starshield

us-spy-satellites-built-by-spacex-send-signals-in-the-“wrong-direction”

US spy satellites built by SpaceX send signals in the “wrong direction”


Spy satellites emit surprising signals

It seems US didn’t coordinate Starshield’s unusual spectrum use with other countries.

Image of a satellite in space and the Earth in the background.

Image of a Starshield satellite from SpaceX’s website. Credit: SpaceX

Image of a Starshield satellite from SpaceX’s website. Credit: SpaceX

About 170 Starshield satellites built by SpaceX for the US government’s National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) have been sending signals in the wrong direction, a satellite researcher found.

The SpaceX-built spy satellites are helping the NRO greatly expand its satellite surveillance capabilities, but the purpose of these signals is unknown. The signals are sent from space to Earth in a frequency band that’s allocated internationally for Earth-to-space and space-to-space transmissions.

There have been no public complaints of interference caused by the surprising Starshield emissions. But the researcher who found them says they highlight a troubling lack of transparency in how the US government manages the use of spectrum and a failure to coordinate spectrum usage with other countries.

Scott Tilley, an engineering technologist and amateur radio astronomer in British Columbia, discovered the signals in late September or early October while working on another project. He found them in various parts of the 2025–2110 MHz band, and from his location, he was able to confirm that 170 satellites were emitting the signals over Canada, the United States, and Mexico. Given the global nature of the Starshield constellation, the signals may be emitted over other countries as well.

“This particular band is allocated by the ITU [International Telecommunication Union], the United States, and Canada primarily as an uplink band to spacecraft on orbit—in other words, things in space, so satellite receivers will be listening on these frequencies,” Tilley told Ars. “If you’ve got a loud constellation of signals blasting away on the same frequencies, it has the potential to interfere with the reception of ground station signals being directed at satellites on orbit.”

In the US, users of the 2025–2110 MHz portion of the S-Band include NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), as well as nongovernmental users like TV news broadcasters that have vehicles equipped with satellites to broadcast from remote locations.

Experts told Ars that the NRO likely coordinated with the US National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to ensure that signals wouldn’t interfere with other spectrum users. A decision to allow the emissions wouldn’t necessarily be made public, they said. But conflicts with other governments are still possible, especially if the signals are found to interfere with users of the frequencies in other countries.

Surprising signals

A man standing outdoors in front of two large antennas.

Scott Tilley and his antennas.

Credit: Scott Tilley

Scott Tilley and his antennas. Credit: Scott Tilley

Tilley previously made headlines in 2018 when he located a satellite that NASA had lost contact with in 2005. For his new discovery, Tilley published data and a technical paper describing the “strong wideband S-band emissions,” and his work was featured by NPR on October 17.

Tilley’s technical paper said emissions were detected from 170 satellites out of the 193 known Starshield satellites. Emissions have since been detected from one more satellite, making it 171 out of 193, he told Ars. “The apparent downlink use of an uplink-allocated band, if confirmed by authorities, warrants prompt technical and regulatory review to assess interference risk and ensure compliance” with ITU regulations, Tilley’s paper said.

Tilley said he uses a mix of omnidirectional antennas and dish antennas at his home to receive signals, along with “software-defined radios and quite a bit of proprietary software I’ve written or open source software that I use for analysis work.” The signals did not stop when the paper was published. Tilley said the emissions are powerful enough to be received by “relatively small ground stations.”

Tilley’s paper said that Starshield satellites emit signals with a width of 9 MHz and signal-to-noise (SNR) ratios of 10 to 15 decibels. “A 10 dB SNR means the received signal power is ten times greater than the noise power in the same bandwidth,” while “20 dB means one hundred times,” Tilley told Ars.

Other Starshield signals that were 4 or 5 MHz wide “have been observed to change frequency from day to day with SNR exceeding 20dB,” his paper said. “Also observed from time to time are other weaker wide signals from 2025–2110 MHz what may be artifacts or actual intentional emissions.”

The 2025–2110 MHz band is used by NASA for science missions and by other countries for similar missions, Tilley noted. “Any other radio activity that’s occurring on this band is intentionally limited to avoid causing disruption to its primary purpose,” he said.

The band is used for some fully terrestrial, non-space purposes. Mobile service is allowed in 2025–2110 MHz, but ITU rules say that “administrations shall not introduce high-density mobile systems” in these frequencies. The band is also licensed in the US for non-federal terrestrial services, including the Broadcast Auxiliary Service, Cable Television Relay Service, and Local Television Transmission Service.

While Earth-based systems using the band, such as TV links from mobile studios, have legal protection against interference, Tilley noted that “they normally use highly directional and local signals to link a field crew with a studio… they’re not aimed into space but at a terrestrial target with a very directional antenna.” A trade group representing the US broadcast industry told Ars that it hasn’t observed any interference from Starshield satellites.

“There without anybody knowing it”

Spectrum consultant Rick Reaser told Ars that Starshield’s space-to-Earth transmissions likely haven’t caused any interference problems. “You would not see this unless you were looking for it, or if it turns out that your receiver looks for everything, which most receivers aren’t going to do,” he said.

Reaser said it appears that “whatever they’re doing, they’ve come up with a way to sort of be there without anybody knowing it,” or at least until Tilley noticed the signals.

“But then the question is, can somebody prove that that’s caused a problem?” Reaser said. Other systems using the same spectrum in the correct direction probably aren’t pointed directly at the Starshield satellites, he said.

Reaser’s extensive government experience includes managing spectrum for the Defense Department, negotiating a spectrum-sharing agreement with the European Union, and overseeing the development of new signals for GPS. Reaser said that Tilley’s findings are interesting because the signals would be hard to discover.

“It is being used in the wrong direction, if they’re coming in downlink, that’s supposed to be an uplink,” Reaser said. As for what the signals are being used for, Reaser said he doesn’t know. “It could be communication, it could be all sorts of things,” he said.

Tilley’s paper said the “results raise questions about frequency-allocation compliance and the broader need for transparent coordination among governmental, commercial, and scientific stakeholders.” He argues that international coordination is becoming more important because of the ongoing deployment of large constellations of satellites that could cause harmful interference.

“Cooperative disclosure—without compromising legitimate security interests—will be essential to balance national capability with the shared responsibility of preserving an orderly and predictable radio environment,” his paper said. “The findings presented here are offered in that spirit: not as accusation, but as a public-interest disclosure grounded in reproducible measurement and open analysis. The data, techniques, and references provided enable independent verification by qualified parties without requiring access to proprietary or classified information.”

While Tilley doesn’t know exactly what the emissions are for, his paper said the “signal characteristics—strong, coherent, and highly predictable carriers from a large constellation—create the technical conditions under which opportunistic or deliberate PNT exploitation could occur.”

PNT refers to Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) applications. “While it is not suggested that the system was designed for that role, the combination of wideband data channels and persistent carrier tones in a globally distributed or even regionally operated network represents a practical foundation for such use, either by friendly forces in contested environments or by third parties seeking situational awareness,” the paper said.

Emissions may have been approved in secret

Tilley told us that a few Starshield satellites launched just recently, in late September, have not emitted signals while moving toward their final orbits. He said this suggests the emissions are for an “operational payload” and not merely for telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C).

“This could mean that [the newest satellites] don’t have this payload or that the emissions are not part of TT&C and may begin once these satellites achieve their place within the constellation,” Tilley told Ars. “If these emissions are TT&C, you would expect them to be active especially during the early phases of the mission, when the satellites are actively being tested and moved into position within the constellation.”

Whatever they’re for, Reaser said the emissions were likely approved by the NTIA and that the agency would likely have consulted with the Federal Communications Commission. For federal spectrum use, these kinds of decisions aren’t necessarily made public, he said.

“NRO would have to coordinate that through the NTIA to make sure they didn’t have an interference problem,” Reaser said. “And by the way, this happens a lot. People figure out a way [to transmit] on what they call a non-interference basis, and that’s probably how they got this approved. They say, ‘listen, if somebody reports interference, then you have to shut down.’”

Tilley said it’s clear that “persistent S-band emissions are occurring in the 2025–2110 MHz range without formal ITU coordination.” Claims that the downlink use was approved by the NTIA in a non-public decision “underscore, rather than resolve, the transparency problem,” he told Ars.

An NTIA spokesperson declined to comment. The NRO and FCC did not provide any comment in response to requests from Ars.

SpaceX just “a contractor for the US government”

Randall Berry, a Northwestern University professor of electrical and computer engineering, agreed with Reaser that it’s likely the NTIA approved the downlink use of the band and that this decision was not made public. Getting NTIA clearance is “the proper way this should be done,” he said.

“It would be surprising if NTIA was not aware, as Starshield is a government-operated system,” Berry told Ars. While NASA and other agencies use the band for Earth-to-space transmissions, “they may have been able to show that the Starshield space-to-Earth signals do not create harmful interference with these Earth-to-space signals,” he said.

There is another potential explanation that is less likely but more sinister. Berry said it’s possible that “SpaceX did not make this known to NTIA when the system was cleared for federal use.” Berry said this would be “surprising and potentially problematic.”

Digital rendering of a satellite in space.

SpaceX rendering of a Starshield satellite.

Credit: SpaceX

SpaceX rendering of a Starshield satellite. Credit: SpaceX

Tilley doesn’t think SpaceX is responsible for the emissions. While Starshield relies on technology built for the commercial Starlink broadband system of low Earth orbit satellites, Elon Musk’s space company made the Starshield satellites in its role as a contractor for the US government.

“I think [SpaceX is] just operating as a contractor for the US government,” Tilley said. “They built a satellite to the government specs provided for them and launched it for them. And from what I understand, the National Reconnaissance Office is the operator.”

SpaceX did not respond to a request for comment.

TV broadcasters conduct interference analysis

TV broadcasters with news trucks that use the same frequencies “protect their band vigorously” and would have reported interference if it was affecting their transmissions, Reaser said. This type of spectrum use is known as Electronic News Gathering (ENG).

The National Association of Broadcasters told Ars that it “has been closely tracking recent reports concerning satellite downlink operation in the 2025–2110 MHz frequency band… While it’s not clear that satellite downlink operations are authorized by international treaty in this range, such operations are uncommon, and we are not aware of any interference complaints related to downlink use.”

The NAB investigated after Tilley’s report. “When the Tilley report first surfaced, NAB conducted an interference analysis—based on some assumptions given that Starshield’s operating parameters have not been publicly disclosed,” the group told us. “That analysis found that interference with ENG systems is unlikely. We believe the proposed downlink operations are likely compatible with broadcaster use of the band, though coordination issues with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) could still arise.”

Tilley said that a finding of interference being unlikely “addresses only performance, not legality… coordination conducted only within US domestic channels does not meet international requirements under the ITU Radio Regulations. This deployment is not one or two satellites, it is a distributed constellation of hundreds of objects with potential global implications.”

Canada agency: No coordination with ITU or US

When contacted by Ars, an ITU spokesperson said the agency is “unable to provide any comment or additional information on the specific matter referenced.” The ITU said that interference concerns “can be formally raised by national administrations” and that the ITU’s Radio Regulations Board “carefully examines the specifics of the case and determines the most appropriate course of action to address it in line with ITU procedures.”

The Canadian Space Agency (CSA) told Ars that its “missions operating within the frequency band have not yet identified any instances of interference that negatively impact their operations and can be attributed to the referenced emissions.” The CSA indicated that there hasn’t been any coordination with the ITU or the US over the new emissions.

“To date, no coordination process has been initiated for the satellite network in question,” the CSA told Ars. “Coordination of satellite networks is carried out through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Radio Regulation, with Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED) serving as the responsible national authority.”

The European Space Agency also uses the 2025–2100 band for TT&C. We contacted the agency but did not receive any comment.

The lack of coordination “remains the central issue,” Tilley told Ars. “This band is globally allocated for Earth-to-space uplinks and limited space-to-space use, not continuous space-to-Earth transmissions.”

NASA needs protection from interference

An NTIA spectrum-use report updated in 2015 said NASA “operates earth stations in this band for tracking and command of manned and unmanned Earth-orbiting satellites and space vehicles either for Earth-to-space links for satellites in all types of orbits or through space-to-space links using the Tracking Data and Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). These earth stations control ninety domestic and international space missions including the Space Shuttle, the Hubble Space Telescope, and the International Space Station.”

Additionally, the NOAA “operates earth stations in this band to control the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) and Polar Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) meteorological satellite systems,” which collect data used by the National Weather Service. We contacted NASA and NOAA, but neither agency provided comment to Ars.

NASA’s use of the band has increased in recent years. The NTIA told the FCC in 2021 that 2025–2110 MHz is “heavily used today and require[s] extensive coordination even among federal users.” The band “has seen dramatically increased demand for federal use as federal operations have shifted from federal bands that were repurposed to accommodate new commercial wireless broadband operations.”

A 2021 NASA memo included in the filing said that NASA would only support commercial launch providers using the band if their use was limited to sending commands to launch vehicles for recovery and retrieval purposes. Even with that limit, commercial launch providers would cause “significant interference” for existing federal operations in the band if the commercial use isn’t coordinated through the NTIA, the memo said.

“NASA makes extensive use of this band (i.e., currently 382 assignments) for both transmissions from earth stations supporting NASA spacecraft (Earth-to-space) and transmissions from NASA’s Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) to user spacecraft (space-to-space), both of which are critical to NASA operations,” the memo said.

In 2024, the FCC issued an order allowing non-federal space launch operations to use the 2025–2110 MHz band on a secondary basis. The allocation is “limited to space launch telecommand transmissions and will require commercial space launch providers to coordinate with non-Federal terrestrial licensees… and NTIA,” the FCC order said.

International non-interference rules

While US agencies may not object to the Starshield emissions, that doesn’t guarantee there will be no trouble with other countries. Article 4.4 of ITU regulations says that member nations may not assign frequencies that conflict with the Table of Frequency Allocations “except on the express condition that such a station, when using such a frequency assignment, shall not cause harmful interference to, and shall not claim protection from harmful interference caused by, a station operating in accordance with the provisions.”

Reaser said that under Article 4.4, entities that are caught interfering with other spectrum users are “supposed to shut down.” But if the Starshield users were accused of interference, they would probably “open negotiations with the offended party” instead of immediately stopping the emissions, he said.

“My guess is they were allowed to operate on a non-interference basis and if there is an interference issue, they’d have to go figure a way to resolve them,” he said.

Tilley told Ars that Article 4.4 allows for non-interference use domestically but “is not a blank check for continuous, global downlinks from a constellation.” In that case, “international coordination duties still apply,” he said.

Tilley pointed out that under the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, states must report the general function of a space object. “Objects believed to be part of the Starshield constellation have been registered with UNOOSA [United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs] under the broad description: ‘Spacecraft engaged in practical applications and uses of space technology such as weather or communications,’” his paper said.

Tilley told Ars that a vague description such as this “may satisfy the letter of filing requirements, but it contradicts the spirit” of international agreements. He contends that filings should at least state whether a satellite is for military purposes.

“The real risk is that we are no longer dealing with one or two satellites but with massive constellations that, by their very design, are global in scope,” he told Ars. “Unilateral use of space and spectrum affects every nation. As the examples of US and Chinese behavior illustrate, we are beginning from uncertain ground when it comes to large, militarily oriented mega-constellations, and, at the very least, this trend distorts the intent and spirit of international law.”

China’s constellation

Tilley said he has tracked China’s Guowang constellation and its use of “spectrum within the 1250–1300 MHz range, which is not allocated for space-to-Earth communications.” China, he said, “filed advance notice and coordination requests with the ITU for this spectrum but was not granted protection for its non-compliant use. As a result, later Chinese filings notifying and completing due diligence with the ITU omit this spectrum, yet the satellites are using it over other nations. This shows that the Chinese government consulted internationally and proceeded anyway, while the US government simply did not consult at all.”

By contrast, Canada submitted “an unusual level of detail” to the ITU for its military satellite Sapphire and coordinated fully with the ITU, he said.

Tilley said he reported his findings on Starshield emissions “directly to various western space agencies and the Canadian government’s spectrum management regulators” at the ISED.

“The Canadian government has acknowledged my report, and it has been disseminated within their departments, according to a senior ISED director’s response to me,” Tilley said, adding that he is continuing to collaborate “with other researchers to assist in the gathering of more data on the scope and impact of these emissions.”

The ISED told Ars that it “takes any reports of interference seriously and is not aware of any instances or complaints in these bands. As a general practice, complaints of potential interference are investigated to determine both the cause and possible resolutions. If it is determined that the source of interference is not Canadian, ISED works with its regulatory counterparts in the relevant administration to resolve the issue. ISED has well-established working arrangements with counterparts in other countries to address frequency coordination or interference matters.”

Accidental discovery

Two pictures of large antennas set up outdoors.

Antennas used by Scott Tilley.

Credit: Scott Tilley

Antennas used by Scott Tilley. Credit: Scott Tilley

Tilley’s discovery of Starshield signals happened because of “a clumsy move at the keyboard,” he told NPR. “I was resetting some stuff, and then all of a sudden, I’m looking at the wrong antenna, the wrong band,” he said.

People using the spectrum for Earth-to-space transmissions generally wouldn’t have any reason to listen for transmissions on the same frequencies, Tilley told Ars. Satellites using 2025–2100 MHz for Earth-to-space transmissions have their downlink operations on other frequencies, he said.

“The whole reason why I publicly revealed this rather than just quietly sit on it is to alert spacecraft operators that don’t normally listen on this band… that they should perform risk assessments and assess whether their missions have suffered any interference or could suffer interference and be prepared to deal with that,” he said.

A spacecraft operator may not know “a satellite is receiving interference unless the satellite is refusing to communicate with them or asking for the ground station to repeat the message over and over again,” Tilley said. “Unless they specifically have a reason to look or it becomes particularly onerous for them, they may not immediately realize what’s going on. It’s not like they’re sitting there watching the spectrum to see unusual signals that could interfere with the spacecraft.”

While NPR paraphrased Tilley as saying that the transmissions could be “designed to hide Starshield’s operations,” he told Ars that this characterization is “maybe a bit strongly worded.”

“It’s certainly an unusual place to put something. I don’t want to speculate about what the real intentions are, but it certainly could raise a question in one’s mind as to why they would choose to emit there. We really don’t know and probably never will know,” Tilley told us.

How amateurs track Starshield

After finding the signals, Tilley determined they were being sent by Starshield satellites by consulting data collected by amateurs on the constellation. SpaceX launches the satellites into what Tilley called classified orbits, but the space company distributes some information that can be used to track their locations.

For safety reasons, SpaceX publishes “a notice to airmen and sailors that they’re going to be dropping boosters and debris in hazard areas… amateurs use those to determine the orbital plane the launch is going to go into,” Tilley said. “Once we know that, we just basically wait for optical windows when the lighting is good, and then we’re able to pick up the objects and start tracking them and then start cataloguing them and generating orbits. A group of us around the world do that. And over the last year and a half or so since they started launching the bulk of this constellation, the amateurs have amassed considerable body of orbital data on this constellation.”

After accidentally discovering the emissions, Tilley said he used open source software to “compare the Doppler signal I was receiving to the orbital elements… and immediately started coming back with hits to Starshield and nothing else.” He said this means that “the tens of thousands of other objects in orbit didn’t match the radio Doppler characteristics that these objects have.”

Tilley is still keeping an eye on the transmissions. He told us that “I’m continuing to hear the signals, record them, and monitor developments within the constellation.”

Photo of Jon Brodkin

Jon is a Senior IT Reporter for Ars Technica. He covers the telecom industry, Federal Communications Commission rulemakings, broadband consumer affairs, court cases, and government regulation of the tech industry.

US spy satellites built by SpaceX send signals in the “wrong direction” Read More »

pentagon-may-put-spacex-at-the-center-of-a-sensor-to-shooter-targeting-network

Pentagon may put SpaceX at the center of a sensor-to-shooter targeting network


Under this plan, SpaceX’s satellites would play a big role in the Space Force’s kill chain.

The Trump administration plans to cancel a fleet of orbiting data relay satellites managed by the Space Development Agency and replace it with a secretive network that, so far, relies primarily on SpaceX’s Starlink Internet constellation, according to budget documents.

The move prompted questions from lawmakers during a Senate hearing on the Space Force’s budget last week. While details of the Pentagon’s plan remain secret, the White House proposal would commit $277 million in funding to kick off a new program called “pLEO SATCOM” or “MILNET.”

The funding line for a proliferated low-Earth orbit satellite communications network hasn’t appeared in a Pentagon budget before, but plans for MILNET already exist in a different form. Meanwhile, the budget proposal for fiscal year 2026 would eliminate funding for a new tranche of data relay satellites from the Space Development Agency. The pLEO SATCOM or MILNET program would replace them, providing crucial support for the Trump administration’s proposed Golden Dome missile defense shield.

“We have to look at what are the other avenues to deliver potentially a commercial proliferated low-Earth orbit constellation,” Gen. Chance Saltzman, chief of space operations, told senators last week. “So, we are simply looking at alternatives as we look to the future as to what’s the best way to scale this up to the larger requirements for data transport.”

What will these satellites do?

For six years, the Space Development Agency’s core mission has been to provide the military with a more resilient, more capable network of missile tracking and data relay platforms in low-Earth orbit. Those would augment the Pentagon’s legacy fleet of large, billion-dollar missile warning satellites that are parked more than 20,000 miles away in geostationary orbit.

These satellites detect the heat plumes from missile launches—and also large explosions and wildfires—to provide an early warning of an attack. The US Space Force’s early warning satellites were critical in allowing interceptors to take out Iranian ballistic missiles launched toward Israel last month.

Experts say there are good reasons for the SDA’s efforts. One motivation was the realization over the last decade or so that a handful of expensive spacecraft make attractive targets for an anti-satellite attack. It’s harder for a potential military adversary to go after a fleet of hundreds of smaller satellites. And if they do take out a few of these lower-cost satellites, it’s easier to replace them with little impact on US military operations.

Missile-tracking satellites in low-Earth orbit, flying at altitudes of just a few hundred miles, are also closer to the objects they are designed to track, meaning their infrared sensors can detect and locate dimmer heat signatures from smaller projectiles, such as hypersonic missiles.

The military’s Space Development Agency is in the process of buying, building, and launching a network of hundreds of missile-tracking and communications satellites. Credit: Northrop Grumman

But tracking the missiles isn’t enough. The data must reach the ground in order to be useful. The SDA’s architecture includes a separate fleet of small communications satellites to relay data from the missile tracking network, and potentially surveillance spacecraft tracking other kinds of moving targets, to military forces on land, at sea, or in the air through a series of inter-satellite laser crosslinks.

The military refers to this data relay component as the transport layer. When it was established in the first Trump administration, the SDA set out to deploy tranches of tracking and data transport satellites. Each new tranche would come online every couple of years, allowing the Pentagon to tap into new technologies as fast as industry develops them.

The SDA launched 27 so-called “Tranche 0” satellites in 2023 to demonstrate the concept’s overall viability. The first batch of more than 150 operational SDA satellites, called Tranche 1, is due to begin launching later this year. The SDA plans to begin deploying more than 250 Tranche 2 satellites in 2027. Another set of satellites, Tranche 3, would have followed a couple of years later. Now, the Pentagon seeks to cancel the Tranche 3 transport layer, while retaining the Tranche 3 tracking layer under the umbrella of the Space Development Agency.

Out of the shadows

While SpaceX’s role isn’t mentioned explicitly in the Pentagon’s budget documents, the MILNET program is already on the books, and SpaceX is the lead contractor. It has been made public in recent months, after years of secrecy, although many details remain unclear. Managed in a partnership between the Space Force and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), MILNET is designed to use military-grade versions of Starlink Internet satellites to create a “hybrid mesh network” the military can rely on for a wide range of applications.

The military version of the Starlink platform is called Starshield. SpaceX has already launched nearly 200 Starshield satellites for the NRO, which uses them for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.

At an industry conference last month, the Space Force commander in charge of operating the military’s communications satellites revealed new information about MILNET, according to a report by Breaking Defense. The network uses SpaceX-made user terminals with additional encryption to connect with Starshield satellites in orbit.

Col. Jeff Weisler, commander of a Space Force unit called Delta 8, said MILNET will comprise some 480 satellites operated by SpaceX but overseen by a military mission director “who communicates to the contracted workforce to execute operations at the timing and tempo of warfighting.”

The Space Force has separate contracts with SpaceX to use the commercial Starlink service. MILNET’s dedicated constellation of more secure Starshield satellites is separate from Starlink, which now has more 7,000 satellites in space.

“We are completely relooking at how we’re going to operate that constellation of capabilities for the joint force, which is going to be significant because we’ve never had a DoD hybrid mesh network at LEO,” Weisler said last month.

So, the Pentagon already relies on SpaceX’s communication services, not to mention the company’s position as the leading launch provider for Space Force and NRO satellites. With MILNET’s new role as a potential replacement for the Space Development Agency’s data relay network, SpaceX’s satellites would become a cog in combat operations.

Gen. Chance Saltzman, chief of Space Operations in the US Space Force, looks on before testifying before a House Defense Subcommittee on May 6, 2025. Credit: Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images

The data transport layer, whether it’s SDA’s architecture or a commercial solution like Starshield, will “underpin” the Pentagon’s planned Golden Dome missile defense system, Saltzman said.

But it’s not just missiles. Data relay satellites in low-Earth orbit will also have a part in the Space Force’s initiatives to develop space-based platforms to track moving targets on the ground and in the air. Eventually, all Space Force satellites could have the ability to plug into MILNET to send their data to the ground.

A spokesperson for the Department of the Air Force, which includes the Space Force, told Air & Space Forces Magazine that the pLEO, or MILNET, constellation “will provide global, integrated, and resilient capabilities across the combat power, global mission data transport, and satellite communications mission areas.”

That all adds up to a lot of bits and bytes, and the Space Force’s need for data backhaul is only going to increase, according to Col. Robert Davis, head of the Space Sensing Directorate at Space Systems Command.

He said the SDA’s satellites will use onboard edge processing to create two-dimensional missile track solutions. Eventually, the SDA’s satellites will be capable of 3D data fusion with enough fidelity to generate a full targeting solution that could be transmitted directly to a weapons system for it to take action without needing any additional data processing on the ground.

“I think the compute [capability] is there,” Davis said Tuesday at an event hosted by the Mitchell Institute, an aerospace-focused think tank in Washington, DC. “Now, it’s a comm[unication] problem and some other technical integration challenges. But how do I do that 3D fusion on orbit? If I do 3D fusion on orbit, what does that allow me to do? How do I get low-latency comms to the shooter or to a weapon itself that’s in flight? So you can imagine the possibilities there.”

The possibilities include exploiting automation, artificial intelligence, and machine learning to sense, target, and strike an enemy vehicle—a truck, tank, airplane, ship, or missile—nearly instantaneously.

“If I’m on the edge doing 3D fusion, I’m less dependent on the ground and I can get around the globe with my mesh network,” Davis said. “There’s inherent resilience in the overall architecture—not just the space architecture, but the overall architecture—if the ground segment or link segment comes under attack.”

Questioning the plan

Military officials haven’t disclosed the cost of MILNET, either in its current form or in the future architecture envisioned by the Trump administration. For context, SDA has awarded fixed-price contracts worth more than $5.6 billion for approximately 340 data relay satellites in Tranches 1 and 2.

That comes out to roughly $16 million per spacecraft, at least an order of magnitude more expensive than a Starlink satellite coming off of SpaceX’s assembly line. Starshield satellites, with their secure communications capability, are presumably somewhat more expensive than an off-the-shelf Starlink.

Some former defense officials and lawmakers are uncomfortable with putting commercially operated satellites in the “kill chain,” the term military officials use for the process of identifying threats, making a targeting decision, and taking military action.

It isn’t clear yet whether SpaceX will operate the MILNET satellites in this new paradigm, but the company has a longstanding preference for doing so. SpaceX built a handful of tech demo satellites for the Space Development Agency a few years ago, but didn’t compete for subsequent SDA contracts. One reason for this, sources told Ars, is that the SDA operates its satellite constellation from government-run control centers.

Instead, the SDA chose L3Harris, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Rocket Lab, Sierra Space, Terran Orbital, and York Space Systems to provide the next batches of missile tracking and data transport satellites. RTX, formerly known as Raytheon, withdrew from a contract after the company determined it couldn’t make money on the program.

The tracking satellites will carry different types of infrared sensors, some with wide fields of view to detect missile launches as they happen, and others with narrow-angle sensors to maintain custody of projectiles in flight. The data relay satellites will employ different frequencies and anti-jam waveforms to supply encrypted data to military forces on the ground.

This frame from a SpaceX video shows a stack of Starlink Internet satellites attached to the upper stage of a Falcon 9 rocket, moments after the launcher’s payload fairing is jettisoned. Credit: SpaceX

The Space Development Agency’s path hasn’t been free of problems. The companies the agency selected to build its spacecraft have faced delays, largely due to supply chain issues, and some government officials have worried the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aren’t ready to fully capitalize on the information streaming down from the SDA’s satellites.

The SDA hired SAIC, a government services firm, earlier this year with a $55 million deal to act as a program integrator with responsibility to bring together satellites from multiple contractors, keep them on schedule, and ensure they provide useful information once they’re in space.

SpaceX, on the other hand, is a vertically integrated company. It designs, builds, and launches its own Starlink and Starshield satellites. The only major components of SpaceX’s spy constellation for the NRO that the company doesn’t build in-house are the surveillance sensors, which come from Northrop Grumman.

Buying a service from SpaceX might save money and reduce the chances of further delays. But lawmakers argued there’s a risk in relying on a single company for something that could make or break real-time battlefield operations.

Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.), ranking member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, raised concerns that the Space Force is canceling a program with “robust competition and open standards” and replacing it with a network that is “sole-sourced to SpaceX.”

“This is a massive and important contract,” Coons said. “Doesn’t handing this to SpaceX make us dependent on their proprietary technology and avoid the very positive benefits of competition and open architecture?”

Later in the hearing, Sen. John Hoeven (R-N.D.) chimed in with his own warning about the Space Force’s dependence on contractors. Hoeven’s state is home to one of the SDA’s satellite control centers.

“We depend on the Air Force, the Space Force, the Department of Defense, and the other services, and we can’t be dependent on private enterprise when it comes to fighting a war, right? Would you agree with that?” Hoeven asked Saltzman.

“Absolutely, we can’t be dependent on it,” Saltzman replied.

Air Force Secretary Troy Meink said military officials haven’t settled on a procurement strategy. He didn’t mention SpaceX by name.

As we go forward, MILNET, the term, should not be taken as just a system,” Meink said. “How we field that going forward into the future is something that’s still under consideration, and we will look at the acquisition of that.”

An Air Force spokesperson confirmed the requirements and architecture for MILNET are still in development, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine. The spokesperson added that the department is “investigating” how to scale MILNET into a “multi-vendor satellite communication architecture that avoids vendor lock.”

This doesn’t sound all that different than the SDA’s existing technical approach for data relay, but it shifts more responsibility to commercial companies. While there’s still a lot we don’t know, contractors with existing mega-constellations would appear to have an advantage in winning big bucks under the Pentagon’s new plan.

There are other commercial low-Earth orbit constellations coming online, such as Amazon’s Project Kuiper broadband network, that could play a part in MILNET. However, if the Space Force is looking for a turnkey commercial solution, Starlink and Starshield are the only options available today, putting SpaceX in a strong position for a massive windfall.

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Stephen Clark is a space reporter at Ars Technica, covering private space companies and the world’s space agencies. Stephen writes about the nexus of technology, science, policy, and business on and off the planet.

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nro-chief:-“you-can’t-hide”-from-our-new-swarm-of-spacex-built-spy-satellites

NRO chief: “You can’t hide” from our new swarm of SpaceX-built spy satellites


“A satellite is always coming over an area within a given reasonable amount of time.”

This frame from a SpaceX video shows a stack of Starlink Internet satellites attached to the upper stage of a Falcon 9 rocket, moments after jettison of the launcher’s payload fairing. Credit: SpaceX

The director of the National Reconnaissance Office has a message for US adversaries around the world.

“You can’t hide, because we’re constantly looking,” said Chris Scolese, a longtime NASA engineer who took the helm of the US government’s spy satellite agency in 2019.

The NRO is taking advantage of SpaceX’s Starlink satellite assembly line to build a network of at least 100 satellites, and perhaps many more, to monitor adversaries around the world. So far, more than 80 of these SpaceX-made spacecraft, each a little less than a ton in mass, have launched on four Falcon 9 rockets. There are more to come.

A large number of these mass-produced satellites, or what the NRO calls a “proliferated architecture,” will provide regularly updated imagery of foreign military installations and other sites of interest to US intelligence agencies. Scolese said the new swarm of satellites will “get us reasonably high-resolution imagery of the Earth, at a high rate of speed.”

This is a significant change in approach for the NRO, which has historically operated a smaller number of more expensive satellites, some as big as a school bus.

“We expect to quadruple the number of satellites we have to have on-orbit in the next decade,” said Col. Eric Zarybnisky, director of the NRO’s office of space launch, during an October 29 presentation at the Wernher von Braun Space Exploration Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama.

The NRO is not the only national security agency eyeing a constellation of satellites in low-Earth orbit. The Pentagon’s Space Development Agency plans to kick off a rapid-fire launch cadence next year to begin placing hundreds of small satellites in orbit to detect and track missiles threatening US or allied forces. The Space Force is also interested in buying its own set of SpaceX satellites for broadband connectivity.

The Pentagon started moving in this direction about a decade ago, when leaders raised concerns that the legacy fleets of military and spy satellites were at risk of attack. Now, Elon Musk’s SpaceX and a handful of other companies, many of them startups, specialize in manufacturing and launching small satellites at relatively low cost.

“Why didn’t we do this earlier? Well, launch costs were high, right?” said Troy Meink, the NRO’s principal deputy director, in an October 17 discussion hosted by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. “The cost of entry was pretty high, which has come way down. Then, digital electronics has allowed us to build capability in a much smaller package, and a combination of those two is really what’s enabled it.”

A constant vigil

NRO officials still expect to require some large satellites with sharp-eyed optics—think of a Hubble Space Telescope pointed at Earth—to resolve the finest details of things like missile installations, naval fleets, or insurgent encampments. The drawback of this approach is that, at best, a few big optical or radar imaging satellites only fly over places of interest several times per day.

With the proliferated architecture, the NRO will capture views of most places on Earth a lot more often. Two of the most important metrics with a remote-sensing satellite system are imaging resolution and revisit time, or how often a satellite is over a specific location on Earth.

“We need to have persistence or fast revisit,” Scolese said on October 3 in a discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a nonprofit Washington think tank. “You can proliferate your architecture, put more satellites up there, so that a satellite is always coming over an area within a given reasonable amount of time that’s needed by the users. That’s what we’re doing with the proliferated architecture.

“That’s enabled by a really rich commercial industry that’s building hundreds or thousands of satellites,” Scolese said. “That allowed us to take those satellites, adapt them to our use at low cost, and apply whatever sensor is needed to go off and acquire the information that’s needed at whatever revisit time is required.”

The NRO’s logo for its proliferated satellite constellation, with the slogan “Strength in Numbers.”

Credit: National Reconnaissance Office

The NRO’s logo for its proliferated satellite constellation, with the slogan “Strength in Numbers.” Credit: National Reconnaissance Office

The NRO has identified other benefits, too. It’s a lot more difficult for a country like Russia or China to take out an entire constellation of satellites than to destroy or disable a single spy platform in orbit. Military officials have often referred to these expensive one-off satellites as “big juicy targets” for potential adversaries.

“It gives us a degree of resilience that we didn’t have before,” Scolese said.

The proliferated constellation also allows the NRO to be more nimble in responding to threats or new technologies. If a new type of sensor becomes available, or an adversary does something new that intelligence analysts want to look at, the NRO and its contractor can quickly swap out payloads on satellites going through the production line.

“That’s a huge change for an organization like the NRO,” Zarybnisky said. “It’s a catalyst. Another catalyst for innovation in the NRO is these smaller, lower price-point systems. Rapid turn time means you can introduce that next technology into the next generation and not wait for many years or even decades to introduce new technologies.”

Three-letter agencies

The NRO provides imaging, signals, and electronic intelligence data from its satellites to the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense. Scolese said the NRO wants to get actionable information into the hands of users across the federal government as quickly as possible, but the volume of data coming down from hundreds of satellites presents a challenge.

“Once you go to a proliferated architecture and you’re going from a few satellites to tens of satellites to now hundreds of satellites, you have to change a lot of things, and we’re in the process of doing that,” Scolese said.

With so many satellites, it “means that it’s no longer possible for an individual sitting at a control center to say, ‘I know what this satellite is doing,'” Scolese said. “So we have to have the machines to go off and help us there. We need artificial intelligence, machine learning, automated processes to help us do that.”

“We will deliver data in seconds, not minutes, and not hours,” Zarybnisky said.

The existence of this constellation was made public in March, when Reuters reported the NRO was working with SpaceX to develop and deploy a network of satellites in low-Earth orbit. SpaceX’s Starshield business unit is building the satellites under a $1.8 billion contract signed in 2021, according to Reuters. This is remarkably inexpensive by the standards of the NRO, which has spent more money just constructing a satellite processing facility at Cape Canaveral, Florida (thanks to Eric Berger’s reporting in Reentry for this juicy tidbit).

Chris Scolese appears before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2019 during a confirmation hearing to become director of the National Reconnaissance Office.

Chris Scolese appears before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2019 during a confirmation hearing to become director of the National Reconnaissance Office. Credit: Tom Williams/CQ Roll Call

Reuters reported Northrop Grumman is supplying sensors to mount on at least some of the SpaceX-built satellites, but their design and capabilities remain classified. The NRO, which usually keeps its work secret, officially acknowledged the program in April, a month before the first batch of satellites launched from Vandenberg Space Force Base, California.

SpaceX revealed the existence of the Starshield division in 2022, the year after signing the NRO contract, as a vehicle for applying the company’s experience manufacturing Starlink Internet satellites to support US national security missions. SpaceX has built and launched more than 7,200 Starlink satellites since 2019, with more than 6,000 currently operational, 10 times larger than any other existing satellite constellation.

The current generation of Starlink satellites launch in batches of 20 to 23 spacecraft on SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket. They’re flat-packed one on top of the other inside the Falcon 9’s payload shroud, then released all at once in orbit. The NRO’s new satellites likely use the same basic design, launching in groups of roughly 21 satellites on each mission.

According to Scolese, the NRO owns these SpaceX-built satellites, rather than SpaceX owning them and supplying data to the government through a service contract arrangement. By the end of the year, the NRO’s director anticipates having at least 100 of these satellites in orbit, with additional launches expected through 2028.

“We are going from the demo phase to the operational phase, where we’re really going to be able to start testing all of this stuff out in a more operational way,” Scolese said.

The NRO is buttressing its network of government-owned satellites with data buys from commercial remote-sensing companies, such as Maxar, Planet, and BlackSky. One advantage of commercial imagery is the NRO can share it widely with allies and the public because it isn’t subject to top-secret classification restrictions.

Scolese said it’s important to maintain a diversity of sources and observation methods to overcome efforts from other nations to hide what they’re doing. This means using more satellites, as the NRO is doing with SpaceX and other commercial partners. It also means using electro-optical, radar, thermal infrared, and electronic detection sensors to fully characterize what intelligence analysts are seeing.

The NRO is also studying more exotic methods like quantum remote sensing, using the principles of quantum physics at the atomic level.

“There’s camouflage,” Scolese said. “There are lots of techniques that can be used, which means we have to go off and look at very different phenomenologies, and we’ve developed and are developing capabilities that will allow us to defeat those types of activities. Quantum sensing is one of them. You can’t really hide from fundamental physics.”

Photo of Stephen Clark

Stephen Clark is a space reporter at Ars Technica, covering private space companies and the world’s space agencies. Stephen writes about the nexus of technology, science, policy, and business on and off the planet.

NRO chief: “You can’t hide” from our new swarm of SpaceX-built spy satellites Read More »