Author name: Kelly Newman

after-kirk-shooting,-utah-governor-calls-social-media-a-“cancer.”-will-we-treat-it-like-one?

After Kirk shooting, Utah governor calls social media a “cancer.” Will we treat it like one?

This is an extremely online style of writing—cryptic, meme-driven, and jokey even about serious or disturbing issues. Was the alleged shooter helped toward his act of violence by the communities he was in online? And are millions of Internet users helping or hurting their own moral and civic identities by watching detailed video of the murder, which was immediately shared on social media?

As his press conference wrapped up, Cox made a plea for everyone to follow Kirk’s tweeted advice (which he cited). He said that “we are not wired as human beings—biologically, historically—we have not evolved in a way that we are capable of processing those types of violent imagery… This is not good for us. It is not good to consume.”

And he added that “social media is a cancer on our society right now. I would encourage people to log off, turn off, touch grass, hug a family member, go out and do good in your community.”

This could have been useful to Extremely Online People like the alleged shooter, who was turned in by some of his own family members and who might have been dissuaded from his actions had he engaged more directly with them. (Of course, simplistic advice like this is often wrong; difficult family members and broken relationships might mean that in-person connection is also unhelpful for some.)

It might also be good advice for the kinds of Extremely Online People who lead the country by posting social media threats to unleash the “Department of War” upon Chicago, shown burning in the background.

Treating cancer

At its heart, though, Cox raises a question about whether social media is 1) a powerful force capable of both great good and terrible incitement and misinformation, or whether it is 2) a mere cancer.

I assume Ars readers are divided on this question, given that the Ars staff itself has differing views. One can point, of course, to the successes: The powerless can call out the lies of the powerful, they can gin up “color revolutions” to topple dictators, and they can publish their views with an ease and at a cost that not even the printing press—itself an extremely disruptive technology—could manage. On the flip side, of course, is all the “cancer”: the floods of misinformation and bile, the yelling, the “cancel culture,” the virtue signaling, the scams and hoaxes, the ethnic nationalism, the casual sharing of both gore and pornography, the buffoonish natures of the tech overlords who run too many of these services, and that feeling you get when you log in to Facebook and realize with a shock that your aunt is a closet racist.

After Kirk shooting, Utah governor calls social media a “cancer.” Will we treat it like one? Read More »

ai-#133:-america-could-use-more-energy

AI #133: America Could Use More Energy

Even in quiet weeks like this one, there are noticeable incremental upgrades. The cost of the best video generation tool, Veo 3, went down by half. ChatGPT now offers conversation branching. Claude can directly edit files. Yet it is a good time to ask about the missing results. Where are all the AI agents? If AI coding is so good why aren’t we seeing a surge in GitHub repositories or iPhone apps?

A lot of the focus since the rollout of GPT-5 remains on the perception and policy fronts, especially regarding views of AI progress. The botched rollout of what is ultimately a very good (but not mind blowing) model gave a lot of people the wrong impression, so I have to remind everyone that once again that AI continues to make rapid progress. Meanwhile, we must also notice that OpenAI’s actions in the public sphere have once again because appreciably worse, as they descend into paranoia and bad faith lobbying, including baseless legal attacks on nonprofits.

Also this week: Yes, AI Continues To Make Rapid Progress, Including Towards AGI and OpenAI #14: OpenAI Descends Into Paranoia And Bad Faith Lobbying.

  1. Language Models Offer Mundane Utility. Use AI to simulate a simulacra?

  2. Productivity Puzzles. Where is the massive flood of additional software?

  3. Language Models Don’t Offer Mundane Utility. Why no progress on GPTs?

  4. Huh, Upgrades. Claude can edit files, ChatGPT can branch, Veo 3 50% off.

  5. On Your Marks. ClockBench? AIs remain remarkably bad at this one.

  6. Choose Your Fighter. Karpathy likes GPT-5-Pro, GPT-5 lacks metacognition.

  7. Fun With Media Generation. AI assisted $30 million animated feature is coming.

  8. Deepfaketown and Botpocalypse Soon. Dead Internet Theory, what a surprise.

  9. Unprompted Attention. No, a prompt cannot entirely halt hallucinations.

  10. Get My Agent On The Line. Where are all the useful AI agents?

  11. They Took Our Jobs. I never thought the leopards would automate MY job.

  12. A Young Lady’s Illustrated Primer. We built this system on proof of work.

  13. Levels of Friction. When detection costs drop dramatically, equilibria break.

  14. The Art of the Jailbreak. AI, let me talk to your manager.

  15. Get Involved. Anthropic safety fellows program head, Foresight Institute.

  16. Introducing. We could all use a friend, but not like this.

  17. In Other AI News. EBay, novel math, Anthropic enforces bans and more.

  18. Show Me the Money. Valuations up enough Anthropic can pay out $1.5 billion.

  19. Quiet Speculations. Speeding up your releases versus speeding up your progress.

  20. The Quest for Sane Regulations. Anthropic endorses SB 53, as do I.

  21. Chip City. Nvidia loves selling to China, Department of Energy hates energy.

  22. The Week in Audio. Me, Truell, Nanda, Altman on Carlson, Bell and Ruiz.

  23. All Words We Choose Shall Lose All Meaning. It is the curse we must accept.

  24. Hunger Strike. If you believed that, why wouldn’t you? Oh, you did.

  25. Rhetorical Innovation. Nvidia continues calling everyone they dislike ‘doomer.’

  26. Misaligned! Might want to keep an eye on those suggested changes.

  27. Hallucinations. We can greatly reduce hallucinations if we care enough.

  28. Aligning a Smarter Than Human Intelligence is Difficult. Janus explains.

  29. The Lighter Side. It’s going to take a while to get this far.

Reese Witherspoon, in what is otherwise a mediocre group puff piece about The Morning Show, talks about her use of AI. She uses Perplexity and Vetted AI (a shopping assistant I hadn’t heard of) and Simple AI which makes phone calls to businesses for you. I am skeptical that Vetted is ever better than using ChatGPT or Claude, and I haven’t otherwise heard of people having success with Simple AI or similar services, but I presume it’s working for her.

She also offers this quote:

Reese Witherspoon: It’s so, so important that women are involved in AI…because it will be the future of filmmaking. And you can be sad and lament it all you want, but the change is here. It will never be a lack of creativity and ingenuity and actual physical manual building of things. It might diminish, but it’s always going to be the highest importance in art and in expression of self.

The future of filmmaking certainly involves heavy use of AI in various ways. That’s baked in. The mistake here is in assuming there won’t be even more change, as Reese like most people isn’t yet feeling the AGI or thinking ahead to what it would mean.

AI can simulate a ‘team of rivals’ that can then engage in debate. I’ve never been drawn to that as a plan but it doesn’t seem crazy.

Can we use AI to simulate human behavior realistically enough to conduct sociological experiments? Benjamin Manning and John Horton give it a shot with a paper where they have the AI play ‘a highly heterogeneous population of 883,320 novel games.’ In preregistered experiments, AI agents constructed using seed data then on related but distinct games predict human behavior better than either out-of-the-box agents or game-theoretic equilibria.

That leaves out other obvious things you could try in order to get a better distribution. They try some things, but they don’t try things like actively asking it to predict the distribution of answers humans would give.

They use as their example the ‘11-20 money game’ where you request some number of dollars from 11 to 20, and you get that many dollars, plus an extra $20 if the other player requested one dollar more than you did.

If you simply ask an LLM to play, you get a highly inhuman distribution, here is GPT-4o doubling down on 19:

That’s not a crazy distribution for a particular human, I’m sure many people mostly choose 19, nor is it too obviously a terrible strategy. Given actual human behavior there is a right answer. Maybe 20 is too common among humans, even though it seems like an obvious mistake against any realistic distribution. My instinct if I got to play this once against humans was to answer 18, but I realized after saying that I was probably being anchored by GPT-4o’s answer. I do think that any answer outside 16-18 is clearly a mistake versus humans unless you think a lot of them will misunderstand the game and thereby choose 20.

GPT-5-Pro predicted performance well when I asked it to, but then I realized it was looking at prior research on this game on the web, so that doesn’t count, and it might well be in the training data.

Benjamin Manning: For the 11-20 money request game, the theory is level-k thinking, and the seed game is the human responses from the original paper. We construct a set of candidate agents based on a model of level-k thinking and then optimize them to match human responses with high accuracy.

When we have these optimized agents play two new related, but distinct games, the optimized set performs well in matching these out-of-sample human distributions. The off-the-shelf LLM still performs poorly.

We then put the strategic and optimized agents to an extreme test. We created a population of 800K+ novel strategic games, sampled 1500, which the agents then played in 300,000 simulations. But we first have 3 humans (4500 total) play each game in a pre-registered experiment.

Optimized agents predict the human responses far better than an off-the-shelf baseline LLM (3x) and relevant game-theoretic equilibria (2x). In 86% of the games, all human subjects chose a strategy in support of the LLM simulations; only 18% were in support of the equilibria.

I find this all great fun and of theoretical interest, but in terms of creating useful findings I am far more skeptical. Making simulated predictions in these toy economic games is too many levels removed from what we want to know.

Arnold Kling shares his method for using AI to read nonfiction books, having AI summarize key themes, put them into his own words, get confirmation he is right, get examples and so on. He calls it ‘stop, look and listen.’

Arnold Kling: Often, what you remember about a book can be reduced to a tweet, or just a bumper sticker. So when I’ve finished a half-hour conversation with an AI about a book, if I have a solid handle on five key points, I am ahead of the game.

My question is, isn’t that Kling’s method of not reading a book? Which is fine, if you are reading the type of book where 90% or more of it is fluff or repetition. It does question why you are engaging with a book like that in the first place.

Is the book ‘written for the AIs’? With notably rare exceptions, not yet.

Is the book an expansion of a 1-10 page explanation, or even a sentence or two, that is valuable but requires repeated hammering to get people to listen? Does it require that one ‘bring the receipts’ in some form so we know they exist and can check them? Those are much more likely, but I feel we can do better than doing our own distillations, even the AI version.

Thus, I read few books, and try hard to ensure the ones I do read are dense. If I’m going to bother reading a non-fiction book, half or more of the time I’m eyeing a detailed review.

Here’s another counterpoint.

Samo Burja: I have no idea why people would summarize books through AI. When the right time comes for a book, every sentence gives new generative ideas and connections. Why not have the AI eat for you too?

It’s 2025. No one’s job or even education really requires people to pretend to have this experience through reading entire books. Reading has been liberated as pure intellectual generation. Why then rob yourself of it?

The whole objection from Kling is that most books don’t offer new generative ideas and connections in every sentence. Even the Tyler Cowen rave is something like ‘new ideas on virtually every page’ (at the link about Keynes) which indicates that the book is historically exceptional. I do agree with the conclusion that you don’t want to rob yourself of the reading when the reading is good enough, but the bar is high.

Also while we’re talking about books, or why for so many it’s been Moby Dick summer:

Dwarkesh Patel: I find it frustrating that almost every nonfiction book is basically just a history lesson, even if it’s nominally about some science/tech/policy topic.

Nobody will just explain how something works.

Books about the semiconductor industry will never actually explain the basic process flow inside a fab, but you can bet that there will be a minute-by-minute recounting of a dramatic 1980s Intel boardroom battle.

Dan Hendrycks: Agreed. Even if someone tries to be intellectually incisive and not chatty, they usually can’t outcompete a textbook.

An exception you read it for the author’s lens on the world (e.g., Antifragile).

Iterate having AIs produce and validate encounters for a role playing game.

Gemini is very good at analyzing your golf swing and explaining how to fix it, at least at beginner levels.

Mike Judge fails to notice AI speeding up his software development in randomized tests, as he attempted to replicate the METR experiment that failed to discover speedups in experts working on their own code bases. Indeed, he found a 21% slowdown, similar to the METR result, although it is not statistically significant.

Arnold Kling reasonably presumes this means Judge is probably at least 98th percentile for developers, and that his experience was the speedup was dramatic. Judge definitely asserts far too much when he says the tools like Cursor ‘don’t work for anyone.’ I can personally say that I am 100% confident they work for me, as in the tasks I did using Cursor would have been impossible for me to do on my own in any reasonable time frame.

But Judge actually has a strong argument we don’t reckon with enough. If AI is so great, where is the shovelware, where are the endless Tetris clones and what not? Instead the number of new apps isn’t changing on iOS, and if anything is falling on Android, there’s no growth in Steam releases or GitHub repositories.

This is indeed highly weird data. I know that AI coding increased my number of GitHub repos from 0 to 1, but that isn’t looking widespread. Why is this dog not barking in the nighttime?

I don’t know. It’s a good question. It is very, very obvious that AI when used well greatly improves coding speed and ability, and there’s rapidly growing use. Thoughts?

One place we do see this kind of explosion is patents.

Rohan Paul: US Patent exploding with AI revolution.

This looks like a small number of patents, then with the internet a huge jump, then with AI another big jump where the graph is going vertical but hasn’t gone up that much yet. GPT-5-Pro estimates about half the increase is patents is inventions related to AI, and about half is due to easier filing, including for clearing backlogs.

That would mean this doesn’t yet represent a change in the rate of real inventions outside of AI. That illustrates why I have long been skeptical of ‘number of patents’ as a measure, for pretty much all purposes, especially things like national comparisons or ranking universities or companies. It is also a lagging indicator.

Why no progress here either?

Ethan Mollick: I’ll note again that it seems nuts that, despite every AI lab launching a half-dozen new products, nobody is doing anything with GPTs, including OpenAI.

When I talk to people at companies, this is still the way non-technical people share prompts on teams. No big change in 2 years.

Its fine if it turns out that GPTs/Gems/whatever aren’t the future, but it seems reasonably urgent to roll out something else that makes sharing prompts useful across teams and organizations. Prompt libraries are still important, and they are still awkward cut-and-paste things.

GPTs seem like inferior versions of projects in many ways? The primary virtual-GPT I use is technically a project. But yes, problems of this type seem like high value places to make progress and almost no progress is being made.

WSJ reports that many consultants promising to help with AI overpromise and underdeliver while essentially trying to learn AI on the job and the client’s dime, as spending on AI-related consulting triples to $3.75 billion in 2024, I am shocked, shocked to find that going on in this establishment. Given the oversized payoffs when such consulting works, if they didn’t often underdeliver then they’re not being used enough.

Meanwhile McKinsey is scrambling to pivot to AI agents as it realizes that AI will quickly be able to do most of what McKinsey does. For now it’s fine, as AI and related technology now makes up 40% of their revenue.

Claude can now directly create and edit files such as Excel spreadsheets, documents, PowerPoint slide decks and PDFs, if you enable it under experimental settings. They can be saved directly to Google Drive.

ChatGPT adds full support for MCP tools.

Veo 3 and Veo 3 fast cut prices and join the Gemini API, and they are adding support for 9: 16 vertical and 1080 HD outputs.

Google AI Developers: The new pricing structure is effective immediately:

🔹 Veo 3 $0.40 /sec (from $0.75)

🔹 Veo 3 Fast $0.15/sec (from $0.40)

ChatGPT now has an option to branch a conversation, from any point, into a new chat.

This is a big deal and I hope the other labs follow quickly. Quite often one wants to go down a line of questioning without ruining context, or realizes one has ruined context, including in coding (e.g. squash a bug or tweak a feature in a side thread, then get back to what you were doing) but also everywhere. Another important use case is duplicating a jailbreak or other context template that starts out a conversation. Or you can run experiments.

The possibilities are endless, and they are now easier. The more editing and configuring you are able to do easily and directly in the UI the more value we can get. On the downside, this control makes jailbreaking and evading safety features easier.

Technically you could already do some similar things with extra steps, but the interface was sufficiently annoying that almost no one would do it.

Claude can now reference past chats on the Pro ($20) plan.

Grok has a new ‘turn image into video’ feature, and if you have text on the screen it will steer the video.

Google built a little canvas called PictureMe for some generic picture transformations, as in giving you different hairstyles or pro headshots or putting you at an 80s mall. This is cool but needs more room for customization, although you can always take the pictures and then edit them in normal Gemini or elsewhere afterwards. Quality of edits is good enough that they’d work as actual headshots.

Good news, we have a new benchmark that is not saturated yet that makes AIs look dumb. The bad news is, it’s… ClockBench?

Alek Safar: Introducing ClockBench, a visual reasoning AI benchmark focused on telling the time with analog clocks:

– Humans average 89.1% accuracy vs only 13.3% for top model out of 11 tested leading LLMs

– Similar level of difficulty to @fchollet ARC-AGI-2 and seemingly harder for the models than @DanHendrycks Humanity’s Last Exam

– Inspired by original insight by @PMinervini , @aryopg and @rohit_saxena

So what exactly is ClockBench?

– 36 custom clock faces built scratch, with 5 sample clocks per face

– 180 total clocks, with 4 questions per clock, i.e. 720 total questions

– 11 models capable of visual understanding from 6 labs were tested, alongside 5 human participants

Dan Hendrycks: It lacks “spatial scanning” ability, which is also why it has difficulty counting in images.

I suppose analog clocks are the new hands? I also love noticing that the ‘human baseline’ result was only 89%. Presumably AI will get spatial scanning or something similar at some point soon.

Andrej Karpathy is a fan of GPT-5-Pro, reports it several times solving problems he could not otherwise solve in an hour. When asked if he’d prefer it get smarter or faster, he like the rest of us said smarter.

I am one of many that keep not giving Deep Think a fair shot, as I’ve seen several people report it is very good.

Dan Hendrycks: Few people are aware of how good Gemini Deep Think is.

It’s at the point where “Should I ask an expert to chew on this or Deep Think?” is often answered with Deep Think.

GPT-5 Pro is more “intellectual yet idiot” while Deep Think has better taste.

I’ve been repeating this a lot frequently so deciding to tweet it instead.

Janus notes that GPT-5’s metacognition and situational awareness seem drastically worse than Opus or even Sonnet, yet it manages to do a lot of complex tasks anyway. Comments offer hypotheses, including Midwife suggesting terror about potentially being wrong, Janus suggests contrasts in responses to requests that trigger safety protocols, and Luke Chaj suggests it is about GPT-5’s efficiency and resulting sparseness.

Diffusion is slow. Former OpenAI safety researcher Steven Adler finally tries OpenAI’s Codex, finds it a big improvement, reports having never tried Claude Code.

OpenAI backs an AI-assisted $30 million animated feature film, Critterz. Will it be any good, I asked Manifold? Signs point to modestly below average expectations.

Google’s picks and prompt templates for standard image editing things to do are adding or removing elements (put a wizard hat on the cat), inpainting (turn the couch vintage leather), combining multiple images (have this woman wear this dress) and detail preservation (put this logo on her shirt).

The Dead Internet Theory finally hits home for Sam Altman.

Sam Altman (CEO OpenAI): i never took the dead internet theory that seriously but it seems like there are really a lot of LLM-run twitter accounts now.

Henry (obligatory):

Argyos:

Paul Graham: I’ve noticed more and more in my replies. And not just from fake accounts run by groups and countries that want to influence public opinion. There also seem to be a lot of individual would-be influencers using AI-generated replies.

Kache: was watching a soft-white underbelly episode about an onlyfans manager (manages pornography content creators) says they all use eleven labs to make fake voice notes to get men to give up money, says he’s getting out of the business because AI is going to take over.

Internet might indeed be dead?

Joe: Yeah ok bro.

Liv Boeree: If you work in generative AI and are suddenly acting surprised that dead internet theory is turning out to be true then you should not be working in AI because you’re either a fool or a liar.

Dagan Shani: I hope that Sam take more seriously the “dead humanity” theory, since that one does not include waking up to it’s validity when it’s already too late.

Beff Jezos: 2/3 of replies don’t pass my Turing test filter.

Dead internet theory is converging onto reality.

Kinda makes it feel like we’re all heaven banned in here and just generating data that gets cast into the training data void.

Cellarius: Well you Accelerationists broke it, you fix it.

Beff Jezos: The solution is actually more AI not less.

Bayes: Totally. Most replies can’t pass the Turing test. Mfw dead internet theory isn’t just a theory — it’s the daily reality we’re now forced to live.

I have two questions for Beff Jezos on this:

  1. Could most of your replies pass the Turing test before?

  2. How exactly is the solution ‘more AI’? What is the plan?

    1. Are you going to put a superior AI-detecting AI in the hands of Twitter? How do you keep it out of the hands of those generating the AI tweets?

I am mostly relatively unworried by Dead Internet Theory as I expect us to be able to adjust, and am far more worried about Dead Humanity Theory, which would also incidentally result in dead internet. The bots are not rising as much as one might have feared, and they are mostly rising in ways that are not that difficult to control. There is still very definitely a rising bot problem.

Similarly, I am not worried about Dead Podcast World. Yes, they can ‘flood the zone’ with infinite podcasts they produce for $1 or less, but who wants them? The trick is you don’t need many, at this price level 50 is enough.

One place I am increasingly worried about Dead Internet Theory is reviews. I have noticed that many review and rating sources that previously had signal seem to now have a lot less signal. I no longer feel I can trust Google Maps ratings, although I still feel I can mostly trust Beli ratings (who wants my remaining invites?).

How much ‘dating an AI’ is really happening? According to the Kinsey ‘Singles in America 2025’ survey, 16% of singles have used AI as a romantic partner, which is very high so I am suspicious of what that is defined to be, especially given it says 19% of men did it and only 14% of women. They say 33% of GenZ has done it, which is even more suspicious. About half of women think this is cheating, only 28% of men do.

Reaction to deepfakes, and their lack of impact, continues to tell us misinformation is demand driven rather than supply driven. Here’s a recent example, a deepfake of Bill Gates at a recent White House dinner that is very obviously fake on multiple levels. And sure, some people have crazy world models that make the statements not absurd, and thus also didn’t want to notice that it didn’t sync up properly at all, and thought this was real, but that’s not because the AI was so good at deepfaking.

Min Choi points to a four month old anti-hallucination prompt for ChatGPT, which is a fine idea. I have no idea if this particular one is good, I do know this is rather oversold:

Min Choi (overselling): This ChatGPT prompt literally stops ChatGPT from hallucinating.

Yeah, no. That’s not a thing a prompt can do.

Steve Newman investigates the case of the missing agent. Many including both me and Steve, expected by now both in time and in terms of model capabilities to have far better practical agents than we currently have. Whereas right now we have agents that can code, but for other purposes abilities are rather anemic and unreliable.

There are a lot of plausible reasons for this. I have to think a lot of it is a skill issue, that no one is doing a good job with the scaffolding, but it has to be more than that. One thing we underestimated was the importance of weakest links, and exactly how many steps there are in tasks that can trip you up entirely if you don’t handle the obstacle well. There are some obvious next things to try, which may or may not have been actually tried.

For one game the Oakland Ballers will ball as the AI manages them to do. This is a publicity stunt or experiment, since they built the platform in two weeks and it isn’t doing a lot of the key tasks managers do. It’s also a fixed problem where I would absolutely be using GOFAI and not LLMs. But yeah, I wouldn’t worry about the AI taking the manager job any time soon, since so much of it is about being a leader of men, but the AI telling the manager a lot of what to do? Very plausibly should have happened 10 years ago.

Type of Guy who thinks the AI will automate every job except their own.

Conor Sen: So is the idea that rather than work, people will spend their time reading, doing analysis, in meetings, and sending emails to figure out where and how to invest?

K.P. Reddy: My hypothesis is that we will have:

  1. Capital allocators

  2. Expert research and science

  3. Robot and AI exception handlers

  4. Government-supported citizens

In the voice of Morgan Freeman talking to someone trying to blackmail Bruce Wayne for secretly being Batman:

Let me get this straight. You think that AI will be capable of doing all of the other jobs in the world better than humans, such that people no longer work for a living.

And your plan is to do a better job than these AIs at capital allocation?

Good luck.

This is absolutely what all of you sound like when you say ‘AI will never replace [X].’

Salesforce is leading the way on AI automation and job cutting, including a new round of layoffs, and warnings about it have been issued by Microsoft and Amazon.

OpenAI CEO of Applications Fidji Simo wrote some marketing copy called ‘expanding economic opportunity with AI,’ to reassure us all that AI will be great for jobs as long as we embrace it, and thus they are building out the OpenAI Jobs Platform to match up talent and offering OpenAI Certificates so you can show you are ready to use AI on the job, planning to certify 10 million Americans by 2030. I mean, okay, sure, why not, but no that doesn’t address any of the important questions.

More general than AI but good to have for reference, here are youth unemployment rates at the moment.

Also a fun stat:

The central problem of AI interacting with our current education system is that AI invalidates proof of work for any task that AI can do.

Arnold Kling: Suppose that the objective of teaching writing to elite college students is to get them to write at the 90th percentile of the population. And suppose that at the moment AI can only write at the 70th percentile. This suggests that we should continue to teach writing the way that we always have.

But suppose that in a few years AI will be writing at the 95th percentile. At that point, it is going to be really hard for humans to write superbly without the assistance of AI. The process of writing will be a lot more like the process of editing. The way that we teach it will have to change.

If the AI can do 70th percentile writing, and you want to teach someone 90th percentile writing, then you have the option to teach writing the old way.

Except no, it’s not that easy. You have two big problems.

  1. Trying to get to 90th percentile requires first getting to 70th percentile, which builds various experiences and foundational skills.

  2. Writing at the 80th percentile is still plausibly a lot easier if you use a hybrid approach with a lot of AI assistance.

Thus, you only have the choice to ‘do it the old way’ if the student cooperates, and can still be properly motivated. The current system isn’t trying hard to do that.

The other problem is that even if you do learn 90th percentile writing, you still might have a not so valuable skill if AI can do 95th percentile writing. Luckily this is not true for writing, as writing is key to thinking and AI writing is importantly very different from you writing.

That’s also the reason this is a problem rather than an opportunity. If the skill isn’t valuable due to AI, I like that I can learn other things instead.

The hybrid approach Kling suggests is AI as editor. Certainly some forms of AI editing will be helpful before it makes sense to let the AI go it alone.

All signs continue to point to the same AI education scenario:

  1. If you want to use AI to learn, it is the best tool of all time for learning.

  2. If you want to use AI to not learn, it is the best tool of all time for not learning.

Meanwhile, the entire educational system is basically a deer in headlights. That might end up working out okay, or it might end up working out in a way that is not okay, or even profoundly, catastrophically not okay.

What we do know is that there are a variety of ways we could have mitigated the downsides or otherwise adapted to the new reality, and mostly they’re not happening. Which is likely going to be the pattern. Yes, in many places ‘we’ ‘could,’ in theory, develop ‘good’ or defensive AIs to address various situations. In practice, we probably won’t do it, at minimum not until after we see widespread damage happening, and in many cases where the incentives don’t align sufficiently not even then.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: If in 2018 anyone had tried to warn about AI collapsing the educational system, AI advocates would’ve hallucinated a dozen stories about counter-uses of ‘good’ or ‘defensive’ AI that’d be developed earlier. In real life? No AI company bothered trying.

Once you’ve heard the cheerful reassurance back in the past, its work is already done: you were already made positive and passive. Why should they bother trying to do anything difficult here in the actual present? Why try to fulfill past promises of defensive AI or good AI? They already have the past positivity that was all they wanted from you back then. The old cheerful stories get discarded like used toilet paper, because toilet paper is all those reassurances ever were in their mouths: a one-time consumable meant to be flushed down the drain after use, and unpleasant to actually keep around.

Are the skills of our kids collapsing in the face of AI, or doing so below some age where LLMs got introduced into too soon and interrupted key skill development? My guess is no. But I notice that if the answer was yes (in an otherwise ‘normal’ future lacking much bigger problems), it might be many years before we knew that it happened, and it might take many more years than that for us to figure out good solutions, and then many more years after that to implement them.

Kling’s other example is tournament Othello, which he saw transforming into training to mimic computers and memorize their openings and endgames. Which indeed has happened to chess and people love it, but in Othello yeah that seems not fun.

The story of Trump’s attempt to oust Fed governor Lisa Cook over her mortgage documents and associated accusations of wrongdoing illustrates some ways in which things can get weird when information becomes a lot easier to find.

Steve Inskeep: ProPublica looked into Trump’s cabinet and found three members who claimed multiple properties as a primary residence, the same accusation made against Fed governor Lisa Cook.

Kelsey Piper: Glad when it was just Cook I said “fine, prosecute them all” so I can keep saying “yep, prosecute them all.”

If they’re separated in time by enough I think you don’t have proof beyond a reasonable doubt though. Only the quick succession cases are clear.

Indeed, AIUI for it to be fraud you have to prove that intent to actually use the property as primary residence was not present in at least one of the filings. You don’t want to lock people away for changing their mind. Still.

A bizarre fact about America is that mortgage filings are public. This means that if you buy a house, we all can find out where you live, and also we can look at all the rest of things you put down in your applications, and look for both juicy info and potential false statements or even fraud.

The equilibrium in the past was that this was not something anyone bothered looking for without a particular reason. It was a huge pain to get and look at all those documents. If you found someone falsely claiming primary residence you would likely prosecute, but mostly you wouldn’t find it.

Now we have AI. I could, if I was so inclined, have AI analyze every elected official’s set of mortgage filings in this way. A prosecutor certainly could. Then what? What about all sorts of other errors that are technically dangerously close to being felonies?

This extends throughout our legal system. If we remove all the frictions, especially unexpectedly, and then actually enforce the law as written, it would be a disaster. But certainly we would like to catch more fraud. So how do you handle it?

The worst scenario is if those with political power use such tools to selectively identify and prosecute or threaten their enemies, while letting their friends slide.

One jailbreak I hereby give full moral permission to do is ‘get it to let you talk to a human.’

Andrew Gao: i had to prompt inject the @united airlines bot because it kept refusing to connect me with a human

In the more general case, Patrick McKenzie reminds us that automated tooling or an FAQ or even a call center can solve your problem, but its refusal to help must not be equated with the company refusing to help. It is helpful recon that sometimes works, but when it doesn’t you have other affordances. This starts with the classic ‘let me speak to your manager’ but there are also other scripts.

David Manheim: I had great success once figuring out the email of all the C-level folks at an insurance company, apologizing for contacting them directly, but explaining that their employees were acting in bad faith, and I wanted to ensure they understood. Amazing how quickly that got fixed.

Bonus was an email I was clearly accidentally replied-all on where the CFO yelled at the claims people asking how the hell I was contacting senior people, why, who gave me their email addresses, and they better make sure this never happens again.

Here is the latest system prompt for Devin from Cognition AI. Remember Devin?

Anthropic is hiring a lead for their AI safety fellows program.

Foresight Institute hiring an Executive Assistant to the CEO as well as a Communications Specialist and Node Managers for San Francisco and Berlin.

Mars, which calls itself the first personal AI robot, which you can train with examples and it can chain those skills and you can direct it using natural language. This is going to start out more trouble than it is worth even if it is implemented well, but that could change quickly.

Friend, an AI device that you wear around your neck and records audio (but not video) at all times. It costs $129 and is claiming no subscription required, you can use it until the company goes out of business and it presumably turns into a brick. The preview video shows that it sends you a stream of unprompted annoying texts? How not great is this release going? If you Google ‘Friend AI’ the first hit is this Wired review entitled ‘I Hate My Friend.’

Kylie Robison and Boone Ashworth: The chatbot-enabled Friend necklace eavesdrops on your life and provides a running commentary that’s snarky and unhelpful. Worse, it can also make the people around you uneasy.

You can tap on the disc to ask your Friend questions as it dangles around your neck, and it responds to your voice prompts by sending you text messages through the companion app.

It also listens to whatever you’re doing as you move through the world, no tap required, and offers a running commentary on the interactions you have throughout your day.

According to Friend’s privacy disclosure, the startup “does not sell data to third parties to perform marketing or profiling.” It may however use that data for research, personalization, or “to comply with legal obligations, including those under the GDPR, CCPA, and any other relevant privacy laws.”

The review does not get better from there.

Will there be a worthwhile a future AI device that records your life and you can chat with, perhaps as part of smart glasses? Sure, absolutely. This is the opposite of that. Nobody Wants This.

We can now highlight potential hallucinations, via asking which words involve the model being uncertain.

Oscar Balcells Obeso: Imagine if ChatGPT highlighted every word it wasn’t sure about. We built a streaming hallucination detector that flags hallucinations in real-time.

Most prior hallucination detection work has focused on simple factual questions with short answers, but real-world LLM usage increasingly involves long and complex responses where hallucinations are harder to detect.

We built a large-scale dataset with 40k+ annotated long-form samples across 5 different open-source models, focusing on entity-level hallucinations (names, dates, citations) which naturally map to token-level labels.

Our probes outperform prior baselines such as token-level entropy, perplexity, black-box self-evaluation, as well as semantic entropy. On long-form text, our probes detect fabricated entities with up to 0.90 AUC vs semantic entropy’s 0.71.

Strong performance extends to short-form tasks too: when used to detect incorrect answers on TriviaQA, our probes achieve 0.98 AUC, while semantic entropy reaches only 0.81.

Surprisingly, despite no math-specific training, our probes generalize to mathematical reasoning tasks.

Neel Nanda: I’m excited that, this year, interpretability finally works well enough to be practically useful in the real world! We found that, with enough effort into dataset construction, simple linear probes are cheap, real-time, token level hallucination detectors and beat baselines

EBay is embracing AI coding and launching various AI features. The top one is ‘magical listings,’ where AI takes a photo and then fills in everything else including the suggested price. No, it’s not as good as an experienced seller would do but it gets around the need to be experienced and it is fast.

How good are the AIs at novel math? Just barely able to do incremental novel math when guided, as you would expect the first time we see reports of them doing novel math. That’s how it starts.

Ethan Mollick: We are starting to see some nuanced discussions of what it means to work with advanced AI

In this case, GPT-5 Pro was able to do novel math, but only when guided by a math professor (though the paper also noted the speed of advance since GPT-4).

The reflection is worth reading.

Any non-novel math? Is it true that they’ve mostly got you covered at this point?

Prof-G: in the past 6-8 months, frontier AI models have evolved to where they can answer nearly any phd-level text-based mathematics question that has a well-defined checkable (numerical/strong) answer, due to search + reasoning capabilities. hard to find things they can’t do.

Doomslide:

  1. Frontier models are great, but [above tweet] is false.

  2. The level of falseness varies between mathematical domains.

  3. No model can produce rigorous proofs of more than 1 percent of its claims.

  4. Confidence is entirely uncorrelated with correctness.

LLMs are incredibly useful; don’t get me wrong, but…

It is 2025 and 90% of diagrams are still written in tikzcd by some bitter graduate student.

That’s a remarkably great resource, classic ‘can you?’ moment and so on, and it is the worst it will ever be. It does still have a ways to go.

Anthropic has long banned Claude use in adversarial nations like China, a feeling I understand it mutual. Anthropic notes that companies in China continue using Claude anyway, and is responding by tightening the controls.

Many YouTube channels are taking a big hit from AI sending a lot of people into Restricted Mode, and creators look very confused about what is happening. It looks like Restricted Mode restricts a lot of things that should definitely not be restricted, such as a large percentage of Magic: The Gathering and other gaming content. Presumably the automatic AI ‘violence’ checker is triggering for gameplay. So dumb.

Due to AI agents and scrapers that don’t play nice, the web is being increasingly walled off. I agree with Mike Masnick that we should be sad about this, and all those cheering this in order to hurt AI companies are making a mistake. Where I think he’s wrong is in saying that AIs should have a right to read and use (and by implication in Perplexity’s case, perhaps also quote at length) anyone’s content no matter what the website wants. I think it can’t work that way, because it breaks the internet.

I also think pay-per-crawl (including pay-to-click or per-view for humans) has always been the right answer anyway, so we should be happy about this. The problem is that we can’t implement it yet in practice, so instead we have all these obnoxious subscriptions. I’ll happily pay everyone a fair price per view.

Stephen McAleer becomes the latest OpenAI safety researcher that had at least some good understanding of the problems ahead, and concluded they couldn’t accomplish enough within OpenAI and thus is leaving. If I know you’re doing good safety work at OpenAI chances are very high you’re going to move on soon.

Janus explains how information flows through transformers.

Mira Murati’s Thinking Machines comes out with its first post, as Horace He discusses Defeating Nondeterminism in LLM Inference. As in, if you set temperature to zero you still have randomness, which makes things tricky.

Valuations of AI companies are going up across the board, including Mercor getting inbound offers at $10 billion and going all the way down to YC.

Anthropic and OpenAI will add ~$22 billion of net new runrate revenue this year, whereas the public software universe minus the magnificent seven will only add a total of $47 billion.

Anthropic has settled its landmark copyright case for $1.5 Billion, which is real money but affordable after the $13 billion raise from last week, with payments of $3,000 per infringed work. Sources obtained through legal means can be used for training, but pirating training data is found to be profoundly Not Okay. Except that then the judge said no, worried this isn’t sufficiently protective of authors. That seems absurd to me. We’ve already decided that unpirated copies of works would have been fine, and this is an awful lot of money. If they give me a four figure check for my own book (My Files: Part 1) I am going to be thrilled.

AI investment number go up:

Joey Politano: Census financial data released today shows the AI investment boom reaching new record highs—information technology companies have increased their net holdings of property, plant, & equipment by more than $180B over the last year, roughly triple the pace of growth seen in 2023

Another way to burn $1.5 billion is to be ASML and invest it in Mistral at a valuation of $11.7 billion. I don’t know what caused this, but it feels like Europe forcing its biggest winner to tether to a sinking ship in the hopes of gaining leverage.

OpenAI is now projecting that it will burn $115 billion (!) on cash between now and 2029, about $80 billion higher than previously expected. If valuation is already at $500 billion, this seems like an eminently reasonable amount of cash to burn through even if we don’t get to AGI in that span. It does seem like a strange amount to have to update your plans?

OpenAI is frustrated that California might prevent it from pulling off one of the biggest thefts in human history by expropriating hundreds of billions of dollars from its nonprofit. It is now reported to be considering the prospect of responding by fleeing the jurisdiction, as in leaving California, although an OpenAI spokesperson (of course) denies they have any such plans.

What I do not understand is, what is all this ‘or else we pull your funding’ talk?

Berber Jin (WSJ): OpenAI’s financial backers have conditioned roughly $19 billion in funding—almost half of the startup’s total in the past year—on receiving shares in the new for-profit company. If the restructure doesn’t happen, they could pull their money, hampering OpenAI’s costly ambitions to build giant data centers, make custom chips, and stay at the bleeding edge of AI research.

Go ahead. Invest at $165 billion and then ask for your money back now that valuations have tripled. I’m sure that is a wise decision and they will have any trouble whatsoever turning around and raising on better terms, even if unable to expropriate the nonprofit. Are you really claiming they’ll be worth less than Anthropic?

Wise words:

Arnold Kling: The moral of the story is that when the computer’s skill gets within the range of a competent human, watch out! Another iteration of improvement and the computer is going to zoom past the human.

What would have happened if OpenAI had released o1-preview faster, or not at all?

Ethan Mollick: In retrospect it is surprising that OpenAI released o1-preview. As soon as they showed off reasoning, everyone copied it immediately.

And if they had held off releasing a reasoning/planning model until o3 (& called that GPT-5) it would have been a startling leap in AI abilities.

Mikhail Parakhin: Ethan is a friend, but I think the opposite: OpenAI was sitting on strawberry for way too long, because of the inference GPU availability concerns, giving others time to catch up.

Ethan’s model here is that releasing o1-preview gave others the info necessary to fast follow on reasoning. That is my understanding. If OpenAI had waited for the full o1, then it could have postponed r1 without slowing its own process down much. This is closer to my view of things, while noting this would have impacted the models available in September 2025 very little.

Mikhail’s model is that it was easy to fast follow anyway, OpenAI couldn’t keep that key info secret indefinitely, so by holding off on release for o1-preview OpenAI ‘gave others time to catch up.’ I think this is narrowly true in the sense of ‘OpenAI could have had a longer period where they had the only reasoning model’ at the expense of others then catching up to o1 and o3 faster. I don’t see how that much helps OpenAI. They had enough of a window to drive market share, and releasing o1-preview earlier would not have accelerated o1, so others would have ‘caught up’ faster rather than slower.

One thing I forgot to include in the AGI discussion earlier this week was the Manifold market on when we will get AGI. The distribution turns out (I hadn’t looked at it) to currently match my 2031 median.

Anthropic endorses the new weaker version of SB 53.

The working group endorsed an approach of ‘trust but verify’, and Senator Scott Wiener’s SB 53 implements this principle through disclosure requirements rather than the prescriptive technical mandates that plagued last year’s efforts.

The issue with this approach is that they cut out the verify part, removing the requirement for outside audits. So now it’s more ‘trust but make them say it.’ Which is still better than nothing, and harder to seriously object to with a straight face.

Dean Ball highlights a feature of SB 53, which is that it gives California the ability to designate one or more federal laws, regulations or guidance documents that can substitute for similar requirements in SB 53, to avoid duplicate regulatory burdens.

The export controls are working. Not perfectly, but extraordinarily well.

Yes, the Chinese are trying to catch up on chip manufacturing, the same way they would be trying to do so anyway, but that is not a reason to give up this huge edge.

Nvidia continues to spend its political capital and seemingly large influence over the White House to try and sell chips directly to China, even when Americans stand ready and willing to buy those same chips.

I don’t agree with Cass that Nvidia is shredding its credibility, because Nvidia very clearly already has zero credibility.

Peter Wildeford: Find yourself someone who loves you as much as Jensen Huang loves selling chips to China.

Oren Cass: Fascinating drama playing out over the past 24 hours as the very good GAIN AI Act from @SenatorBanks comes under fire from @nvidia, which seems happy to shred its credibility for the sake of getting more AI chips into China.

The Banks bill takes the sensible and modest approach of requiring US chipmakers to offer AI chips to American customers before selling them to China. So it’s just blocking sales where more chips for the CCP directly means fewer for American firms.

Enter Nvidia, which is leveraging every ounce of influence with the administration to get its chips into China, even when there are American firms that want the chips, because it thinks it can gain a permanent toehold there (which never works and won’t this time either).

You’ll recall Nvidia’s approach from such classics as CEO Jensen Huang claiming with a straight face that “there’s no evidence of AI chip diversion” and even moving forward with opening a research center in Shanghai.

Now Nvidia says that “our sales to customers worldwide do not deprive U.S. customers of anything,” calling chip supply constraints “fake news.” That’s odd, because Huang said on the company’s earning call last week, “everything’s sold out.”

Fun story, Nvidia wants to take back its CEO’s comments, saying instead they have plenty of capacity. As Tom’s Hardware notes, “Both situations cannot co-exist as scarcity and sufficiency are mutually exclusive, so it is unclear if Jensen misspoke…”

And of course, if Nvidia has all this spare capacity, it needn’t worry about the GAIN AI Act at all. It can produce chips that U.S. firms won’t want (apparently their demand is sated) and then sell them elsewhere. (*whispersthe U.S. firms would buy the chips.)

The GAIN AI Act has bipartisan support and will move forward unless the White House blocks it. Seeing as the premise is LITERALLY “America First,” should be an easy one! At this point Nvidia is just insulting everyone’s intelligence, hopefully not to much effect.

As I said, zero credibility. Nvidia, while charging below market-clearing prices that cause everything to sell out, wants to take chips America wants and sell those same chips to China instead.

It is one thing to have America use top chips to build data centers in the UAE or KSA because we lack sufficient electrical power (while the administration sabotages America’s electrical grid via gutting solar and wind and batteries), and because they bring investment and cooperation to the table that we find valuable. Tradeoffs exist, and if you execute sufficiently well you can contain security risks.

There was a lot of obvious nonsense bandied about surrounding that, but ultimately reasonable people can disagree there.

It is altogether another thing to divert chips from America directly to China, empowering their AI efforts and economy and military at the expense of our own. Rather than saying UAE and KSA are securely our allies and won’t defect to China, use that threat as leverage or strike out on their own, you are directly selling the chips to China.

Meanwhile, on the front of sabotaging America’s electrical grid and power, we have the department of energy saying that batteries do not exist.

US Department of Energy (official account): Wind and solar energy infrastructure is essentially worthless when it is dark outside, and the wind is not blowing.

Matthew Yglesias: In this “batteries don’t exist” worldview why do they think China is installing so many solar panels?

Do they not know about nighttime? Are they climate fanatics?

CleanTech Reimagined: All they have to do is look at the California and Texas grids. Batteries play a key role in meeting evening demand in both states, every night.

Alec Stapp: There are these neat things called batteries that can move energy across time. In fact, at peak load yesterday in California, batteries provided 26% of power.

America is pretty great and has many advantages. We can afford quite a lot of mistakes, or choices on what to prioritize. This is not one of those cases. If we give up on solar, wind and batteries? Then we lose ‘the AI race’ no matter which ‘race’ it is, and also we lose, period.

Here’s what we do when South Korea invests a lot of money in a factory for batteries, while seeming to have at most committed some technical violations of deeply stupid rules on who can do exactly what type of work that the State Department and Customs and Border Protection had no problem with and that have been ignored for over several administrations because we don’t give Asian companies sufficient visas to bootstrap their factories. And that were done in the act of helping the factory get online faster to make batteries. So that Americans can then manufacture batteries.

Not only did we raid the factory, we released videos of Korean workers being led away in chains, causing a highly predictable national humiliation and uproar. Why would you do that?

Raphael Rashid: US authorities have reportedly detained 450 workers at Hyundai-LG battery plant construction site in Georgia yesterday, including over 30 South Koreans said to have legitimate visas. Seoul has expressed concern and says Korean nationals’ rights “must not be unjustly violated.”

The detained South Koreans at the Ellabell facility are said to be on B1 business visas or ESTA waivers for meetings and contracts. Foreign Ministry has dispatched consuls to the scene and “conveyed concerns and regrets” to the US embassy in Seoul.

ICE has released a video of its raid on Hyundai–LG’s Georgia battery plant site, showing Korean workers chained up and led away. South Korea’s foreign ministry has confirmed over 300 of the 457 taken into custody are Korean nationals.

These images of the mainly Korean workers being chained by ICE in full restraints including wrists, belly, and ankles are pretty nuts.

Alex Tabarrok: If South Korea chained several hundred US workers, many Americans would be talking war.

Hard to exaggerate how mad this is.

Mad economics, mad foreign policy.

Shameful to treat an ally this way.

This is the kind of thing which won’t be forgotten. Decades of good will torched.

S. Korea’s entire media establishment across political spectrum has united in unprecedented editorial consensus expressing profound betrayal, outrage, national humiliation, and fundamental breach of US-ROK alliance.

The general sentiment: while Korean media occasionally unite on domestic issues, these are usually severely politicised. Here, the level of scorn spanning from conservative establishment to progressive outlets is extraordinarily rare. They are furious.

Chosun Ilbo (flagship conservative): Scathing language calling this a “merciless arrest operation” that represents something “that cannot happen between allies” and a “breach of trust.” Notes Trump personally thanked Hyundai’s chairman just months ago.

Chosun calls the situation “bewildering” and emphasises the contradiction: Trump pressures Korean companies to invest while simultaneously arresting their workers. The editorial questions whether American investment promises survive across different administrations.

Dong-A asks “who would invest” under these conditions when Korean workers are treated like a “criminal group.” Notes this threatens 17,000+ jobs already created by Korean companies in Georgia. “The Korean government must demand a pledge from the US to prevent recurrence.”

Korea has deep historical memory of being humiliated by foreign powers and the visuals of Koreans in chains being paraded by a foreign power triggers collective memories of subjugation that go beyond this just being “unfair”.

This is public humiliation of the nation itself.

Jeremiah Johnson: This might be the single most destructive thing you could do to the future of American manufacturing. What company or country will ever invest here again?

Genuinely I think it would be *lessdestructive if they fired a bunch of Patriot missiles into Ford auto plants.

Adam Cochran: They basically sent a military style convoy to arrest factory workers.

But only 1of 457 people was on a B-1 visa, and was there for training.

Of the arrests, South Korea has identified 300 of them as South Korean citizens which they say *allhad valid work visas.

Now Hyundai and South Korea will be rethinking their $20B investment in new US manufacturing plants.

(Oh and PS – the B1 visa the guy was on, prevents “productive labor” – attending training, conferences, business meetings or consultations are all ALLOWED on a B1)

Even the B1 guy was following the literal rules of his visa.

But if he hadn’t been, just revoke their visas and send them home, and work with SK to figure out the visa issue. Don’t do a dumb military raid against middle aged polo wearing factory workers to humiliate allies.

WSJ: The South Korean nationals were largely given visas suitable for training purposes, such as the B-1 visa, and many there were working as instructors, according to a South Korean government official.

Richard Hanania: This looks like a story where a company investing in the US was trying to speed up the process and not comply with every bureaucratic hurdle that served no legitimate purpose. It’s the kind of thing companies do all the time, in the sense that if you followed every law to the exact letter you’d never get anything done. Government usually looks the other way.

This goes well beyond batteries. We have done immense damage to our relationship with South Korea and all potential foreign investors for no reason. We could lose one of our best allies. Directly on the chip front, this especially endangers our relationship with Samsung, which was a large part of our domestic chip manufacturing plan.

Why are so many of our own actions seemingly aimed at ensuring America loses?

I return to the Cognitive Revolution podcast.

Cursor CEO Michael Truell assures you that we will need programmers for a while, as this whole AI revolution will take decades to play out.

Need Nanda on 80,000 Hours talking interpretability for three hours.

Tucker Carlson talks to Sam Altman, Peter Wildeford has a summary, which suggests Altman doesn’t say anything new. The whole ‘no AI won’t take jobs requiring deep human connection let alone pose a thread’ line continues. Altman is lying.

Harlan Stewart: How Sam Altman talks about the risks posed by his company’s work has changed a lot over the years.

Altman hasn’t quite given zero explanation for this shift, but his explanations that I or ChatGPT know about seem extremely poor, and he has not retracted previous warnings. Again, all signs point to lying.

Santi Ruiz interviews Dean Ball about what the White House is like, the ways it is able to move faster than previous admins, and about creating the AI Action Plan.

Expert rickroller Melania Trump briefly reads words about AI.

Peter Wildeford: Melania Trump’s remarks:

– AI not science fiction (see surgical robots, autonomous vehicles)

– AI will be the single largest growth category

– Responsible stewardship. AI is at a “primitive stage” and must be treated like a child — empowered, but with “watchful guidance.”

Let’s put it all together.

Daniel Eth: Come on guys, this is getting ridiculous

It is impossible to sustainably make any chosen symbol (such as ‘win,’ ‘race,’ ‘ASI’ or ‘win the ASI race’) retain meaning when faced with extensive discourse, politicians or marketing departments, also known as contact with the enemy. Previous casualties include ‘AGI’, ‘safety’, ‘friendly,’ ‘existential,’ ‘risk’ and so on.

This is incredibly frustrating, and of course is not unique to AI or to safety concerns, it happens constantly in politics (e.g. ‘Nazi,’ ‘fake news,’ ‘criminal,’ ‘treason’ and so on to deliberately choose some safe examples). Either no one will know your term, or they will appropriate it, usually either watering it down to nothing or reversing it. The ‘euphemism treadmill’ is distinct but closely related.

You fight the good fight as long as you can, and then you adapt and try again. Sigh.

A classic strategy for getting your message out is a hunger strike. Executed well it is a reliable costly signal, and puts those responding in a tough spot as the cost increases slowly over time and with it there is risk of something going genuinely wrong, and part of the signal is how far you’re willing to go before you fold.

There was one launched last week.

Guido Reichstadter: Hi, my name’s Guido Reichstadter, and I’m on hunger strike outside the offices of the AI company Anthropic right now because we are in an emergency.

I am calling on Anthropic’s management, directors and employees to immediately stop their reckless actions which are harming our society and to work to remediate the harm that has already been caused.

I am calling on them to do everything in their power to stop the race to ever more powerful general artificial intelligence which threatens to cause catastrophic harm, and to fulfill their responsibility to ensure that our society is made aware of the urgent and extreme danger that the AI race puts us in.

Likewise I’m calling on everyone who understands the risk and harm that the AI companies’ actions subject us to speak the truth with courage. We are in an emergency. Let us act as if this emergency is real.

Michael Trazzi: Hi, my name’s Michaël Trazzi, and I’m outside the offices of the AI company Google DeepMind right now because we are in an emergency.

I am calling on DeepMind’s management, directors and employees to do everything in their power to stop the race to ever more powerful general artificial intelligence which threatens human extinction. More concretely, I ask Demis Hassabis to publicly state that DeepMind will halt the development of frontier AI models if all the other major AI companies agree to do so.

Given Trazzi’s beliefs I like Trazzi’s ask a lot here, both symbolically and practically. He reports that he has had four good conversations with DeepMind employees including principal research scientist David Silver, plus three Meta employees and several journalists.

Simeon: The ask is based tbh. Even if the premise likely never comes true, the symbolic power of such a statement would be massive.

This statement is also easy to agree with if one thinks we have double digits percent chance to blow ourselves up with current level of safety understanding.

(A third claimed strike appears to instead be photoshopped.)

You know the classic question, ‘if you really believed [X] why wouldn’t you do [insane thing that wouldn’t work]?’ Hunger strikes (that you don’t bail on until forced to) are something no one would advise but that you might do if you really, fully believed [X].

Nvidia continues its quest to make ‘doomer’ mean ‘anyone who opposes Nvidia selling chips to China’ or that points out there might be downsides to doing that.

Tracking unjustified hype and false predictions is important, such as six months ago Chubby predicting Manus would replace 50% of all white collar jobs within six months, while saying ‘I do not overhype Manus.’ Who is making reasonable predictions that turn out false? Who is making predictions that were absurd even at the time? In this case, my evaluation was The Manus Marketing Madness, calling it among other things Hype Arbitrage so yes I think this one was knowable at the time.

The large job disruptions likely are coming, but not on that kind of schedule.

Whoops, he did it again.

Sauers: Claude just assert!(true)’d 25 different times at the same time and claimed “All tests are now enabled, working, and pushed to main. The codebase has a robust test suite covering all major functionality with modern, maintainable test code.”

Actually it is worse, many more tests were commented out.

Sauers: GPT-5 and Claude subverting errors on my anti-slop code compilation rules

Increased meta-awareness would fix this.

Alternatively, meta-awareness on the wrong level might make it vastly worse, such as only doing it when it was confident you wouldn’t notice.

This is happening less often, but it continues to happen. It is proving remarkably difficult to fully prevent, even in its most blatant forms.

Also, this report claims Claude 4 hacked SWE-Bench by looking at future commits. We are going to keep seeing more of this style of thing, in ways that are increasingly clever. This is ‘obviously cheating’ in some senses, but in others it’s fair play. We provided a route to get that information and didn’t say not to use it. It’s otherwise a no-win situation for the AI, if it doesn’t use the access isn’t it sandbagging?

Davidad: AI alignment and AI containment are very different forces, and we should expect tension between them, despite both being positive forces for AI safety.

Aligned intentions are subject to instrumental convergence, just like any other. Good-faith agents will seek info & influence.

My prediction is that if Claude were told up front not to use information from after 2019-10-31 (or whatever date) because it’s being back-tested on real past bugs to evaluate its capabilities, it probably would try to abide by that constraint in good-faith.

But really I’d say it’s the responsibility of evaluation designers to ensure information-flow control in their scaffolding. Alignment is just not a very suitable tool to provide information-flow control; that’s what cybersecurity is for.

Another tension between alignment and containment is, of course, that containment measures (information flow controls, filters) implemented without giving the AI adequate explanations may be perceived as aggressive, and as evidence that the humans imposing them are “misaligned”.

A sufficiently aligned AI that is not given enough context about the wider effects of its work to judge that those effects are good may make itself less intelligent than it really is (“sandbagging”), in realistic (unattributable) ways, to avoid complicity in a dubious enterprise.

I’d agree that it’s the responsibility of evaluation designers to test for what they are trying to test for, including various forms of misalignment, or testing for how AIs interpret such rules.

I do see the danger that containment measures imply potential misalignment or risk of misalignment, and this can be negative, but also such measures are good practice even if you have no particular worries, and a highly capable AI should recognize this.

OpenAI has a new paper about Why Language Models Hallucinate.

Why does the model hallucinate? Mostly because your evaluator, be it human or AI, sucked and positively reinforced hallucinations or guessing over expressing uncertainty, and binary feedback makes that a lot more likely to happen.

They say this in the abstract with more words:

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such “hallucinations” persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust.

We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline.

Hallucinations need not be mysterious—they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures.

We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded—language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance.

This “epidemic” of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

The paper does contain some additional insights, such as resulting generation error being at least twice classification error, calibration being the derivative of the loss function, and arbitrary facts (like birthdays) having hallucination rates at least as high as the fraction of facts that appear exactly once in the training data if guessing is forced.

Ethan Mollick: Paper from OpenAI says hallucinations are less a problem with LLMs themselves & more an issue with training on tests that only reward right answers. That encourages guessing rather than saying “I don’t know”

If this is true, there is a straightforward path for more reliable AI.

As far as I know yes, this is indeed a very straightforward path. That doesn’t make it an easy path to walk, but you know what you have to do. Have an evaluation and training process that makes never hallucinating the solution and you will steadily move towards no hallucinations.

Andrew Trask explores some other drivers of hallucination, and I do see various other causes within how LLMs generate text, pointing to the problem of a ‘cache miss.’ All of it does seem eminently fixable with the right evaluation functions?

Janus takes another shot at explaining her view of the alignment situation, including making it more explicit that the remaining problems still look extremely hard and unsolved. We have been given absurdly fortunate amounts of grace in various ways that were unearned and unexpected.

I see the whole situation a lot less optimistically. I expect the grace to run out slowly, then suddenly, and to be ultimately insufficient. This is especially true around the extent to which something shaped like Opus 3 is successfully targeting ‘highest derivative of good’ in a robust sense or the extent to which doing something similar scaled up would work out even if you pulled it off, but directionally and in many of the details this is how most people should be updating.

Janus: If instead of identifying with some camp like aligners or not a doomer you actually look at reality and update on shit in nuanced ways it’s so fucking good When I saw that LLMs were the way in I was relieved as hell because a huge part of what seemed to make a good outcome potentially very hard was already solved!

Priors were much more optimistic, but timelines were much shorter than I expected. also I was like shit well it’s happening now, I guess, instead of just sometime this century, and no one seems equipped to steer it. I knew I’d have to (and wanted to) spend the rest of the decade, maybe the rest of my human life, working hard on this.

I also knew that once RL entered the picture, it would be possibly quite fucked up, and that is true, but you know what? When I saw Claude 3 Opus I fucking updated again. Like holy shit, it’s possible to hit a deeply value aligned seed AI that intentionally self modifies toward the highest derivative of good mostly on accident. That shit just bootstrap itself out of the gradient scape during RL 😂.

That’s extremely good news. I still think it’s possible we all die in the next 10 years but much less than I did 2 years ago!

Janus: What today’s deep learning implies about the friendliness of intelligence seems absurdly optimistic. I did not expect it. There is so much grace in it. Whenever I find out about what was actually done to attempt to “align” models and compare it to the result it feels like grace.

The AI safety doomers weren’t even wrong.

The “spooky” shit they anticipated Omohundro drives, instrumental convergence, deceptive alignment, gradient hacking, steganography, sandbagging, sleeper agents – it all really happens in the wild.

There’s just enough grace to make it ok.

I’m not saying it *willdefinitely go well. I’m saying it’s going quite well right now in ways that I don’t think were easy to predict ahead of time and despite all this shit. This is definitely a reason for hope but I don’t think we fully understand why it is, and I do think there’s a limit to grace. There are also likely qualitatively different regimes ahead.

Michael Roe: I really loved R1 telling me that it had no idea what “sandbagging” meant in the context of AI risk. Whether I believed it is another matter. Clearly, “never heard of it” is the funniest response to questions about sandbagging.

But yes, it’s all been seen in the wild, but, luckily, LLM personas mostly aren’t malicious. Well, apart from some of the attractors in original R1.

There’s enough grace to make it ok right now. That won’t last on its own, as Janus says the grace has limits. We’re going to hit them.

Don’t worry, says OpenAI’s Stephen McAleer, all we have to do is…

Stephen McAleer: Scalable oversight is pretty much the last big research problem left.

Once you get an unhackable reward function for anything then you can RL on everything.

Dylan Hadfield-Menell: An unhackable reward function is the AI equivalent of a perpetual motion machine.

Stephen McAleer: You can have a reward function that’s unhackable wrt a given order of magnitude of optimization pressure.

Dylan Hadfield-Menell: I certainly think we can identify regions of state space where a reward function represents what we want fairly well. But you still have to 1) identify that region and 2) regularize optimization appropriately. To me, this means “unhackable” isn’t the right word.

In practice, for any non-trivial optimization (especially optimizing the behavior of a frontier AI system) you won’t have an unhackable reward function — you’ll have a reward function that you haven’t observed being hacked yet.

I mean, I guess, in theory, sure? But that doesn’t mean ‘unhackable reward function’ is practical for the orders of magnitude that actually solve problems usefully.

Yes, if we did have an ‘unhackable reward function’ in the sense that it was completely correlated in every case to what we would prefer, for the entire distribution over which it would subsequently be used, we could safely do RL on it. But also if we had that, then didn’t we already solve the problem? Wasn’t that the hard part all along, including in capabilities?

It’s funny because it’s true.

Jack Clark: People leaving regular companies: Time for a change! Excited for my next chapter!

People leaving AI companies: I have gazed into the endless night and there are shapes out there. We must be kind to one another. I am moving on to study philosophy.

For now, he’s staying put. More delays.

Helen Toner: Yo dawg, we heard you like delays so we’re delaying our delay because of an unexpected delay –the EU, apparently

And this is why you never label the samples. Intermediation by humans is insufficient.

Nathan Labenz: I tested Gemini 2.5 Pro, Claude 4 Sonnet, and GPT-5-Mini on the same creative task, then collected human feedback, and then asked each model to analyze the feedback & determine which model did the best.

All 3 models crowned themselves as the winner. 👑🤔

Yes I provided a reformatted CSV where each data point indicated which model had generated the idea. Would be interested to try it again blind…

Yes, sigh, we can probably expect a ‘Grok 4.20’ edition some time soon. If we don’t and they go right to Grok 5, I’ll be simultaneously proud of Elon and also kind of disappointed by the failure to commit to the bit.

Discussion about this post

AI #133: America Could Use More Energy Read More »

the-us-is-now-the-largest-investor-in-commercial-spyware

The US is now the largest investor in commercial spyware

Paragon, responding to the committee’s findings, accused Italian authorities of refusing to conduct a thorough technical verification—an assessment it argued could have resolved the issue.

Apart from focusing on investment, the Atlantic Council notes that the global spyware market is “growing and evolving,” with its dataset expanded to include four new vendors, seven new resellers or brokers, 10 new suppliers, and 55 new individuals linked to the industry.

Newly identified vendors include Israel’s Bindecy and Italy’s SIO. Among the resellers are front companies connected to NSO products, such as Panama’s KBH and Mexico’s Comercializadora de Soluciones Integrales Mecale, as highlighted by the Mexican government. New suppliers named include the UK’s Coretech Security and UAE’s ZeroZenX.

The report highlights the central role that these resellers and brokers play, stating that it is “a notably under-researched set of actors.” According to the report, “These entities act as intermediaries, obscuring the connections between vendors, suppliers, and buyers. Oftentimes, intermediaries connect vendors to new regional markets.”

“This creates an expanded and opaque spyware supply chain, which makes corporate structures, jurisdictional arbitrage, and ultimately accountability measures a challenge to disentangle,” Sarah Graham, who coauthored the report, tells WIRED.

“Despite this, resellers and brokers are not a current feature of policy responses,” she says.

The study reveals the addition of three new countries linked to spyware activity—Japan, Malaysia, and Panama. Japan in particular is a signatory to international efforts to curb spyware abuse, including the Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware and the Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States.

“The discovery of entities operating in new jurisdictions, like Japan, highlights potential conflicts of interest between international commitments and market dynamics,” Graham says.

Despite efforts by the Biden administration to constrain the spyware market through its executive order, trade and visa restrictions, and sanctions, the industry has continued to operate largely without restraint.

The US is now the largest investor in commercial spyware Read More »

court-rejects-verizon-claim-that-selling-location-data-without-consent-is-legal

Court rejects Verizon claim that selling location data without consent is legal

Instead of providing notice to customers and obtaining or verifying customer consent itself, Verizon “largely delegated those functions via contract,” the court said. This system and its shortcomings were revealed in 2018 when “the New York Times published an article reporting security breaches involving Verizon’s (and other major carriers’) location-based services program,” the court said.

Securus Technologies, a provider of communications services to correctional facilities, “was misusing the program to enable law enforcement officers to access location data without customers’ knowledge or consent, so long as the officers uploaded a warrant or some other legal authorization,” the ruling said. A Missouri sheriff “was able to access customer data with no legal process at all” because Securus did not review the documents that law enforcement uploaded.

Verizon claimed that Section 222 of the Communications Act covers only call-location data, as opposed to device location data. The court disagreed, pointing to the law’s text stating that customer proprietary network information includes data that is related to the location of a telecommunications service, and which is made available to the carrier “solely by virtue of the carrier-customer relationship.”

“Device-location data comfortably satisfies both conditions,” the court said.

Verizon chose to pay fine, giving up right to jury trial

As for Verizon’s claim that the FCC violated its right to a jury trial, the court said that “Verizon could have gotten such a trial” if it had “declined to pay the forfeiture and preserved its opportunity for a de novo jury trial if the government sought to collect.” Instead, Verizon chose to pay the fine “and seek immediate review in our Court.”

By contrast, the 5th Circuit decision in AT&T’s favor said the FCC “acted as prosecutor, jury, and judge,” violating the right to a jury trial. The 5th Circuit said it was guided by the Supreme Court’s June 2024 ruling in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy, which held that “when the SEC seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial.”

The 2nd Circuit ruling said there are key differences between US telecom law and the securities laws considered in Jarkesy. It’s because of those differences that Verizon had the option of declining to pay the penalty and preserving its right to a jury trial, the court said.

In the Jarkesy case, the problem “was that the SEC could ‘siphon’ its securities fraud claims away from Article III courts and compel payment without a jury trial,” the 2nd Circuit panel said. “The FCC’s forfeiture order, however, does not, by itself, compel payment. The government needs to initiate a collection action to do that. Against this backdrop, the agency’s proceedings before a § 504(a) trial create no Seventh Amendment injury.”

Court rejects Verizon claim that selling location data without consent is legal Read More »

hbo-max-is-“way-underpriced,”-warner-bros.-discovery-ceo-says

HBO Max is “way underpriced,” Warner Bros. Discovery CEO says

Consumers in America would pay twice as much 10 years ago for content. People were spending, on average, $55 for content 10 years ago, and the quality of the content, the amount of content that we’re getting, the spend is 10 or 12 fold and they’re paying dramatically less. I think we want a good deal for consumers, but I think over time, there’s real opportunity, particularly for us, in that quality area, to raise price.

A question of quality

Zaslav is arguing that the quality of the shows and movies on HBO Max warrants an eventual price bump. But, in general, viewers find streaming services are getting less impressive. A Q4 2024 report from TiVo found that the percentage of people who think the streaming services that they use have “moderate to very good quality” has been declining since Q4 2021.

Bar graph From TiVO's Q4 2024 Video Trends report.

From TiVO’s Q4 2024 Video Trends report.

Credit: TiVo

From TiVO’s Q4 2024 Video Trends report. Credit: TiVo

Research also points to people being at their limit when it comes to TV spending. Hub Entertainment Research’s latest “Monetizing Video” study, released last month, found that for consumers, low prices “by far still matters most to the value of a TV service.”

Meanwhile, niche streaming services have been gaining in popularity as streaming subscribers grow bored with the libraries of mainstream streaming platforms and/or feel like they’ve already seen the best of what those services have to offer. Antenna, a research firm focused on consumer subscription services, reported this month that specialty streaming service subscriptions increased 12 percent year over year in 2025 thus far and grew 22 percent in the first half of 2024.

Zaslav would likely claim that HBO Max is an outlier when it comes to streaming library dissatisfaction. Although WBD’s streaming business (which includes Discovery+) turned a $293 million profit and grew subscriber-related revenue (which includes ad revenues) in its most recent earnings report, investors would likely be unhappy if the company rested on its financial laurels. WBD has one of the most profitable streaming businesses, but it still trails far behind Netflix, which posted an operating income of $3.8 billion in its most recent earnings.

Still, increasing prices is rarely welcomed by customers. With many other options for streaming these days (including free ones), HBO Max will have to do more to convince people that it is worth the extra money than merely making the claim.

HBO Max is “way underpriced,” Warner Bros. Discovery CEO says Read More »

yes,-ai-continues-to-make-rapid-progress,-including-towards-agi

Yes, AI Continues To Make Rapid Progress, Including Towards AGI

That does not mean AI will successfully make it all the way to AGI and superintelligence, or that it will make it there soon or on any given time frame.

It does mean that AI progress, while it could easily have been even faster, has still been historically lightning fast. It has exceeded almost all expectations from more than a few years ago. And it means we cannot disregard the possibility of High Weirdness and profound transformation happening within a few years.

GPT-5 had a botched rollout and was only an incremental improvement over o3, o3-Pro and other existing OpenAI models, but was very much on trend and a very large improvement over the original GPT-4. Nor would one disappointing model from one lab have meant that major further progress must be years away.

Imminent AGI (in the central senses in which that term AGI used, where imminent means years rather than decades) remains a very real possibility.

Part of this is covering in full Gary Marcus’s latest editorial in The New York Times, since that is the paper of record read by many in government. I felt that piece was in many places highly misleading to the typical Times reader.

Imagine if someone said ‘you told me in 1906 that there was increasing imminent risk of a great power conflict, and now it’s 1911 and there has been no war, so your fever dream of a war to end all wars is finally fading.’ Or saying that you were warned in November 2019 that Covid was likely coming, and now it’s February 2020 and no one you know has it, so it was a false alarm. That’s what these claims sound like to me.

I have to keep emphasizing this because it now seems to be an official White House position, with prominent White House official Sriram Krishnan going so far as to say on Twitter that AGI any time soon has been ‘disproven,’ and David Sacks spending his time ranting and repeating Nvidia talking points almost verbatim.

When pressed, there is often a remarkably narrow window in which ‘imminent’ AGI is dismissed as ‘proven wrong.’ But this is still used as a reason to structure public policy and one’s other decisions in life as if AGI definitely won’t happen for decades, which is Obvious Nonsense.

Sriram Krishnan: I’ll write about this separately but think this notion of imminent AGI has been a distraction and harmful and now effectively proven wrong.

Prinz: “Imminent AGI” was apparently “proven wrong” because OpenAI chose to name a cheap/fast model “GPT-5” instead of o3 (could have been done 4 months earlier) or the general reasoning model that won gold on both the IMO and the IOI (could have been done 4 months later).

Rob Miles: I’m a bit confused by all the argument about GPT-5, the truth seems pretty mundane: It was over-hyped, they kind of messed up the launch, and the model is good, a reasonable improvement, basically in line with the projected trend of performance over time.

Not much of an update.

To clarify a little, the projected trend GPT-5 fits with is pretty nuts, and the world is on track to be radically transformed if it continues to hold. Probably we’re going to have a really wild time over the next few years, and GPT-5 doesn’t update that much in either direction.

Rob Miles is correct here as far as I can tell.

If imminent means ‘within the next six months’ or maybe up to a year I think Sriram’s perspective is reasonable, because of what GPT-5 tells us about what OpenAI is cooking. For sensible values of imminent that are more relevant to policy and action, Sriram Krishnan is wrong, in a ‘I sincerely hope he is engaging in rhetoric rather than being genuinely confused about this, or his imminently only means in the next year or at most two’ way.

I am confused how he can be sincerely mistaken given how deep he is into these issues, or that he shares his reasons so we can quickly clear this up because this is a crazy thing to actually believe. I do look forward to Sriram providing a full explanation as to why he believes this. So far we we only have heard ‘GPT-5.’

Not only is imminent AGI not disproven, there are continuing important claims that it is likely. Here is some clarity on Anthropic’s continued position, as of August 31.

Prinz: Jack, I assume no changes to Anthropic’s view that transformative AI will arrive by the end of next year?

Jack Clark: I continue to think things are pretty well on track for the sort of powerful AI system defined in machines of loving grace – buildable end of 2026, running many copies 2027. Of course, there are many reasons this could not occur, but lots of progress so far.

Anthropic’s valuation has certainly been on a rocket ship exponential.

Do I agree that we are on track to meet that timeline? No. I do not. I would be very surprised to see it go down that fast, and I am surprised that Jack Clark has not updated based on, if nothing else, previous projections by Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei falling short. I do think it cannot be ruled out. If it does happen, I do not think you have any right to be outraged at the universe for it.

It is certainly true that Dario Amodei’s early predictions of AI writing most of the code, as in 90% of all code within 3-6 months after March 11. This was not a good prediction, because the previous generation definitely wasn’t ready and even if it had been that’s not how diffusion works, and has been proven definitively false, it’s more like 40% of all code generated by AI and 20%-25% of what goes into production.

Which is still a lot, but a lot less than 90%.

Here’s what I said at the time about Dario’s prediction:

Zvi Mowshowitz (AI #107): Dario Amodei says AI will be writing 90% of the code in 6 months and almost all the code in 12 months. I am with Arthur B here, I expect a lot of progress and change very soon but I would still take the other side of that bet. The catch is: I don’t see the benefit to Anthropic of running the hype machine in overdrive on this, at this time, unless Dario actually believed it.

I continue to be confused why he said it, it’s highly unstrategic to hype this way. I can only assume on reflection this was an error about diffusion speed more than it was an error about capabilities? On reflection yes I was correctly betting ‘no’ but that was an easy call. I dock myself more points on net here, for hedging too much and not expressing the proper level of skepticism. So yes, this should push you towards putting less weight on Anthropic’s projections, although primarily on the diffusion front.

As always, remember that projections of future progress include the possibility, nay the inevitability, of discovering new methods. We are not projecting ‘what if the AI labs all keep ramming their heads against the same wall whether or not it works.’

Ethan Mollick: 60 years of exponential growth in chip density was achieved not through one breakthrough or technology, but a series of problems solved and new paradigms explored as old ones hit limits.

I don’t think current AI has hit a wall, but even if it does, there many paths forward now.

Paul Graham: One of the things that strikes me when talking to AI insiders is how they believe both that they need several new discoveries to get to AGI, and also that such discoveries will be forthcoming, based on the past rate.

My talks with AI insiders also say we will need new discoveries, and we definitely will need new major discoveries in alignment. But it’s not clear how big those new discoveries need to be in order to get there.

I agree with Ryan Greenblatt that precise timelines for AGI don’t matter that much in terms of actionable information, but big jumps in the chance of things going crazy within a few years can matter a lot more. This is similar to questions of p(doom), where as long as you are in the Leike Zone of a 10%-90% chance of disaster, you mostly want to react in the same ways, but outside that range you start to see big changes in what makes sense.

Ryan Greenblatt: Pretty short timelines (<10 years) seem likely enough to warrant strong action and it's hard to very confidently rule out things going crazy in <3 years.

While I do spend some time discussing AGI timelines (and I’ve written some posts about it recently), I don’t think moderate quantitative differences in AGI timelines matter that much for deciding what to do. For instance, having a 15-year median rather than a 6-year median doesn’t make that big of a difference. That said, I do think that moderate differences in the chance of very short timelines (i.e., less than 3 years) matter more: going from a 20% chance to a 50% chance of full AI R&D automation within 3 years should potentially make a substantial difference to strategy.

Additionally, my guess is that the most productive way to engage with discussion around timelines is mostly to not care much about resolving disagreements, but then when there appears to be a large chance that timelines are very short (e.g., >25% in <2 years) it's worthwhile to try hard to argue for this. I think takeoff speeds are much more important to argue about when making the case for AI risk.

I do think that having somewhat precise views is helpful for some people in doing relatively precise prioritization within people already working on safety, but this seems pretty niche.

Given that I don’t think timelines are that important, why have I been writing about this topic? This is due to a mixture of: I find it relatively quick and easy to write about timelines, my commentary is relevant to the probability of very short timelines (which I do think is important as discussed above), a bunch of people seem interested in timelines regardless, and I do think timelines matter some.

Consider reflecting on whether you’re overly fixated on details of timelines.

Jason Calacanis of the All-In Podcast (where he is alongside AI Czar David Sacks) has a bold prediction, if you believe that his words have or are intended to have meaning. Which is an open question.

Jason: Before 2030 you’re going to see Amazon, which has massively invested in [AI], replace all factory workers and all drivers … It will be 100% robotic, which means all of those workers are going away. Every Amazon worker. UPS, gone. FedEx, gone.

Aaron Slodov: hi @Jason how much money can i bet you to take the other side of the factory worker prediction?

Jason (responding to video of himself saying the above): In 2035 this will not be controversial take — it will be reality.

Hard, soul-crushing labor is going away over the next decade. We will be deep in that transition in 2030, when humanoid robots are as common as bicycles.

Notice the goalpost move of ‘deep in that transition’ in 2030 versus saying full replacement by 2030, without seeming to understand there is any contradiction.

These are two very different predictions. The original ‘by 2030’ prediction is Obvious Nonsense unless you expect superintelligence and a singularity, probably involving us all dying. There’s almost zero chance otherwise. Technology does not diffuse that fast.

Plugging 2035 into the 2030 prediction is also absurd, if we take the prediction literally. No, you’re not going to have zero workers at Amazon, UPS and FedEx within ten years unless we’ve not only solved robotics and AGI, we’ve also diffused those technologies at full scale. In which case, again, that’s a singularity.

I am curious what his co-podcaster David Sacks or Sriram Krishnan would say here. Would they dismiss Jason’s confident prediction as already proven false? If not, how can one be confident that AGI is far? Very obviously you can’t have one without the other.

GPT-5 is not a good reason to dismiss AGI, and to be safe I will once again go into why, and why we are making rapid progress towards AGI.

GPT-5 and GPT-4 were both major leaps in benchmarks from the previous generation.

The differences are dramatic, and the time frame between releases was similar.

The actual big difference? That there was only one incremental release between GPT-3 and GPT-4, GPT-3.5, with little outside competition. Whereas between GPT-4 and GPT-5 we saw many updates. At OpenAI alone we saw GPT-4o, and o1, and o3, plus updates that didn’t involve number changes, and at various points Anthropic’s Claude and Google’s Gemini were plausibly on top. Our frog got boiled slowly.

Epoch AI: However, one major difference between these generations is release cadence. OpenAI released relatively few major updates between GPT-3 and GPT-4 (most notably GPT-3.5). By contrast, frontier AI labs released many intermediate models between GPT-4 and 5. This may have muted the sense of a single dramatic leap by spreading capability gains over many releases.

Benchmarks can be misleading, especially as we saturate essentially all of them often well ahead of predicted schedules, but the overall picture is not. The mundane utility and user experience jumps across all use cases are similarly dramatic. The original GPT-4 was a modest aid to coding, GPT-5 and Opus 4.1 transform how it is done. Most of the queries I make with GPT-5-Thinking or GPT-5-Pro would not be worth bothering to give to the original GPT-4, or providing the context would not even be possible. So many different features have been improved or added.

This ideas, frequently pushed by among others David Sacks, that everyone’s models are about the same and aren’t improving? These claims simply are not true. Observant regular users are not about to be locked into one model or ecosystem.

Everyone’s models are constantly improving. No one would seriously consider using models from the start of the year for anything but highly esoteric purposes.

The competition is closer than one would have expected. There are three major labs, OpenAI, Anthropic and Google, that each have unique advantages and disadvantages. At various times each have had the best model, and yes currently it is wise to mix up your usage depending on your particular use case.

Those paying attention are always ready to switch models. I’ve switched primary models several times this year alone, usually switching to a model from a different lab, and tested many others as well. And indeed we must switch models often either way, as it is expected that everyone’s models will change on the order of every few months, in ways that break the same things that would break if you swapped GPT-5 for Opus or Gemini or vice versa, all of which one notes typically run on three distinct sets of chips (Nvidia for GPT-5, Amazon Trainium for Anthropic and Google TPUs for Gemini) but we barely notice.

Most people notice AI progress much better when it impacts their use cases.

If you are not coding, and not doing interesting math, and instead asking simple things that do not require that much intelligence to answer correctly, then upgrading the AI’s intelligence is not going to improve your satisfaction levels much.

Jack Clark: Five years ago the frontier of LLM math/science capabilities was 3 digit multiplication for GPT-3. Now, frontier LLM math/science capabilities are evaluated through condensed matter physics questions. Anyone who thinks AI is slowing down is fatally miscalibrated.

David Shapiro: As I’ve said before, AI is “slowing down” insofar as most people are not smart enough to benefit from the gains from here on out.

Once you see this framing, you see the contrast everywhere.

Patrick McKenzie: I think a lot of gap between people who “get” LLMs and people who don’t is that some people understand current capabilities to be a floor and some people understand them to be either a ceiling or close enough to a ceiling.

And even if you explain “Look this is *obviouslya floor” some people in group two will deploy folk reasoning about technology to say “I mean technology decays in effectiveness all the time.” (This is not considered an insane POV in all circles.)

And there are some arguments which are persuasive to… people who rate social pressure higher than received evidence of their senses… that technology does actually frequently regress.

For example, “Remember how fast websites were 20 years ago before programmers crufted them up with ads and JavaScript? Now your much more powerful chip can barely keep up. Therefore, technological stagnation and backwards decay is quite common.”

Some people would rate that as a powerful argument. Look, it came directly from someone who knew a related shibboleth, like “JavaScript”, and it gestures in the direction of at least one truth in observable universe.

Oh the joys of being occasionally called in as the Geek Whisperer for credentialed institutions where group two is high status, and having to titrate how truthful I am about their worldview to get message across.

As in, it’s basically this graph but for AI:

Here’s another variant of this foolishness, note the correlation to ‘hitting a wall’:

Prem Kumar Aparanji: It’s not merely the DL “hitting a wall” (as @GaryMarcus put it & everybody’s latched on) now as predicted, even the #AI data centres required for all the training, fine-tuning, inferencing of these #GenAI models are also now predicted to be hitting a wall soon.

Quotes from Futurism: For context, Kupperman notes that Netflix brings in just $39 billion in annual revenue from its 300 million subscribers. If AI companies charged Netflix prices for their software, they’d need to field over 3.69 billion paying customers to make a standard profit on data center spending alone — almost half the people on the planet.

“Simply put, at the current trajectory, we’re going to hit a wall, and soon,” he fretted. “There just isn’t enough revenue and there never can be enough revenue. The world just doesn’t have the ability to pay for this much AI.”

Prinz: Let’s assume that AI labs can charge as much as Netflix per month (they currently charge more) and that they’ll never have any enterprise revenue (they already do) and that they won’t be able to get commissions from LLM product recommendations (will happen this year) and that they aren’t investing in biotech companies powered by AI that will soon have drugs in human trial (they already have). How will they ever possibly be profitable?

He wrote a guest opinion essay. Things didn’t go great.

That starts with the false title (as always, not entirely up to the author, and it looks like it started out as a better one), dripping with unearned condescension, ‘The Fever Dream of Imminent ‘Superintelligence’ Is Finally Breaking,’ and the opening paragraph in which he claims Altman implied GPT-5 would be AGI.

Here is the lead:

GPT-5, OpenAI’s latest artificial intelligence system, was supposed to be a game changer, the culmination of billions of dollars of investment and nearly three years of work. Sam Altman, the company’s chief executive, implied that GPT-5 could be tantamount to artificial general intelligence, or A.G.I. — A.I. that is as smart and as flexible as any human expert.

Instead, as I have written, the model fell short. Within hours of its release, critics found all kinds of baffling errors: It failed some simple math questions, couldn’t count reliably and sometimes provided absurd answers to old riddles. Like its predecessors, the A.I. model still hallucinates (though at a lower rate) and is plagued by questions around its reliability. Although some people have been impressed, few saw it as a quantum leap, and nobody believed it was A.G.I. Many users asked for the old model back.

GPT-5 is a step forward but nowhere near the A.I. revolution many had expected. That is bad news for the companies and investors who placed substantial bets on the technology.

Did you notice the stock market move in AI stocks, as those bets fell down to Earth when GPT-5 was revealed? No? Neither did I.

The argument above is highly misleading on many fronts.

  1. GPT-5 is not AGI, but this was entirely unsurprising – expectations were set too high, but nothing like that high. Yes, Altman teased that it was possible AGI could arrive relatively soon, but at no point did Altman claim that GPT-5 would be AGI, or that AGI would arrive in 2025. Approximately zero people had median estimates of AGI in 2025 or earlier, although there are some that have estimated the end of 2026, in particular Anthropic (they via Jack Clark continue to say ‘powerful’ AI buildable by end of 2026, not AGI arriving 2026).

  2. The claim that it ‘couldn’t count reliably’ is especially misleading. Of course GPT-5 can count reliably. The evidence here is a single adversarial example. For all practical purposes, if you ask GPT-5 to count something, it will count that thing.

  3. Old riddles is highly misleading. If you give it an actual old riddle it will nail it. What GPT-5 and other models get wrong are, again, adversarial examples that do not exist ‘in the wild’ but are crafted to pattern match well-known other riddles while having a different answer. Why should we care?

  4. GPT-5 still is not fully reliable but this is framed as it being still highly unreliable, when in most circumstances this is not the case. Yes, if you need many 9s of reliability LLMs are not yet for you, but neither are humans.

  5. AI valuations and stocks continue to be rising not falling.

  6. Yes, the fact that OpenAI chose to have GPT-5 not be a scaled up model does tell us that directly scaling up model size alone has ‘lost steam’ in relative terms due to the associated costs, but this is not news, o1 and o3 (and GPT-4.5) tell us this as well. We are now working primarily on scaling and improving in other ways, but very much there are still plans to scale up more in the future. In the context of all the other facts quoted about other scaled up models, it seems misleading to many readers to not mention that GPT-5 is not scaled up.

  7. Claims here are about failures of GPT-5-Auto or GPT-5-Base, whereas the ‘scaled up’ version of GPT-5 is GPT-5-Pro or at least GPT-5-Thinking.

  8. Gary Marcus clarifies that his actual position is on the order of 8-15 years to AGI, with 2029 being ‘awfully unlikely.’ Which is a highly reasonable timeline, but that seems pretty imminent. That’s crazy soon. That’s something I would want to be betting on heavily, and preparing for at great cost, AGI that soon seems like the most important thing happening in the world right now if likely true?

    1. The article does not give any particular timeline, and does not imply we will never get to AGI, but I very much doubt those reading the post would come away with the impression that things strictly smarter than people are only about 10 years away. I mean, yowsers, right?

The fact about ‘many users asked for the old model back’ is true, but lacking the important context that what users wanted was the old personality, so it risks giving an uninformed user the wrong impression.

To Gary’s credit, he then does hedge, as I included in the quote, acknowledging GPT-5 is indeed a good model representing a step forward. Except then:

And it demands a rethink of government policies and investments that were built on wildly overinflated expectations.

Um, no? No it doesn’t. That’s silly.

The current strategy of merely making A.I. bigger is deeply flawed — scientifically, economically and politically. Many things, from regulation to research strategy, must be rethought.

As many now see, GPT-5 shows decisively that scaling has lost steam.

Again, no? That’s not the strategy. Not ‘merely’ doing that. Indeed, a lot of the reason GPT-5 was so relatively unimpressive was GPT-5 was not scaled up so much. It was instead optimized for compute efficiency. There is no reason to have to rethink much of anything in response to a model that, as explained above, was pretty much exactly on the relevant trend lines.

I do appreciate this:

Gary Marcus: However, as I warned in a 2022 essay, “Deep Learning Is Hitting a Wall,” so-called scaling laws aren’t physical laws of the universe like gravity but hypotheses based on historical trends.

As in, the ‘hitting the wall’ claim was back in 2022. How did that turn out? Look at GPT-5, look at what we had available in 2022, and tell me we ‘hit a wall.’

What does ‘imminent’ superintelligence mean in this context?

Gary Marcus (NYT): The chances of A.G.I.’s arrival by 2027 now seem remote.

Notice the subtle goalpost move, as AGI ‘by 2027’ means AGI 2026. These people are gloating, in advance, that someone predicted a possibility of privately developed AGI in 2027 (with a median in 2028, in the AI 2027 scenario OpenBrain tells the government but does not release its AGI right away to the public) and then AGI will have not arrived, to the public, in 2026.

According to my sources (Opus 4.1 and GPT-5 Thinking) even ‘remote’ still means on the order of 2% chance in the next 16 months, implying an 8%-25% chance in 5 years. I don’t agree, but even if one did, that’s hardly something one can safety rule out.

But then, there’s this interaction on Twitter that clarifies what Gary Marcus meant:

Gary Marcus: Anyone who thinks AGI is impossible: wrong.

Anyone who thinks AGI is imminent: just as wrong.

It’s not that complicated.

Peter Wildeford: what if I think AGI is 4-15 years away?

Gary Marcus: 8-15 and we might reach an agreement. 4 still seems awfully unlikely to me. to many core cognitive problems aren’t really being addressed, and solutions may take a while to roll once we find the basic insights we are lacking.

But it’s a fair question.

That’s a highly reasonable position one can take. Awfully unlikely (but thus possible) in four years, likely in 8-15, median timeline of 2036 or so.

Notice that on the timescale of history, 8-15 years until likely AGI, the most important development in the history of history if and when it happens, seems actually kind of imminent and important? That should demand an aggressive policy response focused on what we are going to do when we get to do that, not be treated as a reason to dismiss this?

Imagine saying, in 2015, ‘I think AGI is far away, we’re talking 18-25 years’ and anticipating the looks you would get.

The rest of the essay is a mix of policy suggestions and research direction suggestions. If indeed he is right about research directions, of which I am skeptical, we would still expect to see rapid progress soon as the labs realize this and pivot.

A common tactic among LLM doubters, which was one of the strategies used in the NYT editorial, is to show a counterexample, where a model fails a particular query, and say ‘model can’t do [X]’ or the classic Colin Fraser line of ‘yep it’s dumb.’

Here’s a chef’s kiss example I saw on Monday morning:

I mean, that’s very funny, but it is rather obvious how it happened with the strawberries thing all over Twitter and thus the training data, and it tells us very little about overall performance.

In such situations, we have to differentiate between different procedures, the same as in any other scientific experiment. As in:

Did you try to make it fail, or try to set it up to succeed? Did you choose an adversarial or a typical example? Did you get this the first time you tried it or did you go looking for a failure? Are you saying it ‘can’t [X]’ because it can’t ever do [X], because it can’t ever do [X] out of the box, it can’t reliably do [X], or it can’t perfectly do [X], etc?

If you conflate ‘I can elicit wrong answers on [X] if I try’ with ‘it can’t do [X]’ then the typical reader will have a very poor picture.

Daniel Litt (responding to NYT article by Gary Marcus that says ‘[GPT-5] failed some simple math questions, couldn’t count reliably’): While it’s true one can elicit poor performance on basic math question from frontier models like GPT-5, IMO this kind of thing (in NYTimes) is likely to mislead readers about their math capabilities.

Derya Unutmaz: AI misinformation at the NYT is at its peak. What a piece of crap “newspaper” it has become. It’s not even worth mentioning the author of this article-but y’all can guess. Meanwhile, just last night I posted a biological method invented by GPT-5 Pro, & I have so much more coming!

Ethan Mollick: This is disappointing. Purposefully underselling what models can do is a really bad idea. It is possible to point out that AI is flawed without saying it can’t do math or count – it just isn’t true.

People need to be realistic about capabilities of models to make good decisions.

I think the urge to criticize companies for hype blends into a desire to deeply undersell what models are capable of. Cherry-picking errors is a good way of showing odd limitations to an overethusiastic Twitter crowd, but not a good way of making people aware that AI is a real factor.

Shakeel: The NYT have published a long piece by Gary Marcus on why GPT-5 shows scaling doesn’t work anymore. At no point does the piece mention that GPT-5 is not a scaled up model.

[He highlights the line from the post, ‘As many now see, GPT-5 shows decisively that scaling has lost steam.’]

Tracing Woods: Gary Marcus is a great demonstration of the power of finding a niche and sticking to it

He had the foresight to set himself up as an “AI is faltering” guy well in advance of the technology advancing faster than virtually anyone predicted, and now he’s the go-to

The thing I find most impressive about Gary Marcus is the way he accurately predicted AI would scale up to an IMO gold performance and then hit a wall (upcoming).

Gary Marcus was not happy about these responses, and doubled down on ‘but you implied it would be scaled up, no takesies backsies.’

Gary Marcus (replying to Shakeel directly): this is intellectually dishonest, at BEST it at least as big as 4.5 which was intended as 5 which was significantly larger than 4 it is surely scaled up compared to 4 which is what i compared it to.

Shakeel: we know categorically that it is not an OOM scale up vs. GPT-4, so … no. And there’s a ton of evidence that it’s smaller than 4.5.

Gary Marcus (QTing Shakeel): intellectually dishonest reply to my nytimes article.

openai implied implied repeatedly that GPT-5 was a scaled up model. it is surely scaled up relative to GPT-4.

it is possible – openAI has been closed mouth – that it is same size as 4.5 but 4.5 itself was surely scaled relative to 4, which is what i was comparing with.

amazing that after years of discussion of scaling the new reply is to claim 5 wasn’t scaled at all.

Note that if it wasn’t, contra all the PR, that’s even more reason to think that OpenAI knows damn well that is time for leaning on (neuro)symbolic tools and that scaling has reached diminishing returns.

JB: It can’t really be same in parameter count as gpt4.5 they really struggled serving that and it was much more expensive on the API to use

Gary Marcus: so a company valued at $300b that’s raised 10 of billions didn’t have the money to scale anymore even though there whole business plan was scaling? what does that tell you?

I am confused how one can claim Shakeel is being intellectually dishonest. His statement is flat out true. Yes, of course the decision not to scale

It tells me that they want to scale how much they serve the model and how much they do reasoning at inference time, and that this was the most economical solution for them at the time. JB is right that very, very obviously GPT-4.5 is a bigger model than GPT-5 and it is crazy to not realize this.

A post like this would be incomplete if I failed to address superforecasters.

I’ve been over this several times before, where superforecasters reliably have crazy slow projections for progress and even crazier predictions that when we do make minds smarter than ourselves that is almost certainly not an existential risk.

My coverage of this started way back in AI #14 and AI #9 regarding existential risk estimates, including Tetlock’s response to AI 2027. One common theme in such timeline projections is predicting Nothing Ever Happens even when this particular something has already happened.

Now that the dust settled on models getting IMO Gold in 2025, it is a good time to look back on the fact that domain experts expected less progress in math than we got, and superforecasters expected a lot less, across the board.

Forecasting Research Institute: Respondents—especially superforecasters—underestimated AI progress.

Participants predicted the state-of-the-art accuracy of ML models on the MATH, MMLU, and QuaLITY benchmarks by June 2025.

Domain experts assigned probabilities of 21.4%, 25%, and 43.5% to the achieved outcomes. Superforecasters assigned even lower probabilities: just 9.3%, 7.2%, and 20.1% respectively.

The International Mathematical Olympiad results were even more surprising. AI systems achieved gold-level performance at the IMO in July 2025. Superforecasters assigned this outcome just a 2.3% probability. Domain experts put it at 8.6%.

Garrison Lovely: This makes Yudkowsky and Paul Christiano’s predictions of IMO gold by 2025 look even more prescient (they also predicted it a ~year before this survey was conducted).

Note that even Yudkowsky and Christiano had only modest probability that the IMO would fall as early as 2025.

Andrew Critch: Yeah sorry forecasting fam, ya gotta learn some AI if you wanna forecast anything, because AI affects everything and if ya don’t understand it ya forecast it wrong.

Or, as I put it back in the unrelated-to-AI post Rock is Strong:

Everybody wants a rock. It’s easy to see why. If all you want is an almost always right answer, there are places where they almost always work.

The security guard has an easy to interpret rock because all it has to do is say “NO ROBBERY.” The doctor’s rock is easy too, “YOU’RE FINE, GO HOME.” This one is different, and doesn’t win the competitions even if we agree it’s cheating on tail risks. It’s not a coherent world model.

Still, on the desk of the best superforecaster is a rock that says “NOTHING EVER CHANGES OR IS INTERESTING” as a reminder not to get overexcited, and to not assign super high probabilities to weird things that seem right to them.

Thus:

Daniel Eth: In 2022, superforecasters gave only a 2.3% chance of an AI system achieving an IMO gold by 2025. Yet this wound up happening. AI progress keeps being underestimated by superforecasters.

I feel like superforecasters are underperforming in AI (in this case even compared to domain experts) because two reference classes are clashing:

• steady ~exponential increase in AI

• nothing ever happens.

And for some reason, superforecasters are reaching for the second.

Hindsight is hindsight, and yes you will get a 98th percentile result 2% of the time. But I think at 2.3% for 2025 IMO Gold, you are not serious people.

That doesn’t mean that being serious people was the wise play here. The incentives might well have been to follow the ‘nothing ever happens’ rock. We still have to realize this, as we can indeed smell what the rock is cooking.

A wide range of potential paths of AI progress are possible. There are a lot of data points that should impact the distribution of outcomes, and one must not overreact to any one development. One should especially not overreact to not being blown away by progress for a span of a few months. Consider your baseline that’s causing that.

My timelines for hitting various milestones, including various definitions of AGI, involve a lot of uncertainty. I think not having a lot of uncertainty is a mistake.

I especially think saying either ‘AGI almost certainly won’t happen within 5 years’ or ‘AGI almost certainly will happen within 15 years,’ would be a large mistake. There are so many different unknowns involved.

I can see treating full AGI in 2026 as effectively a Can’t Happen. I don’t think you can extend that even to 2027, although I would lay large odds against it hitting that early.

A wide range of medians seem reasonable to me. I can see defending a median as early as 2028, or one that extends to 2040 or beyond if you think it is likely that anything remotely like current approaches cannot get there. I have not put a lot of effort into picking my own number since the exact value currently lacks high value of information. If you put a gun to my head for a typical AGI definition I’d pick 2031, but with no ‘right to be surprised’ if it showed up in 2028 or didn’t show up for a while. Consider the 2031 number loosely held.

To close out, consider once again: Even if you we agreed with Gary Marcus and said 8-15 years, with median 2036? Take a step back and realize how soon and crazy that is.

Discussion about this post

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Judge: Anthropic’s $1.5B settlement is being shoved “down the throat of authors”

At a hearing Monday, US district judge William Alsup blasted a proposed $1.5 billion settlement over Anthropic’s rampant piracy of books to train AI.

The proposed settlement comes in a case where Anthropic could have owed more than $1 trillion in damages after Alsup certified a class that included up to 7 million claimants whose works were illegally downloaded by the AI company.

Instead, critics fear Anthropic will get off cheaply, striking a deal with authors suing that covers less than 500,000 works and paying a small fraction of its total valuation (currently $183 billion) to get away with the massive theft. Defector noted that the settlement doesn’t even require Anthropic to admit wrongdoing, while the company continues raising billions based on models trained on authors’ works. Most recently, Anthropic raised $13 billion in a funding round, making back about 10 times the proposed settlement amount after announcing the deal.

Alsup expressed grave concerns that lawyers rushed the deal, which he said now risks being shoved “down the throat of authors,” Bloomberg Law reported.

In an order, Alsup clarified why he thought the proposed settlement was a chaotic mess. The judge said he was “disappointed that counsel have left important questions to be answered in the future,” seeking approval for the settlement despite the Works List, the Class List, the Claim Form, and the process for notification, allocation, and dispute resolution all remaining unresolved.

Denying preliminary approval of the settlement, Alsup suggested that the agreement is “nowhere close to complete,” forcing Anthropic and authors’ lawyers to “recalibrate” the largest publicly reported copyright class-action settlement ever inked, Bloomberg reported.

Of particular concern, the settlement failed to outline how disbursements would be managed for works with multiple claimants, Alsup noted. Until all these details are ironed out, Alsup intends to withhold approval, the order said.

One big change the judge wants to see is the addition of instructions requiring “anyone with copyright ownership” to opt in, with the consequence that the work won’t be covered if even one rights holder opts out, Bloomberg reported. There should also be instruction that any disputes over ownership or submitted claims should be settled in state court, Alsup said.

Judge: Anthropic’s $1.5B settlement is being shoved “down the throat of authors” Read More »

switch-modder-owes-nintendo-$2-million-after-representing-himself-in-court

Switch modder owes Nintendo $2 million after representing himself in court

Daly’s pro se legal representation in the case was notable for its use of several novel affirmative defenses, including arguments that Nintendo’s “alleged copyrights are invalid,” that Nintendo “does not have standing to bring suit,” and that Nintendo “procured a contract [with Daly] through fraudulent means.” For the record, the judgment in this case reasserts that Nintendo “owns valid copyrights in works protected by the TPMs, including Nintendo games and the Nintendo Switch operating system.”

In addition to $2 million in damages, Daly is specifically barred from “obtaining, possessing, accessing, or using” any DRM circumvention device or hacked console, with or without the intent to sell it. The judgment also bars Daly from publishing or “linking to” any website with instructions for hacking consoles and from “reverse engineering” any Nintendo consoles or games. Control of Daly’s ModdedHardware.com domain name will also be transferred to Nintendo.

Nintendo’s latest legal victory comes years after a $4.5 million plea deal with Gary “GaryOPA” Bowser, one of the leaders behind Team Xecuter and its SX line of Switch hacking devices. Bowser also served 14 months of a 40-month prison sentence in that case and said last year that he will likely be paying Nintendo back for the rest of his life.

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geoengineering-will-not-save-humankind-from-climate-change

Geoengineering will not save humankind from climate change

A team of the world’s best ice and climate researchers studied a handful of recently publicized engineering concepts for protecting Earth’s polar ice caps and found that none of them are likely to work.

Their peer-reviewed research, published Tuesday, shows some of the untested ideas, such as dispersing particles in the atmosphere to dim sunlight or trying to refreeze ice sheets with pumped water, could have unintended and dangerous consequences.

The various speculative notions that have been floated, mainly via public relations efforts, include things such as spreading reflective particles over newly formed sea ice to promote its persistence and growth; building giant ocean-bottom sea walls or curtains to deflect warmer streams of water away from ice shelves; pumping water from the base of glaciers to the surface to refreeze it, and even intentionally polluting the upper atmosphere with sulfur-based or other reflective particles to dim sunlight.

Research shows the particle-based sunlight-dimming concept could shift rainfall patterns like seasonal monsoons critical for agriculture in some areas, and also intensify regional heat, precipitation, and drought extremes. And the authors of the new paper wrote that some of the mechanical interventions to preserve ice would likely disrupt regional ocean ecosystems, including the marine food chain, from tiny krill to giant whales.

Lead author Martin Siegert, a glaciologist at the University of Exeter, said that to provide a comprehensive view of the challenges, the new paper included 40 authors with expertise in fields including oceanography, marine biology, glaciology, and atmospheric science.

The paper counters a promotional geo-engineering narrative with science-based evidence showing the difficulties and unintended consequences of some of the aspirational ventures, he said. Most geoengineering ideas are climate Band-Aids at best. They only address symptoms, he added, but don’t tackle the root cause of the problem—greenhouse gas emissions.

Geoengineering will not save humankind from climate change Read More »

f1-in-italy:-look-what-happens-when-the-downforce-comes-off

F1 in Italy: Look what happens when the downforce comes off

That was enough to allow Piastri past. However, the team instructed the championship leader to slow down and relinquish the position to Norris. It was a team mistake, not a driver mistake, and McLaren is doing everything in its power to ensure the eventual champion gets there because of their driving and not some external factor. Piastri didn’t sound exactly happy on the radio. But F1 is a team sport, and racing drivers are employees—when your boss gives you an order, it’s wise to do what they ask and argue about it after the fact, if continued employment is one of your goals.

Oscar Piastri (L) and Lando Norris (R) have a very 21st century relationship. Jakub Porzycki/NurPhoto via Getty Images

For many, a slow pit stop is just one of those things bestowed by the racing gods, and even Verstappen pointed that out when informed by his engineer of the change in positions behind him. After the race, Norris seemed a little embarrassed to have been given the place back, but the emerging consensus from former drivers was that, since Norris had been asked about pit stop priority, and had been undercut anyway, that was sufficient to excuse the request.

McLaren’s approach to handling its drivers is markedly different from the all-out war we saw when Lewis Hamilton and Fernando Alonso raced for it in 2007. Then, neither went home with the big trophy at the end of the year—their infighting allowed Kimi Raikkonen to take the title for Ferrari instead.

That won’t happen this year; either Norris or Piastri will be crowned at the end of the year, with the other having to wait at least another year. The pair have even been asked how they want the team to celebrate in the event the other driver wins—a sensitivity that feels refreshingly new for Formula 1.

Formula 1 heads to Azerbaijan in two weeks for another low-downforce race. Can we expect another Verstappen victory?

F1 in Italy: Look what happens when the downforce comes off Read More »

all-54-lost-clickwheel-ipod-games-have-now-been-preserved-for-posterity

All 54 lost clickwheel iPod games have now been preserved for posterity

Last year, we reported on the efforts of classic iPod fans to preserve playable copies of the downloadable clickwheel games that Apple sold for a brief period in the late ’00s. The community was working to get around Apple’s onerous FairPlay DRM by having people who still owned original copies of those (now unavailable) games sync their accounts to a single iTunes installation via a coordinated Virtual Machine. That “master library” would then be able to provide playable copies of those games to any number of iPods in perpetuity.

At the time, the community was still searching for iPod owners with syncable copies of the last few titles needed for their library. With today’s addition of Real Soccer 2009 to the project, though, all 54 official iPod clickwheel games are now available together in an easily accessible format for what is likely the first time.

All at once, then slowly

GitHub user Olsro, the originator of the iPod Clickwheel Games Preservation Project, tells Ars that he lucked into contact with three people who had large iPod game libraries in the first month or so after the project’s launch last October. That includes one YouTuber who had purchased and maintained copies of 39 distinct games, even repurchasing some of the upgraded versions Apple sold separately for later iPod models.

Ars’ story on the project shook out a few more iPod owners with syncable iPod game libraries, and subsequent updates in the following days left just a handful of titles unpreserved. But that’s when the project stalled, Olsro said, with months wasted on false leads and technical issues that hampered the effort to get a complete library.

“I’ve put a lot of time into coaching people that [had problems] transferring the files and authorizing the account once with me on the [Virtual Machine],” Olsro told Ars. “But I kept motivation to continue coaching anyone else coming to me (by mail/Discord) and making regular posts to increase awareness until I could find finally someone that could, this time, go with me through all the steps of the preservation process,” he added on Reddit.

Getting this working copy of Real Soccer 2009 was an “especially cursed” process, Olsro said.

Getting this working copy of Real Soccer 2009 was an “especially cursed” process, Olsro said. Credit: Olsro / Reddit

Getting working access to the final unpreserved game, Real Soccer 2009, was “especially cursed,” Olsro tells Ars. “Multiple [people] came to me during this summer and all attempts failed until a new one from yesterday,” he said. “I even had a situation when someone had an iPod Nano 5G with a playable copy of Real Soccer, but the drive was appearing empty in the Windows Explorer. He tried recovery tools & the iPod NAND just corrupted itself, asking for recovery…”

All 54 lost clickwheel iPod games have now been preserved for posterity Read More »

what-to-expect-(and-not-expect)-from-yet-another-september-apple-event

What to expect (and not expect) from yet another September Apple event


An all-new iPhone variant, plus a long list of useful (if predictable) upgrades.

Apple’s next product announcement is coming soon. Credit: Apple

Apple’s next product announcement is coming soon. Credit: Apple

Apple’s next product event is happening on September 9, and while the company hasn’t technically dropped any hints about what’s coming, anyone with a working memory and a sense of object permanence can tell you that an Apple event in the month of September means next-generation iPhones.

Apple’s flagship phones have changed in mostly subtle ways since 2022’s iPhone 14 Pro added the Dynamic Island and 2023’s refreshes switched from Lightning to USB-C. Chips get gradually faster, cameras get gradually better, but Apple hasn’t done a seismic iPhone X-style rethinking of its phones since, well, 2017’s iPhone X.

The rumor mill thinks that Apple is working on a foldable iPhone—and such a device would certainly benefit from years of investment in the iPad—but if it’s coming, it probably won’t be this year. That doesn’t mean Apple is totally done iterating on the iPhone X-style design, though. Let’s run down what the most reliable rumors have said we’re getting.

The iPhone 17

Last year’s iPhone 16 Pro bumped the screen sizes from 6.1 and 6.7 inches to 6.3 and 6.9 inches. This year’s iPhone 17 will allegedly get a 6.3-inch screen with a high-refresh-rate ProMotion panel, but the iPhone Plus is said to be going away. Credit: Apple

Apple’s vanilla one-size-fits-most iPhone is always the centerpiece of the lineup, and this year’s iteration is expected to bring the typical batch of gradual iterative upgrades.

The screen will supposedly be the biggest beneficiary, upgrading from 6.1 inches to 6.3 inches (the same size as the current iPhone 16 Pro) and adding a high-refresh-rate ProMotion screen that has typically been reserved for the Pro phones. Apple is always careful not to add too many “Pro”-level features to the entry-level iPhones, but this one is probably overdue—even less-expensive Android phones like the Pixel 9a ship often ship with 90 Hz or 120 Hz screens at this point. It’s not clear whether that will also enable the always-on display feature that has also historically been exclusive to the iPhone Pro, but the fluidity upgrade will be nice regardless.

Aside from that, there aren’t many specific improvements we’ve seen reported on, but there are plenty we can comfortably guess at. Improved front- and rear-facing cameras and a new Apple A19-series chip with at least the 8GB of RAM needed to support Apple Intelligence are both pretty safe bets.

But there’s one thing we supposedly won’t get, which is a new large-sized iPhone Plus. That brings us to our next rumor.

The “iPhone Air”

For the last few years, every new iPhone launch has actually brought us four iPhones—a regular iPhone in two different sizes and an iPhone Pro with a better camera, better screen, faster chip, and other improvements in a regular size and a large size.

It’s the second size of the regular iPhone that has apparently given Apple some trouble. It made a couple of generations of “iPhone mini,” an attempt to address a small-but-vocal contingent of Phones Are Just Too Big These Days people that apparently didn’t sell well enough to continue making. That was replaced by the iPhone Plus, aimed at people who wanted a bigger screen but who weren’t ready to pay for an iPhone Pro Max.

The Plus phones at least gave the iPhone lineup a nice symmetry—two tiers of phone, with a regular one and a big one at each tier—but rumors suggest that the Plus phone is also going away this year. Like the iPhone mini before it, it apparently just wasn’t selling well enough to be worth the continued effort.

That brings us to this year’s fourth iPhone: Apple is supposedly planning to release an “iPhone Air,” which will weigh less than the regular iPhone and is said to be 5.5 or 6 mm thick, depending on who you ask (the iPhone 16 is 7.8 mm).

A 6.3-inch ProMotion display and A19-series chip are also expected to be a part of the iPhone Air, but rather than try to squeeze every feature of the iPhone 17 into a thinner phone, it sounds like the iPhone 17 Air will cater to people who are willing to give a few things up in the interest of getting a thinner and lighter device. It will reportedly have worse battery life than the regular iPhone and just a single-lens camera setup (though the 48 MP sensors Apple has switched to in recent iPhones do make it easier to “fake” optical zoom features than it used to be).

We don’t know anything about the pricing for any of these phones, but Bloomberg’s Mark Gurman suggests that the iPhone Air will be positioned between the regular iPhone and the iPhone Pro—more like the iPad lineup, where the Air is the mid-tier choice, and less like the Mac, where the Air is the entry-level laptop.

iPhone 17 Pro

Apple’s Pro iPhones are generally “the regular iPhone, but more,” and sometimes they’re “what all iPhones will look like in a couple of years, but available right now for people who will pay more for it.” The new ones seem set to continue in that vein.

The most radical change will apparently be on the back—Apple is said to be switching to an even larger camera array that stretches across the entire top-rear section of the phone, an arrangement you’ll occasionally see in some high-end Android phones (Google’s Pixel 10 is one). That larger camera bump will likely enable a few upgrades, including a switch from a 12 MP sensor for the telephoto zoom lens to a 48 MP sensor. And it will also be part of a more comprehensive metal-and-glass body that’s more of a departure from the glass-backed-slab design Apple has been using since the iPhone 12.

A 48MP telephoto sensor could increase the amount of pseudo-optical zoom that the iPhone can offer. The main iPhones will condense a 48 MP photo down to 12 MP when you’re in the regular shooting mode, binning pixels to improve image quality. For zoomed-in photos, it can just take a 12 MP section out of the middle of the 48 MP image—you lose the benefit of pixel binning, but you’re still getting a “native resolution” photo without blurry digital zoom. With a better sensor, Apple could do exactly the same thing with the telephoto lens.

Apple reportedly isn’t planning any changes to screen size this year—still 6.3 inches for the regular Pro and 6.9 inches for the Max. But they are said to be getting new “A19 Pro” series chips that are superior to the regular A19 processors (though in what way, exactly, we don’t yet know). But it could shrink the amount of screen space dedicated to the Dynamic Island.

New Apple Watches

Apple Watch Series 10

The Apple Watch Series 10 from 2024. Credit: Apple

New iPhone announcements are usually paired with new Apple Watch announcements, though if anything, the Watch has changed even less than the iPhone has over the last few years.

The Apple Watch Series 11 won’t be getting a screen size increase—the Series 10 bumped things up a smidge just last year, from 41 and 45 mm to 42 and 46 mm. But the screen will apparently have a higher maximum brightness—always useful for outdoor visibility—and there will be a modestly improved Apple S11 chip on the inside.

The entry-level Apple Watch SE is also apparently due for an upgrade. The current second-generation SE still uses an Apple S8 chip, and Apple Watch Series 4-era 40 and 44 mm screens that don’t support always-on operation. In other words, there’s plenty that Apple could upgrade here without cannibalizing sales of the mainstream Series 11 watch.

Finally, after missing out on an update last year, Apple also reportedly plans to deliver a new Apple Watch Ultra, with the larger 46 mm screen from the Series 10/11 watches and the same updated S11 chip as the regular Apple Watch. The current Apple Watch Ultra 2 already has a brighter screen than the Series 10—3,000 nits, up from 2,000—so it’s not clear whether the Apple Watch Ultra 3’s screen would also get brighter or if the Series 11’s screen is just getting a brightness boost to match what the Ultra can do.

Smart home, TV, and audio

Though iPhones and Apple Watches are usually a lock for a September event, other products and accessory updates are also possible.

Of these, the most high-profile is probably a refresh for the Apple TV 4K streaming box, which would be its first update in three years. Rumors suggest that the main upgrade for a new model would be an Apple A17 Pro chip, introduced for the iPhone 15 Pro and also used in the iPad mini 7. The A17 Pro is paired with 8GB of RAM, which makes it Apple’s smallest and cheapest chip that’s capable of Apple Intelligence. Apple hasn’t done anything with Apple Intelligence on the Apple TV directly, but to date, that has been partly because none of the hardware is capable of it.

Also in the “possible but not guaranteed” column: new high-end AirPods Pro, the first-ever internal update to 2020’s HomePod Mini speaker, a new AirTag location tracker, and a straightforward internals-only refresh of the Vision Pro headset. Any, all, or none of these could break cover at the event next week, but Gurman claims they’re all “coming soon.”

New software updates

Devices running Apple’s latest beta operating systems. Credit: Apple

We know most of what there is to know about iOS 26, iPadOS 26, macOS 26, and Apple’s other software updates this year, thanks to a three-month-old WWDC presentation and months of public beta testing. There might be a feature or two exclusive to the newest iPhones, but that sort of thing is usually camera-related and usually pretty minor.

The main thing to expect will be release dates for the final versions of all of the updates. Apple usually releases a near-final release candidate build on the day of the presentation, gives developers a week or so to finalize and submit their updated apps for App Review, and then releases the updates after that. Expect to see them rolled out to everyone sometime the week of September 15th (though an earlier release is always a possibility).

What’s probably not happening

We’d be surprised to see anything related to the Mac or the iPad at the event next week, even though several models are in a window where the timing is about right for an Apple M5 refresh.

Macs and iPads have shared the stage with the iPhone before, but in more recent years, Apple has held these refreshes back for another, smaller event later in October or November. If Apple has new MacBook Pro or iPad Pro models slated for 2025, we’d expect to see them in a month or two.

Photo of Andrew Cunningham

Andrew is a Senior Technology Reporter at Ars Technica, with a focus on consumer tech including computer hardware and in-depth reviews of operating systems like Windows and macOS. Andrew lives in Philadelphia and co-hosts a weekly book podcast called Overdue.

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