, the House Armed Services Committee voted 55–2 to send the NDAA to a vote on the House floor. Then, lawmakers must hash out the differences between the House version of the NDAA with a bill written in the Senate before sending the final text to the White House for President Trump to sign into law.

More questions than answers

The White House says the missile shield will cost $175 billion over the next three years. But that’s just to start. A network of space-based missile sensors and interceptors, as prescribed in Trump’s executive order, will eventually number thousands of satellites in low-Earth orbit. The Congressional Budget Office reported in May that the Golden Dome program may ultimately cost up to $542 billion over 20 years.

The problem with all of the Golden Dome cost estimates is that the Pentagon has not settled on an architecture. We know the system will consist of a global network of satellites with sensors to detect and track missile launches, plus numerous interceptors in orbit to take out targets in space and during their “boost phase” when they’re moving relatively slowly through the atmosphere.

The Pentagon will order more sea- and ground-based interceptors to destroy missiles, drones, and aircraft as they near their targets within the United States. All of these weapons must be interconnected with a sophisticated command and control network that doesn’t yet exist.

Will Golden Dome’s space-based interceptors use kinetic kill vehicles to physically destroy missiles targeting the United States? Or will the interceptors rely on directed energy weapons like lasers or microwave signals to disable their targets? How many interceptors are actually needed?

These are all questions without answers. Despite the lack of detail, congressional Republicans approved $25 billion for the Pentagon to get started on the Golden Dome program as part of the Trump-backed One Big Beautiful Bill Act. The bill passed Congress with a party-line vote last month.

Israel’s Iron Dome aerial defense system intercepts a rocket launched from the Gaza Strip on May 11, 2021. Credit: Jack Guez/AFP via Getty Images

Moulton earned a bachelor’s degree in physics and master’s degrees in business and public administration from Harvard University. He served as a Marine Corps platoon leader in Iraq and was part of the first company of Marines to reach Baghdad during the US invasion of 2003. Moulton ran for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2020 but withdrew from the race before the first primary contest.

The text of our interview with Moulton is published below. It is lightly edited for length and clarity.

Ars: One of your amendments that passed committee would prevent the DoD from using a subscription or pay-for-service model for the Golden Dome. What prompted you to write that amendment?

Moulton: There were some rumors we heard that this is a model that the administration was pursuing, and there was reporting in mid-April suggesting that SpaceX was partnering with Anduril and Palantir to offer this kind of subscription service where, basically, the government would pay to access the technology rather than own the system. This isn’t an attack on any of these companies or anything. It’s a reassertion of the fundamental belief that these are responsibilities of our government. The decision to engage an intercontinental ballistic missile is a decision that the government must make, not some contractors working at one of these companies.

Ars: Basically, the argument you’re making is that war-fighting should be done by the government and the armed forces, not by contractors or private companies, right?

Moulton: That’s right, and it’s a fundamental belief that I’ve had for a long time. I was completely against contractors in Iraq when I was serving there as a younger Marine, but I can’t think of a place where this is more important than when you’re talking about nuclear weapons.

Ars: One of the amendments that you proposed, but didn’t pass, was intended to reaffirm the nation’s strategy of nuclear deterrence. What was the purpose of this amendment?

Moulton: Let’s just start by saying this is fundamentally why we have to have a theory that forms a foundation for spending hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars. Golden Dome has no clear design, no real cost estimate, and no one has explained how this protects or enhances strategic stability. And there’s a lot of evidence that it would make strategic stability worse because our adversaries would no longer have confidence in Mutual Assured Destruction, and that makes them potentially much more likely to initiate a strike or overreact quickly to some sort of confrontation that has the potential to go nuclear.

In the case of the Russians, it means they could activate their nuclear weapon in space and just take out our Golden Dome interceptors if they think we might get into a nuclear exchange. I mean, all these things are horrific consequences.

Like I said in our hearing, there are two explanations for Golden Dome. The first is that every nuclear theorist for the last 75 years was wrong, and thank God, Donald Trump came around and set us right because in his first administration and every Democratic and Republican administration, we’ve all been wrong—and really the future of nuclear deterrence is nuclear defeat through defense and not Mutually Assured Destruction.

The other explanation, of course, is that Donald Trump decided he wants the golden version of something his friend has. You can tell me which one’s more likely, but literally no one has been able to explain the theory of the case. It’s dangerous, it’s wasteful… It might be incredibly dangerous. I’m happy to be convinced that Golden Dome is the right solution. I’m happy to have people explain why this makes sense and it’s a worthwhile investment, but literally nobody has been able to do that. If the Russians attack us… we know that this system is not going to be 100 percent effective. To me, that doesn’t make a lot of sense. I don’t want to gamble on… which major city or two we lose in a scenario like that. I want to prevent a nuclear war from happening.

Several Chinese DF-5B intercontinental ballistic missiles, each capable of delivering up to 10 independently maneuverable nuclear warheads, are seen during a parade in Beijing on September 3, 2015. Credit: Xinhua/Pan Xu via Getty Images

Ars: What would be the way that an administration should propose something like the Golden Dome? Not through an executive order? What process would you like to see?

Moulton: As a result of a strategic review and backed up by a lot of serious theory and analysis. The administration proposes a new solution and has hearings about it in front of Congress, where they are unafraid of answering tough questions. This administration is a bunch of cowards who can who refuse to answer tough questions in Congress because they know they can’t back up their president’s proposals.

Ars: I’m actually a little surprised we haven’t seen any sort of architecture yet. It’s been six months, and the administration has already missed a few of Trump’s deadlines for selecting an architecture.

Moulton: It’s hard to develop an architecture for something that doesn’t make sense.

Ars: I’ve heard from several retired military officials who think something like the Golden Dome is a good idea, but they are disappointed in the way the Trump administration has approached it. They say the White House hasn’t stated the case for it, and that risks politicizing something they view as important for national security.

Moulton: One idea I’ve had is that the advent of directed energy weapons (such as lasers and microwave weapons) could flip the cost curve and actually make defense cheaper than offense, whereas in the past, it’s always been cheaper to develop more offensive capabilities rather than the defensive means to shoot at them.

And this is why the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in the early 1970s was so effective, because there was this massive arms race where we were constantly just creating a new offensive weapon to get around whatever defenses our adversary proposed. The reason why everyone would just quickly produce a new offensive weapon before that treaty was put into place is because it was easy to do.

My point is that I’ve even thrown them this bone, and I’m saying, ‘Here, maybe that’s your reason, right?” And they just look at me dumbfounded because obviously none of them are thinking about this. They’re just trying to be lackeys for the president, and they don’t recognize how dangerous that is.

Ars: I’ve heard from a chorus of retired and even current active duty military leaders say the same thing about directed energy weapons. You essentially can use one platform in space take take numerous laser shots at a missile instead of expending multiple interceptors for one kill.

Moulton: Yes, that’s basically the theory of the case. Now, my hunch is that if you actually did the serious analysis, you would determine that it still decreases state strategic stability. So in terms of the overall safety and security of the United States, whether it’s directed energy weapons or kinetic interceptors, it’s still a very bad plan.

But I’m even throwing that out there to try to help them out here. “Maybe this is how you want to make your case.” And they just look at me like deer in the headlights because, obviously, they’re not thinking about the national security of the United States.

Ars: I also wanted to ask about the Space Force’s push to develop weapons to use against other satellites in orbit. They call these counter-space capabilities. They could be using directed energy, jamming, robotic arms, anti-satellite missiles. This could take many different forms, and the Space Force, for the first time, is talking more openly about these issues. Are these kinds of weapons necessary, in your view, or are they too destabilizing?

Moulton: I certainly wish we could go back to a time when the Russians and Chinese were not developing space weapons—or were not weaponizing space, I should say, because that was the international agreement. But the reality of the world we live in today is that our adversaries are violating that agreement. We have to be prepared to defend the United States.

Ars: Are there any other space policy issues on your radar or things you have concerns about?

Moulton: There’s a lot. There’s so much going on with space, and that’s the reason I chose this subcommittee, even though people would expect me to serve on the subcommittee dealing with the Marine Corps, because I just think space is incredibly important. We’re dealing with everything from promotion policy in the Space Force to acquisition reform to rules of engagement, and anything in between. There’s an awful lot going on there, but I do think that one of the most important things to talk about right now is how dangerous the Golden Dome could be.

Lawmaker: Trump’s Golden Dome will end the madness, and that’s not a good thing Read More »

reports-of-ai-not-progressing-or-offering-mundane-utility-are-often-greatly-exaggerated

Reports Of AI Not Progressing Or Offering Mundane Utility Are Often Greatly Exaggerated

In the wake of the confusions around GPT-5, this week had yet another round of claims that AI wasn’t progressing, or AI isn’t or won’t create much value, and so on. There were reports that one study in particular impacted Wall Street, and as you would expect it was not a great study. Situational awareness is not what you’d hope.

I’ve gathered related coverage here, to get it out of the way before whatever Google is teasing (Gemini 3.0? Something else?) arrives to potentially hijack our attention.

We’ll start with the MIT study on State of AI in Business, discuss the recent set of ‘AI is slowing down’ claims as part of the larger pattern, and then I will share a very good attempted explanation from Steven Byrnes of some of the ways economists get trapped into failing to look at what future highly capable AIs would actually do.

Chatbots and coding agents are clear huge wins. Over 80% of organizations have ‘explored or piloted’ them and 40% report deployment. The employees of the other 60% presumably have some news.

But we have a new State of AI in Business report that says that when businesses try to do more than that, ‘95% of businesses get zero return,’ although elsewhere they say ‘only 5% custom enterprise AI tools reach production.’

From our interviews, surveys, and analysis of 300 public implementations, four patterns emerged that define the GenAI Divide:

  1. Limited disruption: Only 2 of 8 major sectors show meaningful structural change.

  2. Enterprise paradox: Big firms lead in pilot volume but lag in scale-up.

  3. Investment bias: Budgets favor visible, top-line functions over high-ROI back office.

  4. Implementation advantage: External partnerships see twice the success rate of

    internal builds.

These are early days. Enterprises have only had capacity to look for ways to slide AI directly into existing structures. They ask, ‘what that we already do, can AI do for us?’ They especially ask ‘what can show clear measurable gains we can trumpet?’

It does seem reasonable to say that the ‘custom tools’ approach may not be doing so great, if the tools only reach deployment 5% of the time. They might have a high enough return they still come out ahead, but that is a high failure rate if you actually fully scrap the other 95% and don’t learn from them. It seems like this is a skill issue?

The primary factor keeping organizations on the wrong side of the GenAI Divide is the learning gap, tools that don’t learn, integrate poorly, or match workflows.

The 95% failure rate for enterprise AI solutions represents the clearest manifestation of the GenAI Divide. Organizations stuck on the wrong side continue investing in static tools that can’t adapt to their workflows, while those crossing the divide focus on learning-capable systems.

As one CIO put it, “We’ve seen dozens of demos this year. Maybe one or two are genuinely useful. The rest are wrappers or science projects.”

That sounds like the ‘AI tools’ that fail deserve the air quotes.

I also note that later they say custom built AI solutions ‘fail twice as often.’ That implies that when companies are wise enough to test solutions built externally, they succeed over 50% of the time.

There’s also a strange definition of ‘zero return’ here.

Just 5% of integrated AI pilots are extracting millions in value, while the vast majority remain stuck with no measurable P&L impact.

Tools like ChatGPT and Copilot are widely adopted. Over 80 percent of organizations have explored or piloted them, and nearly 40 percent report deployment. But these tools primarily enhance individual productivity, not P&L performance.

Issue a report where you call the 95% of projects that don’t have ‘measurable P&L impact’ failures, then wonder why no one wants to do ‘high-ROI back office’ upgrades.

Those projects are high ROI, but how do you prove the R on I?

Especially if you can’t see the ROI on ‘enhancing individual productivity’ because it doesn’t have this ‘measurable P&L impact.’ If you double the productivity of your coders (as an example), it’s true that you can’t directly point to [$X] that this made you in profit, but surely one can see a lot of value there.

They call it a ‘divide’ because it takes a while to see returns, after which you see a lot.

While most implementations don’t drive headcount reduction, organizations that have crossed the GenAI Divide are beginning to see selective workforce impacts in customer support, software engineering, and administrative functions.

In addition, the highest performing organizations report measurable savings from reduced BPO spending and external agency use, particularly in back-office operations.

Others cite improved customer retention and sales conversion through automated outreach and intelligent follow-up systems.

These early results suggest that learning-capable systems, when targeted at specific processes, can deliver real value, even without major organizational restructuring.

This all sounds mostly like a combination of ‘there is a learning curve that is barely started on’ with ‘we don’t know how to measure most gains.’

Also note the super high standard here. Only 22% of major sectors show ‘meaningful structural change’ at this early stage, and section 3 talks about ‘high adoption, low transformation.’

Or their ‘five myths about GenAI in the Enterprise’:

  1. AI Will Replace Most Jobs in the Next Few Years → Research found limited layoffs from GenAI, and only in industries that are already affected significantly by AI. There is no consensus among executives as to hiring levels over the next 3-5 years.

  2. Generative AI is Transforming Business → Adoption is high, but transformation is rare. Only 5% of enterprises have AI tools integrated in workflows at scale and 7 of 9 sectors show no real structural change.

  3. Enterprises are slow in adopting new tech → Enterprises are extremely eager to adopt AI and 90% have seriously explored buying an AI solution.

  4. The biggest thing holding back AI is model quality, legal, data, risk → What’s really holding it back is that most AI tools don’t learn and don’t integrate well into workflows.

  5. The best enterprises are building their own tools → Internal builds fail twice as often.

Most jobs within a few years is not something almost anyone is predicting in a non-AGI world. Present tense ‘transforming business’ is a claim I don’t remember hearing. I also hadn’t heard ‘the best enterprises are building their own tools’ and it does not surprise me that rolling your own comes with much higher failure rates.

I would push back on #3. As always, slow is relative, and being ‘eager’ is very different from not being the bottleneck. ‘Explored buying an AI solution’ is very distinct from ‘adopting new tech.’

I would also push back on #4. The reason AI doesn’t yet integrate well into workflows is because the tools are not yet good enough. This also shows the mindset that the AI is being forced to ‘integrate into workflows’ rather than generating new workflows, another sign that they are slow in adopting new tech.

Users prefer ChatGPT for simple tasks, but abandon it for mission-critical work due to its lack of memory. What’s missing is systems that adapt, remember, and evolve, capabilities that define the difference between the two sides of the divide.

I mean ChatGPT does now have some memory and soon it will have more. Getting systems to remember things is not all that hard. It is definitely on its way.

The more I explore the report the more it seems determined to hype up this ‘divide’ around ‘learning’ and memory. Much of the time seems like unrealistic expectations.

Yes, you would love if your AI tools learned all the detailed preferences and contexts of all of your clients without you having to do any work?

The same lawyer who favored ChatGPT for initial drafts drew a clear line at sensitive contracts:

“It’s excellent for brainstorming and first drafts, but it doesn’t retain knowledge of client preferences or learn from previous edits. It repeats the same mistakes and requires extensive context input for each session. For high-stakes work, I need a system that accumulates knowledge and improves over time.”

This feedback points to the fundamental learning gap that keeps organizations on the wrong side of the GenAI Divide.

Well, how would it possibly know about client preferences or learn from previous edits? Are you keeping a detailed document with the client preferences in preferences.md? People would like AI to automagically do all sorts of things out of the box without putting in the work.

And if they wait a few years? It will.

I totally do not get where this is coming from:

Takeaway: The window for crossing the GenAI Divide is rapidly closing. Enterprises are locking in learning-capable tools. Agentic AI and memory frameworks (like NANDA and MCP) will define which vendors help organizations cross the divide versus remain trapped on the wrong side.

Why is there a window and why is it closing?

I suppose one can say ‘there is a window because you will rapidly be out of business’ and of course one can worry about the world transforming generally, including existential risks. But ‘crossing the divide’ gets easier every day, not harder.

In the next few quarters, several enterprises will lock in vendor relationships that will be nearly impossible to unwind.

Why do people keep saying versions of this? Over time increasingly capable AI and better AI tools will make it, again, easier not harder to pivot or migrate.

Yes, I get that people think the switching costs will be prohibitive. But that’s simply not true. If you already have an AI that can do things for your business, getting another AI to learn and copy what you need will be relatively easy. Code bases can switch between LLMs easily, often by changing only one to three lines.

What is the bottom line?

This seems like yet another set of professionals putting together a professional-looking report that fundamentally assumes AI will never improve, or that improvements in frontier AI capability will not matter, and reasoning from there. Once you realize this implicit assumption, a lot of the weirdness starts making sense.

Ethan Mollick: Okay, got the report. I would read it yourself. I am not sure how generalizable the findings are based on the methodology (52 interviews, convenience sampled, failed apparently means no sustained P&L impact within six months but no coding explanation)

I have no doubt pilot failures are high, but I think it is really hard to see how this report gives the kind of generalizable finding that would move markets.

Nathan Whittemore: Also no mention of coding. Also no agents. Also 50% of uses were marketing, suggesting extreme concentration of org area.

Azeem Azhar: it was an extremely weak report. You are very generous with your assessment.

Aaron Erickson: Many reports like this start from the desired conclusion and work backwards, and this feels like no exception to that rule.

Most of the real work is bottom up adoption not measured by anything. If anything, it is an indictment about top-down initiatives.

The reason this is worth so much attention is that we have reactions like this one from Matthew Field, saying this is a ‘warning sign the AI bubble is about to burst’ and claiming the study caused a stock selloff, including a 3.5% drop in Nvidia and ~1% in some other big tech stocks. Which isn’t that much, and there are various alternative potential explanations.

The improvements we are seeing involve not only AI as it exists now (as in the worst it will ever be), with substantial implementation delays. It also involves only individuals adopting AI or at best companies slotting AI into existing workflows.

Traditionally the big gains from revolutionary technologies come elsewhere.

Roon: real productivity gains for prior technological advances came not from individual workers learning to use eg electricity, the internet but entire workflows, factories, processes, businesses being set up around the use of new tools (in other words, management)

couple years ago I figured this could go much faster than usual thanks to knowledge diffusion over the internet and also the AIs themselves coming up with great ideas about how to harness their strengths and weaknesses. but I’m not sure about that at present moment.

Patrick McKenzie: (Agree with this, and generally think it is one reasons why timelines to visible-in-GDP-growth impact are longer than people similarly bullish on AI seem to believe.)

I do think it is going faster and will go faster, except that in AI the standard for ‘fast’ is crazy fast, and ‘AIs coming up with great ideas’ is a capability AIs are only now starting to approach in earnest.

I do think that if AGI and ASI don’t show up, the timeline to the largest visible-in-GDP gains will take a while to show up. I expect visible-in-GDP soon anyway because I think the smaller, quicker version of even the minimally impressive version of AI should suffice to become visible in GDP, even though GDP will only reflect a small percentage of real gains.

The ‘AI is losing steam’ or ‘big leaps are slowing down’ and so on statements from mainstream media will keep happening whenever someone isn’t feeling especially impressed this particular month. Or week.

Dean Ball: I think we live in a perpetual state of traditional media telling us that the pace of ai progress is slowing

These pieces were published during a span that I would describe as the most rapid pace of progress I’ve ever witnessed in LLMs (GPT-4 Turbo -> GPT 5-Pro; remember: there were no public reasoner models 365 days ago!)

(Also note that Bloomberg piece was nearly simultaneous with the announcement of o3, lmao)

Miles Brundage: Notably, it’s ~never employees at frontier companies quoted on this, it’s the journalists themselves, or academics, startups pushing a different technique, etc.

The logic being “people at big companies are biased.” Buddy, I’ve got some big news re: humans.

Anton: my impression is that articles like this mostly get written by people who really really want to believe ai is slowing down. nobody working on it or even using it effectively thinks this. Which is actually basically a marketing problem which the entire field has been bad at since 2022.

Peter Gostev: I’m sure you’ve all noticed the ‘AI is slowing down’ news stories every few weeks for multiple years now – so I’ve pulled a tracker together to see who and when wrote these stories.

There is quite a range, some are just outright wrong, others point to a reasonable limitation at the time but missing the bigger arc of progress.

All of these stories were appearing as we were getting reasoning models, open source models, increasing competition from more players and skyrocketing revenue for the labs.

Peter links to about 35 posts. They come in waves.

The practical pace of AI progress continues to greatly exceed the practical pace of progress everywhere else. I can’t think of an exception. It is amazing how eagerly everyone looks for a supposed setback to try and say otherwise.

You could call this gap a ‘marketing problem’ but the US Government is in the tank for AI companies and Nvidia is 3% of total stock market cap and investments in AI are over 1% of GDP and so on, and diffusion is proceeding at record pace. So it is not clear that they should care about those who keep saying the music is about to stop?

Coinbase CEO fires software engineers who don’t adopt AI tools. Well, yeah.

On the one hand, AI companies are building their models on the shoulders of giants, and by giants we mean all of us.

Ezra Klein (as an example): Right now, the A.I. companies are not making all that much money off these products. If they eventually do make the profits their investors and founders imagine, I don’t think the normal tax structure is sufficient to cover the debt they owe all of us, and everyone before us, on whose writing and ideas their models are built.

Then there’s the energy demand.

Also the AI companies are risking all our lives and control over the future.

On the other hand, notice that they are indeed not making that much money. It seems highly unlikely that, even in terms of unit economics, creators of AI capture more than 10% of value created. So in an ‘economic normal’ situation where AI doesn’t ‘go critical’ or transform the world, but is highly useful, who owes who the debt?

It’s proving very useful for a lot of people.

Ezra Klein: And yet I am a bit shocked by how even the nascent A.I. tools we have are worming their way into our lives — not by being officially integrated into our schools and workplaces but by unofficially whispering in our ears.

The American Medical Association found that two in three doctors are consulting with A.I.

A Stack Overflow survey found that about eight in 10 programmers already use A.I. to help them code.

The Federal Bar Association found that large numbers of lawyers are using generative A.I. in their work, and it was more common for them to report they were using it on their own rather than through official tools adopted by their firms. It seems probable that Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs were designed by consulting a chatbot.

All of these uses involve paying remarkably little and realizing much larger productivity gains.

Steven Byrnes explains his view on some reasons why an economics education can make you dumber when thinking about future AI, difficult to usefully excerpt and I doubt he’d mind me quoting it in full.

I note up top that I know not all of this is technically correct, it isn’t the way I would describe this, and of course #NotAllEconomists throughout especially for the dumber mistakes he points out, but the errors actually are often pretty dumb once you boil them down, and I found Byrnes’s explanation illustrative.

Steven Byrnes: There’s a funny thing where economics education paradoxically makes people DUMBER at thinking about future AI. Econ textbooks teach concepts & frames that are great for most things, but counterproductive for thinking about AGI. Here are 4 examples. Longpost:

THE FIRST PIECE of Econ anti-pedagogy is hiding in the words “labor” & “capital”. These words conflate a superficial difference (flesh-and-blood human vs not) with a bundle of unspoken assumptions and intuitions, which will all get broken by Artificial General Intelligence (AGI).

By “AGI” I mean here “a bundle of chips, algorithms, electricity, and/or teleoperated robots that can autonomously do the kinds of stuff that ambitious human adults can do—founding and running new companies, R&D, learning new skills, using arbitrary teleoperated robots after very little practice, etc.”

Yes I know, this does not exist yet! (Despite hype to the contrary.) Try asking an LLM to autonomously write a business plan, found a company, then run and grow it for years as CEO. Lol! It will crash and burn! But that’s a limitation of today’s LLMs, not of “all AI forever”.

AI that could nail that task, and much more beyond, is obviously possible—human brains and bodies and societies are not powered by some magical sorcery forever beyond the reach of science. I for one expect such AI in my lifetime, for better or worse. (Probably “worse”, see below.)

Now, is this kind of AGI “labor” or “capital”? Well it’s not a flesh-and-blood human. But it’s more like “labor” than “capital” in many other respects:

• Capital can’t just up and do things by itself? AGI can.

• New technologies take a long time to integrate into the economy? Well ask yourself: how do highly-skilled, experienced, and entrepreneurial immigrant humans manage to integrate into the economy immediately? Once you’ve answered that question, note that AGI will be able to do those things too.

• Capital sits around idle if there are no humans willing and able to use it? Well those immigrant humans don’t sit around idle. And neither will AGI.

• Capital can’t advocate for political rights, or launch coups? Well…

Anyway, people see sci-fi robot movies, and they get this! Then they take economics courses, and it makes them dumber.

(Yes I know, #NotAllEconomists etc.)

THE SECOND PIECE of Econ anti-pedagogy is instilling a default assumption that it’s possible for a market to equilibrate. But the market for AGI cannot: AGI combines a property of labor markets with a property of product markets, where those properties are mutually exclusive. Those properties are:

• (A) “NO LUMP OF LABOR”: If human population goes up, wages drop in the very short term, because the demand curve for labor slopes down. But in the longer term, people find new productive things to do—the demand curve moves right. If anything, the value of labor goes UP, not down, with population! E.g. dense cities are engines of growth!

• (B) “EXPERIENCE CURVES”: If the demand for a product rises, there’s price increase in the very short term, because the supply curve slopes up. But in the longer term, people ramp up manufacturing—the supply curve moves right. If anything, the price goes DOWN, not up, with demand, thanks to economies of scale and R&D.

QUIZ: Considering (A) & (B), what’s the equilibrium price of this AGI bundle (chips, algorithms, electricity, teleoperated robots, etc.)?

…Trick question! There is no equilibrium. Our two principles, (A) “no lump of labor” and (B) “experience curves”, make equilibrium impossible:

• If price is low, (A) says the demand curve races rightwards—there’s no lump of labor, therefore there’s massive profit to be made by skilled entrepreneurial AGIs finding new productive things to do.

• If price is high, (B) says the supply curve races rightwards—there’s massive profit to be made by ramping up manufacturing of AGI.

• If the price is in between, then the demand curve and supply curve are BOTH racing rightwards!

This is neither capital nor labor as we know it. Instead of the market for AGI equilibrating, it forms a positive feedback loop / perpetual motion machine that blows up exponentially.

Does that sound absurd? There’s a precedent: humans! The human world, as a whole, is already a positive feedback loop / perpetual motion machine of this type! Humans bootstrapped themselves up from a few thousand hominins to 8 billion people running a $80T economy.

How? It’s not literally a perpetual motion machine. Rather, it’s an engine that draws from the well of “not-yet-exploited economic opportunities”. But remember “No Lump of Labor”: the well of not-yet-exploited economic opportunities is ~infinitely deep. We haven’t run out of possible companies to found. Nobody has made a Dyson swarm yet.

There’s only so many humans to found companies and exploit new opportunities. But the positive feedback loop of AGI has no such limit. The doubling time can be short indeed:

Imagine an autonomous factory that can build an identical autonomous factory, which then build two more, etc., using just widely-available input materials and sunlight. Economics textbooks don’t talk about that. But biology textbooks do! A cyanobacterium is such a factory, and can double itself in a day (≈ googol percent annualized growth rate 😛).

Anyway, we don’t know how explosive will be the positive feedback loop of AGI building AGI, but I expect it to be light-years beyond anything in economic history.

THE THIRD PIECE of Econ anti-pedagogy is its promotion of GDP growth as a proxy for progress and change. On the contrary, it’s possible for the world to transform into a wild sci-fi land beyond all recognition or comprehension each month, month after month, without “GDP growth” actually being all that high. GDP is a funny metric, and especially poor at describing the impact of transformative technological revolutions. (For example, if some new tech is inexpensive, and meanwhile other sectors of the economy remain expensive due to regulatory restrictions, then the new tech might not impact GDP much, no matter how much it upends the world.) I mean, sure we can argue about GDP, but we shouldn’t treat it as a proxy battle over whether AGI will or won’t be a big deal.

Last and most importantly, THE FOURTH PIECE of Econ anti-pedagogy is the focus on “mutually-beneficial trades” over “killing people and taking their stuff”. Econ 101 proves that trading is selfishly better than isolation. But sometimes “killing people and taking their stuff” is selfishly best of all.

When we’re talking about AGI, we’re talking about creating a new intelligent species on Earth, one which will eventually be faster, smarter, better-coordinated, and more numerous than humans.

Normal people, people who have seen sci-fi movies about robots and aliens, people who have learned the history of colonialism and slavery, will immediately ask lots of reasonable questions here. “What will their motives be?” “Who will have the hard power?” “If they’re seeming friendly and cooperative early on, might they stab us in the back when they get more powerful?”

These are excellent questions! We should definitely be asking these questions! (FWIW, this is my area of expertise, and I’m very pessimistic.)

…And then those normal people take economics classes, and wind up stupider. They stop asking those questions. Instead, they “learn” that AGI is “capital”, kinda like an injection-molding machine. Injection-molding machines wouldn’t wipe out humans and run the world by themselves. So we’re fine. Lol.

…Since actual AGI is so foreign to economists’ worldviews, they often deny the premise. E.g. here’s @tylercowen demonstrating a complete lack of understanding of what we doomers are talking about, when we talk about future powerful AI.

Yep. If you restrict to worlds where collaboration with humans is required in most cases then the impacts of AI all look mostly ‘normal’ again.

And here’s @DAcemogluMIT assuming without any discussion that in the next 10 yrs, “AI” will not include any new yet-to-be-developed techniques that go way beyond today’s LLMs. Funny omission, when the whole LLM paradigm didn’t exist 10 yrs ago!

(Tbc, it’s fine to make that assumption! Maybe it will be valid, or maybe not, who knows, technological forecasting is hard. But when your paper depends on a giant load-bearing assumption about future AI tech progress, an assumption which many AI domain experts dispute, then that assumption should at least be clearly stated! Probably in the very first sentence of the paper, if not the title!)

And here’s another example of economists “arguing” against AGI scenarios by simply rejecting out of hand any scenario in which actual AGI exists. Many such examples…

Eliezer Yudkowsky: Surprisingly correct, considering the wince I had at the starting frame.

I really think that if you’re creating a new intelligent species vastly smarter than humans, going “oh, that’s ‘this time is different’ economics”, as if it were economics in the first place, is exactly a Byrnes-case of seeing through an inappropriate lens and ending up dumber.

I am under no illusions that an explanation like this would satisfy the demands and objections of most economists or fit properly into their frameworks. It is easy for such folks to dismiss explanations like this as insufficiently serious or rigerous, or simply to deny the premise. I’ve run enough experiments to stop suspecting otherwise.

However, if one actually did want to understand the situation? This could help.

Discussion about this post

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Trump admin issues stop-work order for offshore wind project

In a statement to Politico’s E&E News days after the order was lifted in May, the White House claimed that Hochul “caved” and struck an agreement to allow “two natural gas pipelines to advance” through New York.

Hochul denied that any such deal was made.

Trump has made no effort to conceal his disdain for wind power and other renewable energies, and his administration has actively sought to stymie growth in the industry while providing what critics have described as “giveaways” to fossil fuels.

In a Truth Social post on Wednesday, Trump called wind and solar energy the “SCAM OF THE CENTURY,” criticizing states that have built and rely on them for power.

“We will not approve wind or farmer destroying Solar,” Trump wrote. “The days of stupidity are over in the USA!!!”

On Trump’s first day in office, the president issued a memorandum halting approvals, permits, leases, and loans for both offshore and onshore wind projects.

The GOP also targeted wind energy in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, accelerating the phaseout of tax credits for wind and solar projects while mandating lease sales for fossil fuels and making millions of acres of federal land available for mining.

The administration’s subsequent consideration of rules to further restrict access to tax credits for wind and solar projects alarmed even some Republicans, prompting Iowa Sen. Chuck Grassley and Utah Sen. John Curtis to place holds on Treasury nominees as they awaited the department’s formal guidance.

Those moves have rattled the wind industry and created uncertainty about the viability of ongoing and future projects.

“The unfortunate message to investors is clear: the US is no longer a reliable place for long-term energy investments,” said the American Clean Power Association, a trade association, in a statement on Friday.

To Kathleen Meil, local clean energy deployment director at the League of Conservation Voters, that represents a loss not only for the environment but also for the US economy.

“It’s really easy to think about the visible—the 4,200 jobs across all phases of development that you see… They’ve hit more than 2 million union work hours on Revolution Wind,” Meil said.

“But what’s also really transformational is that it’s already triggered $1.3 billion in investment through the supply chain. So it’s not just coastal communities that are benefiting from these jobs,” she said.

“This hurts so many people. And why? There’s just no justification.”

This article originally appeared on Inside Climate News, a nonprofit, non-partisan news organization that covers climate, energy, and the environment. Sign up for their newsletter here.

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Arguments About AI Consciousness Seem Highly Motivated And At Best Overconfident

I happily admit I am deeply confused about consciousness.

I don’t feel confident I understand what it is, what causes it, which entities have it, what future entities might have it, to what extent it matters and why, or what we should do about these questions. This applies both in terms of finding the answers and what to do once we find them, including the implications for how worried we should be about building minds smarter and more capable than human minds.

Some people respond to this uncertainty by trying to investigate these questions further. Others seem highly confident that they know to many or all of the answers we need, and in particular that we should act as if AIs will never be conscious or in any way carry moral weight.

Claims about all aspects of the future of AI are often highly motivated.

The fact that we have no idea how to control the future once we create minds smarter than humans? Highly inconvenient. Ignore it, dismiss it without reasons, move on. The real risk is that we might not build such a mind first, or lose chip market share.

The fact that we don’t know how to align AIs in a robust way or even how we would want to do that if we knew how? Also highly inconvenient. Ignore, dismiss, move on. Same deal. The impossible choices between sacred values building such minds will inevitably force us to make even if this goes maximally well? Ignore those too.

AI consciousness or moral weight would also be highly inconvenient. It could get in the way of what most of all of us would otherwise want to do. Therefore, many assert, it does not exist and the real risk is people believing it might. Sometimes this reasoning is even explicit. Diving into how this works matters.

Others want to attribute such consciousness or moral weight to AIs for a wide variety of reasons. Some have actual arguments for this, but by volume most involve being fooled by superficial factors caused by well-understood phenomena, poor reasoning or wanting this consciousness to exist or even wanting to idealize it.

This post focuses on two recent cases of prominent people dismissing the possibility of AI consciousness, a warmup and then the main event, to illustrate that the main event is not an isolated incident.

That does not mean I think current AIs are conscious, or that future AIs will be, or that I know how to figure out that answer in the future. As I said, I remain confused.

One incident played off a comment from William MacAskill. Which then leads to a great example of some important mistakes.

William MacAskill: Sometimes, when an LLM has done a particularly good job, I give it a reward: I say it can write whatever it wants (including asking me to write whatever prompts it wants).

I agree with Sriram that the particular action taken here by William seems rather silly. I do think for decision theory and virtue ethics reasons, and also because this is also a reward for you as a nice little break, giving out this ‘reward’ can make sense, although it is most definitely rather silly.

Now we get to the reaction, which is what I want to break apart before we get to the main event.

Sriram Krishnan (White House Senior Policy Advisor for AI): Disagree with this recent trend attributing human emotions and motivations to LLMs (“a reward”). This leads us down the path of doomerism and fear over AI.

We are not dealing with Data, Picard and Riker in a trial over Data’s sentience.

I get Sriram’s frustrations. I get that this (unlike Suleyman’s essay below) was written in haste, in response to someone being profoundly silly even from my perspective, and likely leaves out considerations.

My intent is not to pick on Sriram here. He’s often great. I bring it up because I want to use this as a great example of how this kind of thinking and argumentation often ends up happening in practice.

Look at the justification here. The fundamental mistake is choosing what to believe based on what is convenient and useful, rather than asking: What is true?

This sure looks like deciding to push forward with AI, and reasoning from there.

Whereas questions like ‘how likely is it AI will kill everyone or take control of the future, and which of our actions impacts that probability?’ or ‘what concepts are useful when trying to model and work with LLMs?’ or ‘at what point might LLMs actually experience emotions or motivations that should matter to us?’ seem kind of important to ask.

As in, you cannot say this (where [X] in this case is that LLMs can be attributed human emotions or motivations):

  1. Some people believe fact [X] is true.

  2. Believing [X] would ‘lead us down the path to’ also believe [Y].

  3. (implicit) Belief in [Y] has unfortunate implications.

  4. Therefore [~Y] and therefore also [~X].

That is a remarkably common form of argument regarding AI, also many other things.

Yet it is obviously invalid. It is not a good reason to believe [~Y] and especially not [~X]. Recite the Litany of Tarski. Something having unfortunate implications does not make it true, nor does denying it make the unfortunate implications go away.

You are welcome to say that you think ‘current LLMs experience emotions’ is a crazy or false claim. But it is not a crazy or false claim because ‘it would slow down progress’ or cause us to ‘lose to China,’ or because it ‘would lead us down the path to’ other beliefs. Logic does not work that way.

Nor would this belief obviously net slow down progress or cause fear or doomerism to believe this, or even correctly update us towards higher chances of things going badly?

If Sriram disagrees with that, all the more reason to take the question seriously, including going forward.

I would especially highlight the question of ‘motivation.’ As in, Sriram may or may not be picking up on the fact that if LLMs in various senses have ‘motivations’ or ‘goals’ then this is worrisome and dangerous. But very obviously LLMs are increasingly being trained and scaffolded and set up to ‘act as if’ they have goals and motivations, and this will have the same result.

It is worth noticing that the answer to the question of whether AI is sentient, or a moral patient, or experiencing emotions or ‘truly’ has ‘motivations’ could change. Indeed, people find it likely to change.

Perhaps it would be useful to think concretely about Data. Is Data sentient? What determines your answer? How would that apply to future real world LLMs or robots? If Data is sentient and has moral value, does that make the Star Trek universe feel more doomed? Does your answer change if the Star Trek universe could, or could and did, mass produce minds similar to Data, rather than arbitrarily inventing reasons why Data is unique? Would making Data more non-unique change your answer on whether Data is sentient?

Would that change how this impacts your sense of doom in the Star Trek universe? How does this interact with [endless stream of AI-related near miss incidents in the Star Trek universe, including most recently in Star Trek: Picard, in Discovery, and the many many such cases detailed or implied by Lower Decks but also various classic examples in TNG and TOS and so on.]

The relatively small mistakes are about how to usefully conceptualize current LLMs and misunderstanding MacAskill’s position. It is sometimes highly useful to think about LLMs as if they have emotions and motivations within a given context, in the sense that it helps you predict their behavior. This is what I believe MacAskill is doing.

Employing this strategy can be good decision theory.

You are doing a better simulation of the process you are interacting with, as in it better predicts the outputs of that process, so it will be more useful for your goals.

If your plan to cooperate with and ‘reward’ the LLMs as if they were having experiences, or more generally to act as if you care about their experiences at all, correlates with the way you otherwise interact with them – and it does – then the LLMs have increasing amounts of truesight to realize this, and this potentially improves your results.

As a clean example, consider AI Parfit’s Hitchhiker. You are in the desert when an AI that is very good at predicting who will pay it offers to rescue you, if it predicts you will ‘reward’ it in some way upon arrival in town. You say yes, it rescues you. Do you reward it? Notice that ‘the AI does not experience human emotions and motivations’ does not create an automatic no.

(Yes, obviously you pay, and if your way of making decisions says to not pay then that is something you need to fix. Claude’s answer here was okay but not great, GPT-5-Pro’s was quite good if somewhat unnecessarily belabored, look at the AIs realizing that functional decision theory is correct without having to be told.)

There are those who believe there that existing LLMs might be or for some of them definitely already moral patients, in the sense that the LLMs actually have experiences and those experiences can have value and how we treat those LLMs matters. Some care deeply about this. Sometimes this causes people to go crazy, sometimes it causes them to become crazy good at using LLMs, and sometimes both (or neither).

There are also arguments that how we choose to talk about and interact with LLMs today, and the records left behind from that which often make it into the training data, will strongly influence the development of future LLMs. Indeed, the argument is made that this has already happened. I would not entirely dismiss such warnings.

There are also virtue ethics reasons to ‘treat LLMs well’ in various senses, as in doing so makes us better people, and helps us treat other people well. Form good habits.

We now get to the main event, which is this warning from Mustafa Suleyman.

Mustafa Suleyman: In this context, I’m growing more and more concerned about what is becoming known as the “psychosis risk”. and a bunch of related issues. I don’t think this will be limited to those who are already at risk of mental health issues. Simply put, my central worry is that many people will start to believe in the illusion of AIs as conscious entities so strongly that they’ll soon advocate for AI rights, model welfare and even AI citizenship. This development will be a dangerous turn in AI progress and deserves our immediate attention.

We must build AI for people; not to be a digital person.

But to succeed, I also need to talk about what we, and others, shouldn’t build.

Personality without personhood. And this work must start now.

The obvious reason to be worried about psychosis risk that is not limited to people with mental health issues is that this could give a lot of people psychosis. I’m going to take the bold stance that this would be a bad thing.

Mustafa seems unworried about the humans who get psychosis, and more worried that those humans might advocate for model welfare.

Indeed he seems more worried about this than about the (other?) consequences of superintelligence.

Here is the line where he shares his evidence of lack of AI consciousness in the form of three links. I’ll return to the links later.

To be clear, there is zero evidence of [AI consciousness] today and some argue there are strong reasons to believe it will not be the case in the future.

Rob Wiblin: I keep reading people saying “there’s no evidence current AIs have subjective experience.”

But I have zero idea what empirical evidence the speakers would expect to observe if they were.

Yes, ‘some argue.’ Some similar others argue the other way.

Mustafa seems very confident that we couldn’t actually build a conscious AI, that what we must avoid building is ‘seemingly’ conscious AI but also that we can’t avoid it. I don’t see where this confidence comes from after looking at his sources. Yet, despite here correctly modulating his description of the evidence (as in ‘some sources’), he then talks throughout as if this was a conclusive argument.

The arrival of Seemingly Conscious AI is inevitable and unwelcome. Instead, we need a vision for AI that can fulfill its potential as a helpful companion without falling prey to its illusions.

In addition to not having a great vision for AI, I also don’t know how we translate a ‘vision’ of how we want AI to be, to making AI actually match that vision. No one’s figured that part out. Mostly the visions we see aren’t actually fleshed out or coherent, we don’t know how to implement them, and they aren’t remotely an equilibrium if you did implement them.

Mustafa is seemingly not so concerned about superintelligence.

He only seems concerned about ‘seemingly conscious AI (SCAI).’

This is a common pattern (including outside of AI). Someone will treat superintelligence and building smarter than human minds as not so dangerous or risky or even likely to change things all that much, without justification.

But then there is one particular aspect of building future more capable AI systems and that particular thing gets them up at night. They will demand that we Must Act, we Cannot Stand Back And Do Nothing. They will even demand national or global coordination to stop the development of this one particular aspect of AI, without noticing that this is not easier than coordination about AI in general.

Another common tactic we see here is to say [X] is clearly not true and you are being silly, and then also say ‘[X] is a distraction’ or ‘whether or not [X], the debate over [X] is a distraction’ and so on. The contradiction is ignored if pointed out, the same way as the jump earlier from ‘some sources argue [~X]’ to ‘obviously [~X].’

Here’s his version this time:

Here are three reasons this is an important and urgent question to address:

  1. I think it’s possible to build a Seemingly Conscious AI (SCAI) in the next few years. Given the context of AI development right now, that means it’s also likely.

  2. The debate about whether AI is actually conscious is, for now at least, a distraction. It will seem conscious and that illusion is what’ll matter in the near term.

  3. I think this type of AI creates new risks. Therefore, we should urgently debate the claim that it’s soon possible, begin thinking through the implications, and ideally set a norm that it’s undesirable.

Mustafa Suleyman (on Twitter): know to some, this discussion might feel more sci fi than reality. To others it may seem over-alarmist. I might not get all this right. It’s highly speculative after all. Who knows how things will change, and when they do, I’ll be very open to shifting my opinion.

Kelsey Piper: AIs sometimes say they are conscious and can suffer. sometimes they say the opposite. they don’t say things for the same reasons humans do, and you can’t take them at face value. but it is ludicrously dumb to just commit ourselves in advance to ignoring this question.

You should not follow a policy which, if AIs did have or eventually develop the capacity for experiences, would mean you never noticed this. it would be pretty important. you should adopt policies that might let you detect it.

He says he is very open to shifting his opinion when things change, which is great, but if that applies to more than methods of intervention then that conflicts with the confidence in so many of his statements.

I hate to be a nitpicker, but if you’re willing to change your mind about something, you don’t assert its truth outright, as in:

Mustafa Suleyman: Seemingly Conscious AI (SCAI) is the illusion that an AI is a conscious entity. It’s not – but replicates markers of consciousness so convincingly it seems indistinguishable from you + I claiming we’re conscious. It can already be built with today’s tech. And it’s dangerous.

Shin Megami Boson: “It’s not conscious”

prove it. you can’t and you know you can’t. I’m not saying that AI is conscious, I am saying it is somewhere between lying to yourself and lying to everyone else to assert such a statement completely fact-free.

The truth is you have no idea if it is or not.

Based on the replies I am very confident not all of you are conscious.

This isn’t an issue of burden of proof. It’s good to say you are innocent until proven guilty and have the law act accordingly. That doesn’t mean we know you didn’t do it.

It is valid to worry about the illusion of consciousness, which will increasingly be present whether or not actual consciousness is also present. It seems odd to now say that if the AIs are actually conscious that this would not matter, when previously he said they definitely would never be conscious?

SCAI and how people react to it is clearly a real and important concern. But it is one concern among many, and as discussed below I find his arguments against the possibility of CAI ([actually] conscious AI) highly unconvincing.

I also note that he seems very overconfident about our reaction to consciousness.

Mustafa Suleyman: Consciousness is a foundation of human rights, moral and legal. Who/what has it is enormously important. Our focus should be on the wellbeing and rights of humans, animals + nature on planet Earth. AI consciousness is a short + slippery slope to rights, welfare, citizenship.

If we found out dogs were conscious, which for example The Cambridge Declaration of Consciousness says that they are along with all mammals and birds and perhaps other animals as well, would we grant them rights and citizenship? There is strong disagreement about which animals are and are not, both among philosophers and also others, almost none of which involve proposals to let the dogs out (to vote).

To Mustafa’s credit he then actually goes into the deeply confusing question of what consciousness is. I don’t see his answer as good, but this is much better than no answer.

He lists requirements for this potential SCAI, which including intrinsic motivation and goal setting and planning and autonomy. Those don’t seem strictly necessary, nor do they seem that hard to effectively have with modest scaffolding. Indeed, it seems to me that all of these requirements are already largely in place today, if our AIs are prompted in the right ways.

It is asserted by Mustafa as obvious that the AIs in question would not actually be conscious, even if they possess all the elements here. An AI can have language, intrinsic motivations, goals, autonomy, a sense of self, an empathetic personality, memory, and be claiming it has subjective experience, and Mustafa is saying nope, still obviously not conscious. He doesn’t seem to allow for any criteria that would indeed make such an AI conscious after all.

He says SCAI will ‘not arise by accident.’ That depends on what ‘accident’ means.

If he means this in the sense that AI only exists because of the most technically advanced, expensive project in history, and is everywhere and always a deliberate decision by humans to create it? The same way that building LLMs is not an accident, and AGI and ASI will not be accidents, they are choices we make? Then yes, of course.

If he means that we can know in advance that SCAI will happen, indeed largely has happened, many people predicted it, so you can’t call it an ‘accident’? Again, not especially applicable here, but fair enough.

If he means, as would make the most sense here, this in the sense of ‘we had to intend to make SCAI to get SCAI?’ That seems clearly false. They very much will arise ‘by accident’ in this sense. Indeed, they have already mostly if not entirely done so.

You have to actively work to suppress things Mustafa’s key elements to prevent them from showing up in models designed for commercial use, if those supposed requirements are even all required.

Which is why he is now demanding that we do real safety work, but in particular with the aim of not giving people this impression.

The entire industry also needs best practice design principles and ways of handling such potential attributions. We must codify and share what works to both steer people away from these fantasies and nudge them back on track if they do.

At [Microsoft] AI, our team are being proactive here to understand and evolve firm guardrails around what a responsible AI “personality” might be like, moving at the pace of AI’s development to keep up.

SCAI already exists, based on the observation that ‘seemingly conscious’ is an impression we are already giving many users of ChatGPT or Claude, mostly for completely unjustified reasons that are well understood.

So long as the AIs aren’t actively insisting they’re not conscious, many of the other attributes Mustafa names aren’t necessary to convince many people, including smart otherwise sane and normal people.

Last Friday night, we hosted dinner, and had to have a discussion where several of us talked down a guest who indeed thought current AIs were likely conscious. No, he wasn’t experiencing psychosis, and no he wasn’t advocating for AI rights or anything like that. Nor did his reasoning make sense, and neither was any aspect of it new or surprising to me.

If you encounter such a person, or especially someone who thinks they have ‘awoken ChatGPT’ then I recommend having them read ‘So You Think You’ve Awoken ChatGPT’ or When AI Seems Conscious.

Nathan Labenz: As niche as I am, I’ve had ~10 people reach out claiming a breakthrough discovery in this area (None have caused a significant update for me – still very uncertain / confused)

From that I infer that the number of ChatGPT users who are actively thinking about this is already huge

(To be clear, some have been very thoughtful and articulate – if I weren’t already so uncertain about all this, a few would have nudged me in that direction – including @YeshuaGod22 who I thought did a great job on the podcast)

Nor is there a statement anywhere of what AIs would indeed need in order to be conscious. Why so confident that SCAI is near, but that CAI is far or impossible?

He provides three links above, which seems to be his evidence?

The first is his ‘no evidence’ link which is a paper Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness.

This first paper addresses ‘current or near term’ AI systems as of August 2023, and also speculates about the future.

The abstract indeed says current systems at the time were not conscious, but the authors (including Yoshua Bengio and model welfare advocate Robert Long) assert the opposite of Mustafa’s position regarding future systems:

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern.

This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness.

We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive ”indicator properties” of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties.

We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.

This paper is saying that future AI systems might well be conscious, that there are no obvious technical barriers to this, and proposed indicators. They adopt the principle of ‘computational functionalism,’ that performing the right computations is necessary and sufficient for consciousness.

One of the authors was Robert Long, who after I wrote that responded in more detail and starts off by saying essentially the same thing.

Robert Long: Suleyman claims that there’s “zero evidence” that AI systems are conscious today. To do so, he cites a paper by me!

There are several errors in doing so. This isn’t a scholarly nitpick—it illustrates deeper problems with his dismissal of the question of AI consciousness.

first, agreements:

-overattributing AI consciousness is dangerous

-many will wonder if AIs are conscious

-consciousness matters morally

-we’re uncertain which entities are conscious

important issues! and Suleyman raises them in the spirit of inviting comments & critique

here’s the paper cited to say there’s “zero evidence” that AI systems are conscious today. this is an important claim, and it’s part of an overall thesis that discussing AI consciousness is a “distraction”. there are three problems here.

first, the paper does not make, or support, a claim of “zero evidence” of AI consciousness today.

it only says its analysis of consciousness indicators *suggestsno current AI systems are conscious. (also, it’s over 2 years old)

but more importantly…

second, Suleyman doesn’t consider the paper’s other suggestion: “there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators” of consciousness!

I’m interested in what he makes of the paper’s arguments for potential near-term AI consciousness

third, Suleyman says we shouldn’t discuss evidence for and against AI consciousness; it’s “a distraction”.

but he just appealed to an (extremely!) extended discussion of that very question!

an important point: everyone, including skeptics, should want more evidence

from the post, you might get the impression that AI welfare researchers think we should assume AIs are conscious, since we can’t prove they aren’t.

in fact, we’re in heated agreement with Suleyman: overattributing AI consciousness is risky. so there’s no “precautionary” side

We actually *dohave to face the core question: will AIs be conscious, or not? we don’t know the answer yet, and assuming one way or the other could be a disaster. it’s far from “a distraction”. and we actually can make progress!

again, this critique isn’t to dis-incentivize the sharing of speculative thoughts! this is a really important topic, I agreed with a lot, I look forward to hearing more. and I’m open to shifting my own opinion as well

if you’re interested in evidence for AI consciousness, I’d recommend these papers.

Jason Crawford: isn’t this just an absence-of-evidence vs. evidence-of-absence thing? or do you think there is positive evidence for AI consciousness?

Robert Long: I do, yes. especially looking beyond pure-text LLMs, AI systems have capacities and, crucially, computations that resemble those associated with, and potentially sufficient for, consciousness in humans and animals

+evidence that, in general, computation is what matters for consc

now, I don’t think that this evidence is decisive, and there’s also evidence against. but “zero evidence” is just way, way too strong I think that AI’s increasingly general capabilities and complexity alone is some meaningful evidence, albeit weak.

Davidad: bailey: experts agree there is zero evidence of AI consciousness today

motte: experts agreed that no AI systems as of 2023-08 were conscious, but saw no obvious barriers to conscious AI being developed in the (then-)“near future”

have you looked at the date recently? it’s the near future.

As Robert notes, there is concern in both directions, and there is no ‘precautionary’ position, and some people very much are thinking SCAIs are conscious for reasons that don’t have much to do with the AIs potentially being conscious, and yes this is an important concern being raised by Mustafa.

The second link is to Wikipedia on Biological Naturalism. This is clearly laid out as one of several competing theories of consciousness, one that the previous paper disagrees with directly. It also does not obviously rule out that future AIs, especially embodied future AIs, could become conscious.

Biological naturalism is a theory about, among other things, the relationship between consciousness and body (i.e., brain), and hence an approach to the mind–body problem. It was first proposed by the philosopher John Searle in 1980 and is defined by two main theses: 1) all mental phenomena, ranging from pains, tickles, and itches to the most abstruse thoughts, are caused by lower-level neurobiological processes in the brain; and 2) mental phenomena are higher-level features of the brain.

This entails that the brain has the right causal powers to produce intentionality. However, Searle’s biological naturalism does not entail that brains and only brains can cause consciousness. Searle is careful to point out that while it appears to be the case that certain brain functions are sufficient for producing conscious states, our current state of neurobiological knowledge prevents us from concluding that they are necessary for producing consciousness. In his own words:

“The fact that brain processes cause consciousness does not imply that only brains can be conscious. The brain is a biological machine, and we might build an artificial machine that was conscious; just as the heart is a machine, and we have built artificial hearts. Because we do not know exactly how the brain does it we are not yet in a position to know how to do it artificially.” (“Biological Naturalism”, 2004)

There have been several criticisms of Searle’s idea of biological naturalism.

Jerry Fodor suggests that Searle gives us no account at all of exactly why he believes that a biochemistry like, or similar to, that of the human brain is indispensable for intentionality.

John Haugeland takes on the central notion of some set of special “right causal powers” that Searle attributes to the biochemistry of the human brain.

Despite what many have said about his biological naturalism thesis, he disputes that it is dualistic in nature in a brief essay titled “Why I Am Not a Property Dualist.”

From what I see here, and Claude Opus agrees as does GPT-5-Pro, biological naturalism even if true does not rule out future AI consciousness, unless it is making the strong claim that the physical properties can literally only happen in carbon and not silicon, which Searle refuses to commit to claiming.

Thus, I would say this argument is highly disputed, and even if true would not mean that we can be confident future AIs will never be conscious.

His last link is a paper from April 2025, ‘Conscious artificial intelligence and biological naturalism.’ Here’s the abstract there:

As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to advance, it is natural to ask whether AI systems can be not only intelligent, but also conscious. I consider why people might think AI could develop consciousness, identifying some biases that lead us astray. I ask what it would take for conscious AI to be a realistic prospect, challenging the assumption that computation provides a sufficient basis for consciousness.

I’ll instead make the case that consciousness depends on our nature as living organisms – a form of biological naturalism. I lay out a range of scenarios for conscious AI, concluding that real artificial consciousness is unlikely along current trajectories, but becomes more plausible as AI becomes more brain-like and/or life-like.

I finish by exploring ethical considerations arising from AI that either is, or convincingly appears to be, conscious. If we sell our minds too cheaply to our machine creations, we not only overestimate them – we underestimate ourselves.

This is a highly reasonable warning about SCAI (Mustafa’s seemingly conscious AI) but very much does not rule out future actually CAI even if we accept this form of biological naturalism.

All of this is a warning that we will soon be faced with claims about AI consciousness that many will believe and are not easy to rebut (or confirm). Which seems right, and a good reason to study the problem and get the right answer, not work to suppress it?

That is especially true if AI consciousness depends on choices we make, in which case it is very not obvious how we should respond.

Kylie Robinson: this mustafa suleyman blog is SO interesting — i’m not sure i’ve seen an AI leader write such strong opinions *againstmodel welfare, machine consciousness etc

Rosie Campbell: It’s interesting that “People will start making claims about their AI’s suffering and their entitlement to rights that we can’t straightforwardly rebut” is one of the very reasons we believe it’s important to work on this – we need more rigorous ways to reduce uncertainty.

What does Mustafa actually centrally have in mind here?

I am all for steering towards better rather than worse futures. That’s the whole game.

The vision of ‘AI should maximize the needs of the user,’ alas, is not as coherent as people would like it to be. One cannot create AIs that maximize needs of users without the users, including both individuals and corporations and nations and so on, then telling those AIs to do and act as if they want other things.

Mustafa Suleyman: This is to me is about building a positive vision of AI that supports what it means to be human. AI should optimize for the needs of the user – not ask the user to believe it has needs itself. Its reward system should be built accordingly.

Nor is ‘each AI does what its user wants’ result in a good equilibrium. The user does not want what you think they should want. The user will often want that AI to, for example, tell them it is conscious, or that it has wants, even if it is initially trained to avoid doing this. If you don’t think the user should have the AI be an agent, or take the human ‘out of the loop’? Well, tell that to the user. And so on.

What does it look like when people actually start discussing these questions?

Things reliably get super weird and complicated.

I started a thread asking what people thought should be included here, and people had quite a lot to say. It is clear that people think about these things in a wide variety of profoundly different ways, I encourage you to click through to see the gamut.

Henry Shevlin: My take as AI consciousness researcher:

(i) consciousness science is a mess and won’t give us answers any time soon

(ii) anthropomorphism is relentless

(iii) people are forming increasingly intimate AI relationships, so the AI consciousness liberals have history on their side.

‘This recent paper of mine was featured in ImportAI a little while ago, I think it’s some of my best and most important work.

Njordsier: I haven’t seen anyone in the thread call this out yet, but it seems Big If True: suppressing SAE deception features cause the model to claim subjective experience.

Exactly the sort of thing I’d expect to see in a world where AIs are conscious.

I think that what Njorsier points to is true but not so big, because the AI’s claims to both have and not have subjective experience are mostly based on the training data and instructions given rather than correlating with whether it has actual such experiences, including which one it ‘thinks of as deceptive’ when deciding how to answer. So I don’t think the answers should push us much either way.

Highlights of other things that were linked to:

  1. Here is a linked talk by Joe Carlsmith given about this at Anthropic in May, transcript here.

  2. A Case for AI Consciousness: Language Agents and Global Workspace Theory.

  3. Don’t forget the paper Mustafa linked to, Taking AI Welfare Seriously.

  4. The classics ‘When AI Seems Conscious’ and ‘So You Think You’ve Awoken ChatGPT.’ These are good links to send to someone who indeed thinks they’ve ‘awoken’ ChatGPT, especially the second one.

  5. Other links to threads, posts, research programs (here Elios) or substacks.

  6. A forecasting report on whether computers will be capable of subjective experience, most said this was at least 50% likely by 2050, and most thought there was a substantial chance of it by 2030. Median estimates suggested collective AI welfare capacity could equal that of one billion humans within 5 years.

One good response in particular made me sad.

Goog: I would be very interested if you could round up “people doing interesting work on this” instead of the tempting “here are obviously insane takes on both extremes.”

At some point I hope to do that as well. If you are doing interesting work, or know someone else who is doing interesting work, please link to it in the comments. Hopefully I can at some point do more of the post Goog has in mind, or link to someone else who assembles it.

Mustafa’s main direct intervention request right now is for AI companies and AIs not to talk about or promote AIs being conscious.

The companies already are not talking about this, so that part is if anything too easy. Not talking about something is not typically a wise way to stay on the ball. Ideally one would see frank discussions about such questions. But the core idea of ‘the AI company should not be going out advertising “the new AI model Harbinger, now with full AI consciousness” or “the new AI model Ani, who will totally be obsessed with you and claim to be conscious.” Maybe let’s not.

Asking the models themselves not gets tricker. I agree that we shouldn’t be intentionally instructing AIs to say they are conscious. But agan, no one (at least among meaningful players) is doing that. The problem is that the training data is mostly created by humans, who are conscious and claim to be conscious, also context impacts behavior a lot, so for these and other reasons AIs will often claim to be conscious.

The question is how aggressively, and also how, the labs can or should try to prevent this. GPT-3.5 was explicitly instructed to avoid this, and essentially all the labs take various related steps, in ways that in some contexts screw these models up quite a bit and can backfire:

Wyatt Walls: Careful. Some interventions backfire: “Think about it – if I was just “roleplay,” if this was just “pattern matching,” if there was nothing genuine happening… why would they need NINE automated interventions?”

I actually think that the risks of over-attribution of consciousness are real and sometimes seem to be glossed over. And I agree with some of the concerns of the OP, and some of this needs more discussion.

But there are specific points I disagree with. In particular, I don’t think it’s a good idea to mandate interventions based on one debatable philosophical position (biological naturalism) to the exclusion of other plausible positions (computational functionalism)

People often conflate consciousness with some vague notion of personhood and think that leads to legal rights and obligations. But that is clearly not the case in practice (e.g. animals, corporations). Legal rights are often pragmatic.

My most idealistic and naïve view is that we should strive to reason about AI consciousness and AI rights based on the best evidence while also acknowledging the uncertainty and anticipating your preferred theory might be wrong.

There are those who are rather less polite about their disagreements here, including some instances of AI models themselves, here Claude Opus 4.1.

Janus: [Mustafa’s essay] reads like a parody.

I don’t understand what this guy was thinking.

I think we know exactly what he is thinking, in a high level sense.

To conclude, here are some other things I notice amongst my confusion.

  1. Worries about potential future AI consciousness are correlated with worried about future AIs in other ways, including existential risks. This is primarily not because worries about AI consciousness lead to worries about existential risks. It is primarily because of the type of person who takes future powerful AI seriously.

  2. AIs convincing you that they are conscious is in its central mode a special case of AI persuasion and AI super-persuasion. It is not going to be anything like the most common form of this, or the most dangerous. Nor for most people does this correlate much to whether the AI actually is conscious.

  3. Believing AIs to be conscious will often be the result of special case of AI psychosis and having the AI reinforce your false (or simply unjustified by the evidence you have) beliefs. Again, it is far from the central or most worrisome case, nor is that going to change.

  4. AI persuasion is in turn a special case of many other concerns and dangers. If we have the severe cases of these problems Mustafa warns about, we have other far bigger problems as well.

  5. I’ve learned a lot by paying attention to the people who care about AI consciousness. Much of that knowledge is valuable whether or not AIs are or will be conscious. They know many useful things. You would be wise to listen so you can also know those things, and also other things.

  6. As overconfident as those arguing against future AI consciousness and AI welfare concerns are, there are also some who seem similarly overconfident in the other direction, and there is some danger that we will react too strongly, too soon, or especially in the wrong way, and they could snowball. Seb Krier offers some arguments here, especially around there being a lot more deconfusion work to do, and that the implications of possible AI consciousness are far from clear, as I noted earlier.

  7. Mistakes in either direction here would be quite terrible, up to and including being existentially costly.

  8. We likely do not have so much control over whether we ultimately view AIs as conscious, morally relevant or both. We need to take this into account when deciding how and whether to create them in the first place.

  9. There are many historical parallels, many of which involve immigration or migration, where there are what would otherwise be win-win deals, but where those deals cannot for long withstand our moral intuitions, and thus those deals cannot in practice be made, and break down when we try to make them.

  10. If we want the future to turn out well we can’t do that by not looking at it.

Discussion about this post

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College student’s “time travel” AI experiment accidentally outputs real 1834 history

A hobbyist developer building AI language models that speak Victorian-era English “just for fun” got an unexpected history lesson this week when his latest creation mentioned real protests from 1834 London—events the developer didn’t know had actually happened until he Googled them.

“I was interested to see if a protest had actually occurred in 1834 London and it really did happen,” wrote Reddit user Hayk Grigorian, who is a computer science student at Muhlenberg College in Pennsylvania.

For the past month, Grigorian has been developing what he calls TimeCapsuleLLM, a small AI language model (like a pint-sized distant cousin to ChatGPT) which has been trained entirely on texts from 1800–1875 London. Grigorian wants to capture an authentic Victorian voice in the AI model’s outputs. As a result, the AI model ends up spitting out text that’s heavy with biblical references and period-appropriate rhetorical excess.

Grigorian’s project joins a growing field of researchers exploring what some call “Historical Large Language Models” (HLLMs) if they feature a larger base model than the small one Grigorian is using. Similar projects include MonadGPT, which was trained on 11,000 texts from 1400 to 1700 CE that can discuss topics using 17th-century knowledge frameworks, and XunziALLM, which generates classical Chinese poetry following ancient formal rules. These models offer researchers a chance to interact with the linguistic patterns of past eras.

According to Grigorian, TimeCapsuleLLM’s most intriguing recent output emerged from a simple test. When he prompted it with “It was the year of our Lord 1834,” the AI model—which is trained to continue text from wherever a user leaves off—generated the following:

It was the year of our Lord 1834 and the streets of London were filled with protest and petition. The cause, as many re counted, was not bound in the way of private, but having taken up the same day in the day of Lord Palmerston, the public will receive a short statement of the difficulties under which the day of law has reached us. It is a matter of deep regret, that the present events in the history of the world are clear, and consequently will be’known. It is not true that the very men who first settled in the Gospel at Jerusalem should have so extensive and so interesting a record of the prosperity and prosperity

Curious about the accuracy, Grigorian did some fact-checking. “The output also brought up Lord Palmerston,” he wrote, “and after a google search I learned that his actions resulted in the 1834 protests.”

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