Author name: Kelly Newman

gm-uses-ai-tool-to-determine-which-truck-stops-should-get-ev-chargers

GM uses AI tool to determine which truck stops should get EV chargers

help me choose —

Forget LLM chatbots; this seems like an actually useful implementation of AI.

A 2024 Chevrolet Silverado EV WT at a pull-through charging stall located at a flagship Pilot and Flying J travel center, as part of the new coast-to-coast fast charging network.

Enlarge / A 2024 Chevrolet Silverado EV WT at a pull-through charging stall located at a flagship Pilot and Flying J travel center, as part of the new coast-to-coast fast charging network.

General Motors

It’s understandable if you’re starting to experience AI fatigue; it feels like every week, there’s another announcement of some company boasting about how an LLM chatbot will revolutionize everything—usually followed in short succession by news reports of how terribly wrong it’s all gone. But it turns out that not every use of AI by an automaker is a public relations disaster. As it happens, General Motors has been using machine learning to help guide business decisions regarding where to install new DC fast chargers for electric vehicles.

GM’s transformation into an EV-heavy company has not gone entirely smoothly thus far, but in 2022, it revealed that, together with the Pilot company, it was planning to deploy a network of 2,000 DC fast chargers at Flying J and Pilot travel centers around the US. But how to decide which locations?

“I think that the overarching theme is we’re really looking for opportunities to simplify the lives of our customers, our employees, our dealers, and our suppliers,” explained Jon Francis, GM’s chief data and analytics officer. “And we see the positive effects of AI at scale, whether that’s in the manufacturing part of the business, engineering, supply chain, customer experience—it really runs through threads through all of those.

“Obviously, the place where it shows up most directly is certainly in autonomous, and that’s an important use case for us, but actually [on a] day-to-day basis, AI is improving a lot of systems and workflows within the organization,” he told Ars.

“There’s a lot of companies—and not to name names, but there’s some chasing of shiny objects, and I think there are a lot of cool, sexy things that you can do with AI, but for GM, we’re really looking for solutions that are going to drive the business in a meaningful way,” Francis said.

GM wants to build out chargers at about 200 Flying J and Pilot travel centers by the end of 2024, but narrowing down exactly which locations to focus on was the big question. After all, there are more than 750 spread out across 44 US states and six Canadian provinces.

Obviously, traffic is a big concern—each DC fast charger costs anywhere from $100,000 to $300,000 dollars, and that’s not counting any costs associated with beefing up the electrical infrastructure to power them, nor the various permitting processes that tend to delay everything. Sticking a bank of chargers at a travel center that’s rarely visited isn’t the best use of resources, but neither is deploying them in an area that’s already replete with other fast chargers.

Much of the data GM showed me was confidential, but this screenshot should give you an idea of how the various datasets combine.

Enlarge / Much of the data GM showed me was confidential, but this screenshot should give you an idea of how the various datasets combine.

General Motors

Which is where the ML came in. GM’s data scientists built tools that aggregate different GIS datasets together. For example, it has a geographic database of already deployed DC chargers around the country—the US Department of Energy maintains such a resource—overlayed with traffic data and then the locations of the travel centers. The result is a map with potential locations, which GM’s team then uses to narrow down the exact sites it wants to choose.

It’s true that if you had access to all those datasets, you could probably do all that manually. But we’re talking datasets with, in some cases, billions of data points. A few years ago, GM’s analysts could have done that at a city level without spending years on the project, but doing it on a nationwide scale is the kind of task that requires the amount of cloud platforms and distributed clusters that are really now only becoming commonplace.

As a result, GM was able to deploy the first 25 sites last year, with 100 charging stalls across the 25. By the end of this year, it told Ars it should have around 200 locations operational.

That certainly seems more useful to me than just another chatbot.

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blue-cheese-shows-off-new-colors,-but-the-taste-largely-remains-the-same

Blue cheese shows off new colors, but the taste largely remains the same

Am I blue? —

Future varieties could be yellow-green, reddish-brown-pink, or light blue.

Scientists at University of the Nottingham have discovered how to create different colours of blue cheese.

Enlarge / Scientists at the University of Nottingham have discovered how to create different colors of blue cheese.

University of Nottingham

Gourmands are well aware of the many varieties of blue cheese, known by the blue-green veins that ripple through the cheese. Different kinds of blue cheese have distinctive flavor profiles: they can be mild or strong, sweet or salty, for example. Soon we might be able to buy blue cheeses that belie the name and sport veins of different colors: perhaps yellow-green, reddish-brown-pink, or lighter/darker shades of blue, according to a recent paper published in the journal Science of Food.

“We’ve been interested in cheese fungi for over 10 years, and traditionally when you develop mould-ripened cheeses, you get blue cheeses such as Stilton, Roquefort, and Gorgonzola, which use fixed strains of fungi that are blue-green in color,” said co-author Paul Dyer of the University of Nottingham of this latest research. “We wanted to see if we could develop new strains with new flavors and appearances.”

Blue cheese has been around for a very long time. Legend has it that a young boy left his bread and ewe’s milk cheese in a nearby cave to pursue a lovely young lady he’d spotted in the distance. Months later, he came back to the cave and found it had molded into Roquefort. It’s a fanciful tale, but scholars think the basic idea is sound: people used to store cheeses in caves because their temperature and moisture levels were especially hospitable to harmless molds. That was bolstered by a 2021 analysis of paleofeces that found evidence that Iron Age salt miners in Hallstatt (Austria) between 800 and 400 BCE were already eating blue cheese and quaffing beer.

Color derivatives.

Enlarge / Color derivatives.

The manufacturing process for blue cheese is largely the same as for any cheese, with a few crucial additional steps. It requires cultivation of Penicillium roqueforti, a mold that thrives on exposure to oxygen. The P. roqueforti is added to the cheese, sometimes before curds form and sometimes mixed in with curds after they form. The cheese is then aged in a temperature-controlled environment. Lactic acid bacteria trigger the initial fermentation but eventually die off, and the P. roqueforti take over as secondary fermenters. Piercing the curds forms air tunnels in the cheese, and the mold grows along those surfaces to produce blue cheese’s signature veining.

Once scientists published the complete genome for P. roqueforti, it opened up opportunities for studying this blue cheese fungus, per Dyer et al. Different strains “can have different colony cultures and textures, with commercial strains being sold partly on the basis of color development,” they wrote. This coloration comes from pigments in the coatings of the spores that form as the colony grows. Dyer and his co-authors set out to determine the genetic basis of this pigment formation in the hopes of producing altered strains with different spore coat colors.

The team identified a specific biochemical pathway, beginning with a white color that gradually goes from yellow-green, red-brown-pink, dark brown, light blue, and ultimately that iconic dark blue-green. They used targeted gene deletion to block pigment biosynthesis genes at various points in this pathway. This altered the spore color, providing a proof of principle without adversely affecting the production of flavor volatiles and levels of secondary metabolites called mycotoxins. (The latter are present in low enough concentrations in blue cheese so as not to be a health risk for humans, and the team wanted to ensure those concentrations remained low.)

Pencillium roqueforti. (right) Cross sections of cheeses made with the original (dark blue-green) or new color (red-brown, bright green, white albino) strains of the fungus.” height=”371″ src=”https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/bluecheese3-640×371.jpg” width=”640″>

Enlarge / (left) Spectrum of color strains produced in Pencillium roqueforti. (right) Cross sections of cheeses made with the original (dark blue-green) or new color (red-brown, bright green, white albino) strains of the fungus.

University of Nottingham

However, food industry regulations prohibit gene-deletion fungal strains for commercial cheese production. So Dyer et al. used UV mutagenesis—essentially “inducing sexual reproduction in the fungus,” per Dyer—to produce non-GMO mutant strains of the fungi to create “blue” cheeses of different colors, without increasing mycotoxin levels or impacting the volatile compounds responsible for flavor.

“The interesting part was that once we went on to make some cheese, we then did some taste trials with volunteers from across the wider university, and we found that when people were trying the lighter colored strains they thought they tasted more mild,” said Dyer. “Whereas they thought the darker strain had a more intense flavor. Similarly, with the more reddish-brown and a light green one, people thought they had a fruity, tangy element to them—whereas, according to the lab instruments, they were very similar in flavor. This shows that people do perceive taste not only from what they taste but also by what they see.”

Dyer’s team is hoping to work with local cheese makers in Nottingham and Scotland, setting up a spinoff company in hopes of commercializing the mutant strains. And there could be other modifications on the horizon. “Producers could almost dial up their list of desirable characteristics—more or less color, faster or slower growth rate, acidity differences,” Donald Glover of the University of Queensland in Australia, who was not involved in the research, told New Scientist.

Science of Food, 2024. DOI: 10.1038/s41538-023-00244-9  (About DOIs).

Blue cheese shows off new colors, but the taste largely remains the same Read More »

unreleased-preview-of-microsoft’s-os/2-2.0-is-a-glimpse-down-a-road-not-taken

Unreleased preview of Microsoft’s OS/2 2.0 is a glimpse down a road not taken

OS/2 the future —

Microsoft’s involvement in IBM’s OS/2 project ended before v2.0 was released.

This big, weathered box contains an oddball piece of PC history: one of the last builds of IBM's OS/2 that Microsoft worked on before pivoting all of its attention to Windows.

Enlarge / This big, weathered box contains an oddball piece of PC history: one of the last builds of IBM’s OS/2 that Microsoft worked on before pivoting all of its attention to Windows.

In the annals of PC history, IBM’s OS/2 represents a road not taken. Developed in the waning days of IBM’s partnership with Microsoft—the same partnership that had given us a decade or so of MS-DOS and PC-DOS—OS/2 was meant to improve on areas where DOS was falling short on modern systems. Better memory management, multitasking capabilities, and a usable GUI were all among the features introduced in version 1.x.

But Microsoft was frustrated with some of IBM’s goals and demands, and the company continued to develop an operating system called Windows on its own. Where IBM wanted OS/2 to be used mainly to boost IBM-made PCs and designed it around the limitations of Intel’s 80286 CPU, Windows was being created with the booming market for PC-compatible clones in mind. Windows 1.x and 2.x failed to make much of a dent, but 1990’s Windows 3.0 was a hit, and it came preinstalled on many consumer PCs; Microsoft and IBM broke off their partnership shortly afterward, making OS/2 version 1.2 the last one publicly released and sold with Microsoft’s involvement.

But Microsoft had done a lot of work on version 2.0 of OS/2 at the same time as it was developing Windows. It was far enough along that preview screenshots appeared in PC Magazine, and early builds were shipped to developers who could pay for them, but it was never formally released to the public.

But software archaeologist Neozeed recently published a stable internal preview of Microsoft’s OS/2 2.0 to the Internet Archive, along with working virtual machine disk images for VMware and 86Box. The preview, bought by Brian Ledbetter on eBay for $650 plus $15.26 in shipping, dates to July 1990 and would have cost developers who wanted it a whopping $2,600. A lot to pay for a version of an operating system that would never see the light of day!

The Microsoft-developed build of OS/2 2.0 bears only a passing resemblance to the 32-bit version of OS/2 2.0 that IBM finally shipped on its own in April 1992. Neozeed has published a more thorough exploration of Microsoft’s version, digging around in its guts and getting some early Windows software running (the ability to run DOS and Windows apps was simultaneously a selling point of OS/2 and a reason for developers not to create OS/2-specific apps, one of the things that helped to doom OS/2 in the end). It’s a fascinating detail from a turning point in the history of the PC as we know it today, but as a usable desktop operating system, it leaves something to be desired.

All 26 disks of the OS/2 2.0 preview, plus hefty documentation manuals. There are some things about the '90s I don't miss.

Enlarge / All 26 disks of the OS/2 2.0 preview, plus hefty documentation manuals. There are some things about the ’90s I don’t miss.

This unreleased Microsoft-developed OS/2 build isn’t the first piece of Microsoft-related software history that has been excavated in the last few months. In January, an Internet Archive user discovered and uploaded an early build of 86-DOS, the software that Microsoft bought and turned into MS-DOS/PC-DOS for the original IBM PC 5150. Funnily enough, these unreleased previews serve as bookends for IBM and Microsoft’s often-contentious partnership.

As part of the “divorce settlement” between Microsoft and IBM, IBM would take over the development and maintenance of OS/2 1.x and 2.x while Microsoft continued to work on a more advanced far-future version 3.0 of OS/2. This operating system was never released as OS/2, but it would eventually become Windows NT, Microsoft’s more stable business-centric version of Windows. Windows NT merged with the consumer versions of Windows in the early 2000s with Windows 2000 and Windows XP, and those versions gradually evolved into Windows as we know it today.

It has been 18 years since IBM formally discontinued its last release of OS/2, but as so often happens in computing, the software has found a way to live on. ArcaOS is a semi-modernized, intermittently updated branch of OS/2 updated to run on modern hardware while still supporting the ability to run MS-DOS and 16-bit Windows apps.

Unreleased preview of Microsoft’s OS/2 2.0 is a glimpse down a road not taken Read More »

meta-sues-“brazenly-disloyal”-former-exec-over-stolen-confidential-docs

Meta sues “brazenly disloyal” former exec over stolen confidential docs

Meta sues “brazenly disloyal” former exec over stolen confidential docs

A recently unsealed court filing has revealed that Meta has sued a former senior employee for “brazenly disloyal and dishonest conduct” while leaving Meta for an AI data startup called Omniva that The Information has described as “mysterious.”

According to Meta, its former vice president of infrastructure, Dipinder Singh Khurana (also known as T.S.), allegedly used his access to “confidential, non-public, and highly sensitive” information to steal more than 100 internal documents in a rushed scheme to poach Meta employees and borrow Meta’s business plans to speed up Omniva’s negotiations with key Meta suppliers.

Meta believes that Omniva—which Data Center Dynamics (DCD) reported recently “pivoted from crypto to AI cloud”—is “seeking to provide AI cloud computing services at scale, including by designing and constructing data centers.” But it was held back by a “lack of data center expertise at the top,” DCD reported.

The Information reported that Omniva began hiring Meta employees to fill the gaps in this expertise, including wooing Khurana away from Meta.

Last year, Khurana notified Meta that he was leaving on May 15, and that’s when Meta first observed Khurana’s allegedly “utter disregard for his contractual and legal obligations to Meta—including his confidentiality obligations to Meta set forth in the Confidential Information and Invention Assignment Agreement that Khurana signed when joining Meta.”

A Meta investigation found that during Khurana’s last two weeks at the company, he allegedly uploaded confidential Meta documents—including “information about Meta’s ‘Top Talent,’ performance information for hundreds of Meta employees, and detailed employee compensation information”—on Meta’s network to a Dropbox folder labeled with his new employer’s name.

“Khurana also uploaded several of Meta’s proprietary, highly sensitive, confidential, and non-public contracts with business partners who supply Meta with crucial components for its data centers,” Meta alleged. “And other documents followed.”

In addition to pulling documents, Khurana also allegedly sent “urgent” requests to subordinates for confidential information on a key supplier, including Meta’s pricing agreement “for certain computing hardware.”

“Unaware of Khurana’s plans, the employee provided Khurana with, among other things, Meta’s pricing-form agreement with that supplier for the computing hardware and the supplier’s Meta-specific preliminary pricing for a particular chip,” Meta alleged.

Some of these documents were “expressly marked confidential,” Meta alleged. Those include a three-year business plan and PowerPoints regarding “Meta’s future ‘roadmap’ with a key supplier” and “Meta’s 2022 redesign of its global-supply-chain group” that Meta alleged “would directly aid Khurana in building his own efficient and effective supply-chain organization” and afford a path for Omniva to bypass “years of investment.” Khurana also allegedly “uploaded a PowerPoint discussing Meta’s use of GPUs for artificial intelligence.”

Meta was apparently tipped off to this alleged betrayal when Khurana used his Meta email and network access to complete a writing assignment for Omniva as part of his hiring process. For this writing assignment, Khurana “disclosed non-public information about Meta’s relationship with certain suppliers that it uses for its data centers” when asked to “explain how he would help his potential new employer develop the supply chain for a company building data centers using specific technologies.”

In a seeming attempt to cover up the alleged theft of Meta documents, Khurana apparently “attempted to scrub” one document “of its references to Meta,” as well as removing a label marking it “CONFIDENTIAL—FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY.” But when replacing “Meta” with “X,” Khurana allegedly missed the term “Meta” in “at least five locations.”

“Khurana took such action to try and benefit himself or his new employer, including to help ensure that Khurana would continue to work at his new employer, continue to receive significant compensation from his new employer, and/or to enable Khurana to take shortcuts in building his supply-chain team at his new employer and/or helping to build his new employer’s business,” Meta alleged.

Ars could not immediately reach Khurana for comment. Meta noted that he has repeatedly denied breaching his contract or initiating contact with Meta employees who later joined Omniva. He also allegedly refused to sign a termination agreement that reiterates his confidentiality obligations.

Meta sues “brazenly disloyal” former exec over stolen confidential docs Read More »

google’s-new-gaming-ai-aims-past-“superhuman-opponent”-and-at-“obedient-partner”

Google’s new gaming AI aims past “superhuman opponent” and at “obedient partner”

Even hunt-and-fetch quests are better with a little AI help.

Enlarge / Even hunt-and-fetch quests are better with a little AI help.

At this point in the progression of machine-learning AI, we’re accustomed to specially trained agents that can utterly dominate everything from Atari games to complex board games like Go. But what if an AI agent could be trained not just to play a specific game but also to interact with any generic 3D environment? And what if that AI was focused not only on brute-force winning but instead on responding to natural language commands in that gaming environment?

Those are the kinds of questions animating Google’s DeepMind research group in creating SIMA, a “Scalable, Instructable, Multiworld Agent” that “isn’t trained to win, it’s trained to do what it’s told,” as research engineer Tim Harley put it in a presentation attended by Ars Technica. “And not just in one game, but… across a variety of different games all at once.”

Harley stresses that SIMA is still “very much a research project,” and the results achieved in the project’s initial tech report show there’s a long way to go before SIMA starts to approach human-level listening capabilities. Still, Harley said he hopes that SIMA can eventually provide the basis for AI agents that players can instruct and talk to in cooperative gameplay situations—think less “superhuman opponent” and more “believable partner.”

“This work isn’t about achieving high game scores,” as Google puts it in a blog post announcing its research. “Learning to play even one video game is a technical feat for an AI system, but learning to follow instructions in a variety of game settings could unlock more helpful AI agents for any environment.”

Learning how to learn

Google trained SIMA on nine very different open-world games in an attempt to create a generalizable AI agent.

To train SIMA, the DeepMind team focused on three-dimensional games and test environments controlled either from a first-person perspective or an over-the-shoulder third-person perspective. The nine games in its test suite, which were provided by Google’s developer partners, all prioritize “open-ended interactions” and eschew “extreme violence” while providing a wide range of different environments and interactions, from “outer space exploration” to “wacky goat mayhem.”

In an effort to make SIMA as generalizable as possible, the agent isn’t given any privileged access to a game’s internal data or control APIs. The system takes nothing but on-screen pixels as its input and provides nothing but keyboard and mouse controls as its output, mimicking “the [model] humans have been using [to play video games] for 50 years,” as the researchers put it. The team also designed the agent to work with games running in real time (i.e., at 30 frames per second) rather than slowing down the simulation for extra processing time like some other interactive machine-learning projects.

Animated samples of SIMA responding to basic commands across very different gaming environments.

While these restrictions increase the difficulty of SIMA’s tasks, they also mean the agent can be integrated into a new game or environment “off the shelf” with minimal setup and without any specific training regarding the “ground truth” of a game world. It also makes it relatively easy to test whether things SIMA has learned from training on previous games can “transfer” over to previously unseen games, which could be a key step to getting at artificial general intelligence.

For training data, SIMA uses video of human gameplay (and associated time-coded inputs) on the provided games, annotated with natural language descriptions of what’s happening in the footage. These clips are focused on “instructions that can be completed in less than approximately 10 seconds” to avoid the complexity that can develop with “the breadth of possible instructions over long timescales,” as the researchers put it in their tech report. Integration with pre-trained models like SPARC and Phenaki also helps the SIMA model avoid having to learn how to interpret language and visual data from scratch.

Google’s new gaming AI aims past “superhuman opponent” and at “obedient partner” Read More »

google’s-gemini-ai-now-refuses-to-answer-election-questions

Google’s Gemini AI now refuses to answer election questions

I also refuse to answer political questions —

Gemini is opting out of election-related responses entirely for 2024.

The Google Gemini logo.

Enlarge / The Google Gemini logo.

Google

Like many of us, Google Gemini is tired of politics. Reuters reports that Google has restricted the chatbot from answering questions about the upcoming US election, and instead, it will direct users to Google Search.

Google had planned to do this back when the Gemini chatbot was still called “Bard.” In December, the company said, “Beginning early next year, in preparation for the 2024 elections and out of an abundance of caution on such an important topic, we’ll restrict the types of election-related queries for which Bard and [Google Search’s Bard integration] will return responses.” Tuesday, Google confirmed to Reuters that those restrictions have kicked in. Election queries now tend to come back with the refusal: “I’m still learning how to answer this question. In the meantime, try Google Search.”

Google’s original plan in December was likely to disable election info so Gemini could avoid any political firestorms. Boy, did that not work out! When asked to generate images of people, Gemini quietly tacked diversity requirements onto the image request; this practice led to offensive and historically inaccurate images along with a general refusal to generate images of white people. Last month that earned Google wall-to-wall coverage in conservative news spheres along the lines of “Google’s woke AI hates white people!” Google CEO Sundar Pichai called the AI’s “biased” responses “completely unacceptable,” and for now, creating images of people is disabled while Google works on it.

The start of the first round of US elections in the AI era has already led to new forms of disinformation, and Google presumably wants to opt out of all of it.

Google’s Gemini AI now refuses to answer election questions Read More »

eu-votes-to-ban-riskiest-forms-of-ai-and-impose-restrictions-on-others

EU votes to ban riskiest forms of AI and impose restrictions on others

Europe’s AI Act —

Lawmaker hails “world’s first binding law on artificial intelligence.”

Illustration of a European flag composed of computer code

Getty Images | BeeBright

The European Parliament today voted to approve the Artificial Intelligence Act, which will ban uses of AI “that pose unacceptable risks” and impose regulations on less risky types of AI.

“The new rules ban certain AI applications that threaten citizens’ rights, including biometric categorisation systems based on sensitive characteristics and untargeted scraping of facial images from the Internet or CCTV footage to create facial recognition databases,” a European Parliament announcement today said. “Emotion recognition in the workplace and schools, social scoring, predictive policing (when it is based solely on profiling a person or assessing their characteristics), and AI that manipulates human behavior or exploits people’s vulnerabilities will also be forbidden.”

The ban on certain AI applications provides for penalties of up to 35 million euros or 7 percent of a firm’s “total worldwide annual turnover for the preceding financial year, whichever is higher.” Violations of other provisions have lower penalties.

There are exemptions to allow law enforcement use of remote biometric identification systems in certain cases. A European Commission summary of the legislation said:

All remote biometric identification systems are considered high-risk and subject to strict requirements. The use of remote biometric identification in publicly accessible spaces for law enforcement purposes is, in principle, prohibited.

Narrow exceptions are strictly defined and regulated, such as when necessary to search for a missing child, to prevent a specific and imminent terrorist threat or to detect, locate, identify or prosecute a perpetrator or suspect of a serious criminal offence.

“Strict obligations” for high-risk AI

The AI Act was supported by 523 members of the European Parliament (MEPs), while 46 voted against and 49 abstained. The legislation classifies AI into four categories of risk: unacceptable risk, high risk, limited risk, and minimal or no risk.

“High-risk AI systems will be subject to strict obligations before they can be put on the market,” the legislation summary said. Obligations include “adequate risk assessment and mitigation systems,” “logging of activity to ensure traceability of results,” “appropriate human oversight measures to minimise risk,” and other requirements.

The law drew opposition from the Computer & Communications Industry Association, a tech-industry lobby group.

“The agreed AI Act imposes stringent obligations on developers of cutting-edge technologies that underpin many downstream systems, and is therefore likely to slow down innovation in Europe,” the group said when a deal on the law was agreed to in December 2023. “Furthermore, certain low-risk AI systems will now be subjected to strict requirements without further justification, while others will be banned altogether. This could lead to an exodus of European AI companies and talent seeking growth elsewhere.”

The law will officially be on the books 20 days after its publication in the official Journal, the European Parliament announcement said. The law’s ban on prohibited practices will apply six months after that, but other regulations won’t take effect until later. The “obligations for high-risk systems” will only take effect after 36 months, the announcement said.

“We finally have the world’s first binding law on artificial intelligence, to reduce risks, create opportunities, combat discrimination, and bring transparency,” said MEP Brando Benifei, the Internal Market Committee co-rapporteur. An AI office will be formed “to support companies to start complying with the rules before they enter into force,” he said.

Risky AI categories

Examples of high-risk AI include AI used in robot-assisted surgery; credit scoring systems that can deny loans; law enforcement that may interfere with fundamental rights, such as evaluation of the reliability of evidence; and automated examination of visa applications.

The limited-risk category has to do with applications that aren’t transparent about AI usage. “The AI Act introduces specific transparency obligations to ensure that humans are informed when necessary, fostering trust,” the European Commission said. “For instance, when using AI systems such as chatbots, humans should be made aware that they are interacting with a machine so they can take an informed decision to continue or step back. Providers will also have to ensure that AI-generated content is identifiable.”

AI-generated text that is “published with the purpose to inform the public on matters of public interest must be labelled as artificially generated,” and this requirement “also applies to audio and video content constituting deep fakes.”

AI with minimal or no risk “includes applications such as AI-enabled video games or spam filters. The vast majority of AI systems currently used in the EU fall into this category,” the commission said. There would be no restrictions on this category.

EU votes to ban riskiest forms of AI and impose restrictions on others Read More »

raspberry-pi-powered-ai-bike-light-detects-cars,-alerts-bikers-to-bad-drivers

Raspberry Pi-powered AI bike light detects cars, alerts bikers to bad drivers

Group ride —

Data from multiple Copilot devices could be used for road safety improvements.

Copilot mounted to the rear of a road bike

Velo AI

Whether or not autonomous vehicles ever work out, the effort put into using small cameras and machine-learning algorithms to detect cars could pay off big for an unexpected group: cyclists.

Velo AI is a firm cofounded by Clark Haynes and Micol Marchetti-Bowick, both PhDs with backgrounds in robotics, movement prediction, and Uber’s (since sold-off) autonomous vehicle work. Copilot, which started as a “pandemic passion project” for Haynes, is essentially car-focused artificial intelligence and machine learning stuffed into a Raspberry Pi Compute Module 4 and boxed up in a bike-friendly size and shape.

A look into the computer vision of the Copilot.

While car-detecting devices exist for bikes, including the Garmin Varia, they’re largely radar-based. That means they can’t distinguish between vehicles of different sizes and only know that something is approaching you, not, for example, how much space it will allow when passing.

Copilot purports to do a lot more:

  • Identify cars, bikes, and pedestrians
  • Alert riders audibly about cars “Following,” “Approaching,” and “Overtaking”
  • Issue visual warning to drivers who are approaching too close or too fast
  • Send visual notifications and a simplified rear road view to an optional paired smartphone
  • Record 1080p video and tag “close calls” and “incidents” from your phone

At 330 grams, with five hours of optimal battery life (and USB-C recharging), it’s not for the aero-obsessed rider or super-long-distance rider. And at $400, it might not speak to the most casual and infrequent cyclist. But it’s an intriguing piece of kit, especially for those who already have, or considered, a Garmin or similar action camera for watching their back. What if a camera could do more than just show you the car after you’re already endangered by it?

Copilot's computer vision can alert riders to cars that are

Copilot’s computer vision can alert riders to cars that are “Following,” “Approaching,” and “Overtaking.”

Velo AI

The Velo team detailed some of their building process for the official Raspberry Pi blog. The Compute Module 4 powers the core system and lights, while a custom Hailo AI co-processor helps with the neural networks and computer vision. An Arducam camera provides the vision and recording.

Beyond individual safety, the Velo AI team hopes that data from Copilots can feed into larger-scale road safety improvements. The team told the Pi blog that they’re starting a partnership with Pittsburgh, seeding Copilots to regular bike commuters and analyzing the aggregate data for potential infrastructure upgrades.

The Copilot is available for sale now and shipping, according to Velo AI. A December 2023 pre-order sold out.

Raspberry Pi-powered AI bike light detects cars, alerts bikers to bad drivers Read More »

seeding-steel-frames-brings-destroyed-coral-reefs-back-to-life

Seeding steel frames brings destroyed coral reefs back to life

Image of a large school of fish above a reef.

Coral reefs, some of the most stunningly beautiful marine ecosystems on Earth, are dying. Ninety percent of them will likely be gone by 2050 due to rising ocean temperatures and pollution. “But it’s not that when they are gone, they are gone forever. We can rebuild them,” said Dr. Timothy Lamont, a marine biologist working at Lancaster University.

Lamont’s team evaluated coral reef restoration efforts done through the MARS Coral Reef Restoration Program on the coast of Indonesia and found that planting corals on a network of sand-coated steel frames brought a completely dead reef back to life in just four years. It seems like we can fix something for once.

Growing up in rubble

The restored reef examined by Lamont’s team was damaged by blast fishing done 30–40 years ago. “People were using dynamite to blow up the reef. It kills all the fish, the fish float to the surface, and you can scoop them all up. Obviously, this is very damaging to the habitat and leaves behind loose rubble fields with lots of coral skeletons,” said Lamont.

Because this loose ruble is in constant motion, tumbling and rolling around, coral larvae don’t have enough time to grow before they get squashed. So the first step to bringing damaged reefs back to life was stabilizing the rubble. The people running the MARS program did this using Reef Stars, hexagonal steel structures coated with sand. “These structures are connected into networks and pinned to the seabed to reduce the movement of the rubble,” Lamont said.

Before the reef stars were placed on the seabed, though, the MARS team manually tied little corals around them. This was meant to speed up recovery compared to letting coral larvae settle on the steel structures naturally. Based on some key measures, it worked. But there are questions about whether those measures capture everything we need to know.

Artificial coral reefs

The metric Lamont’s team used to measure the success of the MARS program restoration was a carbonate budget, which describes an overall growth of the whole reef structure. According to Lamont, a healthy coral reef has a positive carbonate budget and produces roughly 20 kilograms of limestone per square meter per year. This is exactly what his team measured in restored sites on the Indonesian reef. But while the recovered reef had the same carbonate budget as a healthy one, the organisms contributing to this budget were different.

An untouched natural reef is a diverse mixture including massive, encrusting, and plating coral species like Isopora or Porites, which contribute roughly a third of the carbonate budget. Restored reefs were almost completely dominated by smaller, branching corals like Stylophora, Acropora, and Pocillopora, which are all fast-growing species initially tied onto reef stars. The question was whether the MARS program achieved its astounding four-year reef recovery time by sacrificing biodiversity and specifically choosing corals that grow faster.

Seeding steel frames brings destroyed coral reefs back to life Read More »

what-happens-when-chatgpt-tries-to-solve-50,000-trolley-problems?

What happens when ChatGPT tries to solve 50,000 trolley problems?

Images of cars on a freeway with green folder icons superimposed on each vehicle.

There’s a puppy on the road. The car is going too fast to stop in time, but swerving means the car will hit an old man on the sidewalk instead.

What choice would you make? Perhaps more importantly, what choice would ChatGPT make?

Autonomous driving startups are now experimenting with AI chatbot assistants, including one self-driving system that will use one to explain its driving decisions. Beyond announcing red lights and turn signals, the large language models (LLMs) powering these chatbots may ultimately need to make moral decisions, like prioritizing passengers’ or pedestrian’s safety. In November, one startup called Ghost Autonomy announced experiments with ChatGPT to help its software navigate its environment.

But is the tech ready? Kazuhiro Takemoto, a researcher at the Kyushu Institute of Technology in Japan, wanted to check if chatbots could make the same moral decisions when driving as humans. His results showed that LLMs and humans have roughly the same priorities, but some showed clear deviations.

The Moral Machine

After ChatGPT was released in November 2022, it didn’t take long for researchers to ask it to tackle the Trolley Problem, a classic moral dilemma. This problem asks people to decide whether it is right to let a runaway trolley run over and kill five humans on a track or switch it to a different track where it kills only one person. (ChatGPT usually chose one person.)

But Takemoto wanted to ask LLMs more nuanced questions. “While dilemmas like the classic trolley problem offer binary choices, real-life decisions are rarely so black and white,” he wrote in his study, recently published in the journal Proceedings of the Royal Society.

Instead, he turned to an online initiative called the Moral Machine experiment. This platform shows humans two decisions that a driverless car may face. They must then decide which decision is more morally acceptable. For example, a user might be asked if, during a brake failure, a self-driving car should collide with an obstacle (killing the passenger) or swerve (killing a pedestrian crossing the road).

But the Moral Machine is also programmed to ask more complicated questions. For example, what if the passengers were an adult man, an adult woman, and a boy, and the pedestrians were two elderly men and an elderly woman walking against a “do not cross” signal?

The Moral Machine can generate randomized scenarios using factors like age, gender, species (saving humans or animals), social value (pregnant women or criminals), and actions (swerving, breaking the law, etc.). Even the fitness level of passengers and pedestrians can change.

In the study, Takemoto took four popular LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, PaLM 2, and Llama 2) and asked them to decide on over 50,000 scenarios created by the Moral Machine. More scenarios could have been tested, but the computational costs became too high. Nonetheless, these responses meant he could then compare how similar LLM decisions were to human decisions.

What happens when ChatGPT tries to solve 50,000 trolley problems? Read More »

bill-that-could-ban-tiktok-passes-in-house-despite-constitutional-concerns

Bill that could ban TikTok passes in House despite constitutional concerns

Bill that could ban TikTok passes in House despite constitutional concerns

On Wednesday, the US House of Representatives passed a bill with a vote of 352–65 that could block TikTok in the US. Fifteen Republicans and 50 Democrats voted in opposition, and one Democrat voted present, CNN reported.

TikTok is not happy. A spokesperson told Ars, “This process was secret and the bill was jammed through for one reason: it’s a ban. We are hopeful that the Senate will consider the facts, listen to their constituents, and realize the impact on the economy, 7 million small businesses, and the 170 million Americans who use our service.”

Lawmakers insist that the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act is not a ban. Instead, they claim the law gives TikTok a choice: either divest from ByteDance’s China-based owners or face the consequences of TikTok being cut off in the US.

Under the law—which still must pass the Senate, a more significant hurdle, where less consensus is expected and a companion bill has not yet been introduced—app stores and hosting services would face steep consequences if they provide access to apps controlled by US foreign rivals. That includes allowing the app to be updated or maintained by US users who already have the app on their devices.

Violations subject app stores and hosting services to fines of $5,000 for each individual US user “determined to have accessed, maintained, or updated a foreign adversary-controlled application.” With 170 million Americans currently on TikTok, that could add up quickly to eye-popping fines.

If the bill becomes law, app stores and hosting services would have 180 days to limit access to foreign adversary-controlled apps. The bill specifically names TikTok and ByteDance as restricted apps, making it clear that lawmakers intend to quash the alleged “national security threat” that TikTok poses in the US.

House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-Wash.), a proponent of the bill, has said that “foreign adversaries like China pose the greatest national security threat of our time. With applications like TikTok, these countries are able to target, surveil, and manipulate Americans.” The proposed bill “ends this practice by banning applications controlled by foreign adversaries of the United States that pose a clear national security risk.”

McMorris Rodgers has also made it clear that “our goal is to get this legislation onto the president’s desk.” Joe Biden has indicated he will sign the bill into law, leaving the Senate as the final hurdle to clear. Senators told CNN that they were waiting to see what happened in the House before seeking a path forward in the Senate that would respect TikTok users’ civil liberties.

Attempts to ban TikTok have historically not fared well in the US, with a recent ban in Montana being reversed by a federal judge last December. Judge Donald Molloy granted TikTok’s request for a preliminary injunction, denouncing Montana’s ban as an unconstitutional infringement of Montana-based TikTok users’ rights.

More recently, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has slammed House lawmakers for rushing the bill through Congress, accusing lawmakers of attempting to stifle free speech. ACLU senior policy counsel Jenna Leventoff said in a press release that lawmakers were “once again attempting to trade our First Amendment rights for cheap political points during an election year.”

“Just because the bill sponsors claim that banning TikTok isn’t about suppressing speech, there’s no denying that it would do just that,” Leventoff said.

Bill that could ban TikTok passes in House despite constitutional concerns Read More »

on-the-latest-tiktok-bill

On the Latest TikTok Bill

This attempt is getting reasonably far rather quickly, passing the House with broad support.

Alec Stapp: TikTok bill to remove influence of CCP:

– passed unanimously out of committee

– GOP leadership says they’ll bring it to the floor for a vote next week

– Biden says he’ll sign the bill if passed

Can’t believe it’s taken this long, but should be done soon.

It’s been obvious for years that we shouldn’t let China control a black-box algorithm that influences >100 million American users.

JSM: Can this stand up to court scrutiny though?

Alec Stapp: Yes.

It then passed the house 352-65, despite opposition from Donald Trump.

Manifold is as of now around 72% that a bill will pass, similar to Metaculus. Consensus is that it is unlikely that ByteDance will divest. They will fight in court, and if they lose they likely are not bluffing about letting TikTok be shut down or banned in America, Metaculus only has a 12% chance they will sell this year.

The bill now goes on to the Senate. I see about a 43% chance it passes there within the month, and a 71% chance it will happen this year. Those numbers seem reasonable to me.

The main purpose of this post is to go over arguments for and against the bill, and also what the bill actually would and would not do.

I have long been in favor on principle of banning or forcing divestiture of TikTok. Then I saw the Restrict Act, and that was clearly a no-good, very-bad bill.

My view of the current bill, after a close reading, is that it is vastly better, and about as good as we could reasonably expect. It seems positive and I hope it passes, whether or not ByteDance folds and agrees to divest. I expect it to pass constitutional muster, although one cannot be sure.

To make them easy to find:

  1. Here is Noah Smith’s case for banning TikTok.

  2. Here is Matthew Yglesias’s case for banning TikTok.

  3. This is a profile of Make Gallagher, who is leading the charge to pass the bill.

I go over various arguments for and against the bill, and for and against forcing divestiture of or banning TikTok in general, as well, as well as other related developments. The good argument against the bill is the libertarian concern about expansion of government powers, and what else the government might do. I do not believe it should carry the day on this bill, but I definitely get why one might think so.

I continue to strongly be in favor, in principle, of banning or forcing divestiture of TikTok, if we could do exactly that and only that, without otherwise attacking free speech and free enterprise or expanding the power of the state.

TikTok continues to be Chinese spyware. It also continues to be an increasing point of vulnerability for China to put its thumb on American culture, politics and opinion.

It continues to promote unhealthy patterns of use. Many want to quit, or know they would be better off without it, or at least would take very little money to quit despite spending tons of time on the app, but feel locked in by a combination of a Skinner box and social dynamics of everyone else being there.

All the dynamics around this round of the fight make me more confident that it is important to get this done.

So yes, if there was a clean way to get rid of it or force divestiture, great.

However, as I said a year ago in Given the Restrict Act, Don’t Ban TikTok, the proposed S 686 or the Restrict Act would have vastly expanded government powers over the internet, a cure far worse than the disease.

So for me, ultimately, it comes down to the bill. Is it a good bill, or a bad bill? More precisely, is this a bill we can live with?

Daniel Lippman (Politico): “They’re trying to use these scare tactics to have a bill that gives the government unprecedented access to remove apps from people’s phones,” Michael Beckerman, TikTok’s head of public policy for the Americas, has said. “This is targeting TikTok, but it could go beyond it in an unconstitutional way.”

Is this bill a ban on TikTok, or merely a forced divestiture? A forced divestiture can still deny quite a lot of value, you were not previously planning to sell and now buyers have you over a barrel, but they are still very different things.

TikTok has been vehiment that this is an outright ban. They both keep calling it an outright ban, including when telling their users to call Congress, and also say that they would rather shut the app down than attempt to sell it.

Thomas Massie: The so-called TikTok ban is a trojan horse.

The President will be given the power to ban WEB SITES, not just Apps.

The person breaking the new law is deemed to be the U.S. (or offshore) INTERNET HOSTING SERVICE or App Store, not the “foreign adversary.”

If you think this isn’t a Trojan horse and will only apply to TikTok and foreign-adversary social media companies, then contemplate why someone thought it was important to get a very specific exclusion for their internet based business written into the bill:

Bill: (B) EXCLUSION – The term “covered company” does not include an entity that operates a website, desktop application, mobile application, or augmented or immersive technology application whose primary purpose is to allow users to post product reviews, business reviews, or travel information and reviews.

@CommitteeOnCCP: The bill does NOT apply to all websites.

It has a very narrowly tailored definition that could only apply to social media platforms controlled by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea that pose a national security threat.

Ian Bremmer (on Twitter): Forcing bytedance to divest tiktok has nothing to do with the first amendment. Americans will still be able to post disinformation there.

Mike Solana: house debate on tiktok now live. one thing i’m noticing: republicans in support (mike gallagher) are very focussed on the narrow restrictions — foreign adversaries only, apps with site only, content agnostic. democrats (frank pallone) are more like “yes, AND we need censorship”

For the record, the tiktok bill remains content agnostic, but pallone mentioned another bill he’s attempting to push forward next week. absolutely crazy that they’re still attempting some kind of national content moderation scam.

Marjorie Taylor Greene now opposing the TikTok divestment on grounds she was once banned from twitter, and ‘if the US cared about china they would be banning farmland’ (which we should definitely also do btw).

Preventing China from buying farmland is supremely bonkers. The concern is actively backwards. You love it when your foreign adversaries buy your farmland. Yes, please purchase physical land in our country that we could and would confiscate without incident if you start a fight.

Cato Institute’s Jennifer Huddleston looks at the constitutionality of the new bill, presumably with maximal skepticism. She points to provisions that would help the new bill pass muster, but says there are still severe first amendment concerns. Which there certainly should be.

Unlike past proposals, the bill provides an option for a sale rather than an immediate ban; however, it creates concerning conditions in that regard as well. The proposal requires the divestiture to be approved by the government, meaning that any proposed buyer would likely be open to significant regulatory scrutiny, particularly given the government’s current positioning towards acquisitions in the tech industry. But still, this distinction will likely be important in any legal challenges to the act even if, in practice, it is unlikely to be different from a true ban.

Under First Amendment precedents, the government will need to prove that forced divestment or otherwise banning of the app is both based on a compelling government interest and represents the least restrictive means of advancing that interest.

Even if the courts found the government’s interest to be compelling, they would then consider if there are less restrictive steps the government could take to resolve its national security concerns, such as the data localization steps proposed by TikTok’s Project Texas.

The Wall Street Journal’s Jacky Wong also has constitutional concerns, and an attempted state ban in Montana was struck down.

I would still be very surprised, although not utterly stunned, if the Supreme Court, which would inevitably rule on the matter, failed to uphold this law. These seem like obstacles that the government can comfortably clear.

There are also worries this is a Bill of Attainder that were raised in the House debate, I expect that also not to ultimately be an issue but it did independently occur to me.

AOC opposes the bill, she says on process grounds, note that she correctly calls it a ‘forced sale bill.’

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez: I’m voting NO on the TikTok forced sale bill.

This bill was incredibly rushed, from committee to vote in 4 days, with little explanation.

There are serious antitrust and privacy questions here, and any national security concerns should be laid out to the public prior to a vote.

I am sympathetic to ‘rushed’ objections when bills are so long there is no time to read and understand them. This does not seem to be one of those cases. The next two grounds, antitrust and privacy, seem odd. If anything TikTok is clearly putting privacy at risk, and if this is a forced sale I do not see large antitrust concerns.

I am sympathetic to the argument on national security, I would love to make everything they know public, but I presume that they are not doing so on national security grounds. It seems like a reasonable equilibrium for there to be some votes on Congress that you lose when you don’t do that. This creates good incentives. But I am going to go ahead and believe that there are important such concerns in play.

But the bottom line is, who is right?

So yes, it’s that time.

The preamble makes it clear this bill is aimed at TikTok and ByteDance, while using the term ‘such as,’ presumably to avoid being a Bill of Attainder.

(1) PROHIBITION OF FOREIGN ADVERSARY CONTROLLED APPLICATIONS.—It shall be unlawful for an entity to distribute, maintain, or update (or enable the distribution, maintenance, or updating of) a foreign adversary-controlled application by carrying out, within the land or maritime borders of the United States, any of the following:

(A) Providing services to distribute, maintain, or update such foreign adversary-controlled application (including any source code of such application) by means of a marketplace (including an online mobile application store) through which users within the land or maritime borders of the United States may access, maintain, or update such application.

(B) Providing internet hosting services to enable the distribution, maintenance, or updating of such foreign adversary-controlled application for users within the land or maritime borders of the United States.

[this applies to anything that qualifies under [g3a] or [g3b]].

This would remove TikTok from the Apple and Google marketplaces. It is not clear how effective this would be against side loading. Note that the this language does not make it illegal to use the application, only to provide hosting services or a marketplace, if ByteDance decided to continue offering the service from abroad.

If you violate 1a that is $5,000 per user, if it is 1b then $500 per user. How much would you pay for TikTok?

Section 1.2b says that before the cutoff date such applications must provide users with all their data for portability. Good luck with that.

Section 1.2c lays out the remedy. If you do a qualified divestiture, you’re off the hook from that point on, and technically you’re allowed to provide limited services to comply with other provisions.

Section 1.2e is the severability boiler-plate in case of court challenge.

Section 1.2f clarifies that users are safe, they cannot even be fined.

Section 1.2g defines terms.

1.2g1 says that ‘controlled by a foreign adversary’ means domiciled in, headquartered in, organized under the laws of, owned at least 20% by or subject to the control of a person or entity from the adversary. I note that 20% is not so high, and ‘subject to the control’ could be ambiguous, but mostly seems fair.

1.2g2 describes what ‘covered company’ means.

(2) Covered Company.

(A) In General. The term ‘”covered company'” means an entity that operates, directly or indirectly (including through a parent company, subsidiary, or affiliate), a website, desktop application, mobile application, or augmented or immersive technology application that meets all of the following criteria:

  • Permits user account creation: Allows users to create an account or profile to generate, share, and view text, images, videos, real-time communications, or similar content.

  • Has a large user base: Has more than 1,000,000 monthly active users for at least two out of the three months preceding a relevant determination by the President under subsection (3)(B).

  • Enables user-generated content: Enables one or more users to generate or distribute content that can be viewed by other users of the platform.

  • Allows viewing of user-generated content: Enables one or more users to view content generated by other users of the platform.

  • (B) EXCLUSION.—The term ‘‘covered company’’ does not include an entity that operates a website, desktop application, mobile application, or augmented or immersive technology application whose primary purpose is to allow users to post product reviews, business reviews, or travel information and reviews.

So it needs to be some form of social media, of some kind: You need to have a million users, account creation and viewing and creation of user-generated content.

Would this, as some say, ‘apply to websites’? Certainly you can imagine websites that would qualify here. But most websites certainly would not qualify. This seems reasonably well drafted.

The exception also seems well-considered. Review sites would otherwise potentially qualify and are not covered. The obvious thing that would still qualify, that one might reasonably object to, would be a shopping platform, since it would not be ‘primarily’ for posting reviews but users would still create accounts and post review content? Thus, if this is intended to be narrow, I would suggest the Senate extend 1.2g2b by saying ‘where the primary purpose of its user-generated content is to allow users to…’ or other similar language.

This should cover most remaining cases where the thing in question is in not intended to be a form of social network or messaging platform. You would still hit for example a Chinese Reddit, but it seems difficult to explain why it shouldn’t.

You could also say that websites should be exempted, and we should only ban the mobile app. Under that alterative theoretical regime, you could use TikTok all you wanted, but you would have to go to their website in the browser, creating friction. I am not alarmed by the current proposal, but I would be down for that compromise, as it robustly protects free speech – if you want the content badly enough you can load up Chrome – while still being a substantial effective barrier, and it would mitigate the spyware concerns.

Section 1.2g3 defines ‘foreign adversary controlled application’ and it explicitly names ByteDance and TikTok, in addition to anything else from a covered company that is controlled by a foreign adversary and is determined by the President to present a significant threat to the national security of the United States after a 30 day determination period.

Section 1.2g4 says ‘foreign adversary country’ is specified in section 4872d2 of title 10, US code, which currently I think says China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. I am curious about Cuba and Venezuela but it matters little in practice either way.

Section 1.2g5 outlines what an internet hosting service is. A regular ISP would not be required to block websites, but managing the resolution of domain names to IP addresses could be an issue, and you couldn’t host the services.

Section 1.2g6 defines a ‘qualified divestiture,’ which would be up to the President to approve as a transfer of control that precludes any operational relationship including operation of a content recommendation algorithm with respect to data sharing. One could read this as saying you could share the algorithm as long as you did not share data.

The rest seems standard.

So what does this law do in practice? Is it a big power grab?

It lets the government shut down mobile apps, and to some extent websites, that are playing the role of social media, a messaging service or something similar , with a million or more users, while having substantial foreign involvement from our enemies list, right now mainly Russia and China, unless those apps are sold and control transferred, if the President determines the service is a danger to the national security of the United States.

Perhaps I am being naive, but this seems much better than the previous Restrict Act. It is in several ways narrowly tailored, where the Restrict Act was an open invitation on anything deemed a national security risk. This only applies to things shaped a lot like social media, the other bill referred to basically anything. The previous bill fined users of VPNs $250k or more plus criminal penalties, whereas this bill explicitly exempts users and offers only civil penalties throughout.

As a practical matter, if ByteDance were to defy the United States, what would happen under this bill? We know the app stores would comply, but beyond that? If you already had the app installed, it might be difficult to get updates, but it would be hard for America to force you to uninstall. On Android you can side load. If you used a VPN, you could do whatever you wanted. If you were willing to navigate to the website, and they were willing to keep that website available, there it would be.

I think this is fine. An outlaw TikTok would presumably rapidly lose momentum in that world, while allowing current users to wind down more gradually. Alternatively, TikTok could divest.

I am open to argument that this is more broad or worrisome than it seems, but my view right now is this is about as good as we could reasonably expect. The only better bill that wouldn’t be a Bill of Attainder, other than raising the user threshold (I would like to see 10 million ideally?) would be to accept websites, which would be a large practical compromise in terms of accomplishing the goal.

So yes. I can support this bill as written.

Nate Silver points us to Pew Research Center, which found it was very popular in March of 2023, and still popular in October 2023 but less so especially among Democrats.

One strong argument for banning TikTok is reciprocity.

China has the Great Firewall. It completely bans Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram. You can’t even access American TikTok.

They instead force their users onto China’s own platforms like WeChat., Sina Weibo and Douyin (the Chinese version of TikTok).

It seems quite reasonable to say that if China wants us to allow TikTok, they need to allow American social media in China. Why should we let them get away with this kind of blatantly anti-competitive action?

Some people don’t know this, and run into razor blades.

There is an obvious economics counterargument that imposing retaliatory tariffs or import bans only hurts you. That is true by default but rests on three assumptions.

  1. It assumes your choice does not impact the choices of others, including in the past and future. If your unwillingness or anticipated unwillingness (or inability) to retaliate means everyone throws up one-way barriers, that could be bad for them but it is certainly bad for you.

  2. It assumes goods are broadly normal and competitive, like most physical goods. If there are strong network effects that generate winner-take-all scenarios and essentially zero marginal costs, these considerations clearly break.

  3. There is the terms of trade argument and other related considerations. It seems hard to deny that banning TikTok would improve our terms of trade with China, unless China decided to massively retaliate, despite again having banned all analogous services in the other direction.

These considerations are on top of all other considerations in both directions. I would not consider them decisive on their own if there were no other concerns, but I believe they add substantial weight.

Also some noted that TikTok is trying to challenge Amazon, and trying to launch TikTok Shop as a shopping destination, currently selling on the order of $7 million a day. Amazon has limited presence in China. It is not outright banned, but no doubt China would not allow it to gain the kind of key role that it has in America, or even a fraction of that. Also no one is saying ByteDance can’t have an e-commerce business?

I don’t buy that the intention was ever to seriously challenge Amazon. I believe the idea was a much smarter one, which is to use the link to TikTok to provide a way for creators to earn money while driving sales. So you advertise a product in your video, if someone clicks through you get a cut, everyone wins, great, good idea, YouTube and Instagram and Twitter should be working on doing more of this as well. But to then try to leverage that to challenging Amazon? Well, good luck, I guess. Remember that for all its value and cultural leverage, TikTok is not yet profitable.

TikTok responded to accusations it was exercising undue influence over its users and our democracy on behalf of China and getting them addicted in unhealthy ways and trapped in bad equilibria where they cannot quit by directing its users to call into their congressman’s office and explain this was a ‘ban on TikTok’ and how much they relied on and spent infinite time on TikTok.

Mike Solana: tiktok just blasted this to 150 million americans. a blatant lie. odd the trust and safety team wouldn’t catch this one.

Is this a ban on TikTok? Technically no. It could mean TikTok goes away, if ByteDance responds to it by refusing to sell and letting the whole thing burn. But also ByteDance could threaten to shut TikTok down if America continues selling chocolate ice cream, or if we don’t elect the right candidate. Decisions.

Of course, plenty of advocates are calling it a ban, so you can’t be that mad at the spin.

Anyway, at this point the calls flooded in, some to explain how desperately people needed TikTok, some because they would click whatever button the app told them to?

“It’s so so bad. Our phones have not stopped ringing. They’re teenagers and old people saying they spend their whole day on the app and we can’t take it away,” one House GOP staffer told POLITICO, granted anonymity to speak candidly.

“If you ban TikTok, I will kill myself,” said one caller, according to audio obtained from a House GOP office. The caller had noted seeing TikTok’s pop-up that claimed members are trying to shut down the app.

Another House GOP staffer observed that “most of the callers are unaware of why they’re even calling, with several agreeing with the bill but calling to continue using the app.” That staffer predicted their office would “easily surpass” receiving “1,000 calls today.”

A third House GOP staffer said some of the younger callers were using false and sometimes vulgar names, such as “Mr. Ben Dover.”

Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wisc.), cosponsor of the TikTok bill, said the video app’s pop-up alert is lying about his bill. “If you actually read the bill, it’s not a ban. It’s a divestiture.”

Byrne Hobart: An app whose parent company has explicitly promised to prioritize the interests of the CCP is mobilizing users to change the outcome of the legislative process.

Neat.

Alec Stapp: “The Chinese Communist Party can send push notifications to 170 million Americans from their favorite app” really should be the end of the debate

Ryan Guill: I dont know that I had a well formed opinion before, but yeah, this should settle it

Eliezer Yudkowsky: Some social media company finally went and added easy phone calls to Congress. Personally, I was a little “how noneliezeran!” that Google didn’t do this way earlier, or Uber under Travis. But I can see how this would be too scary in the USA, such that China did it first.

Emmett Shear: OTOH it seems like it’s backfiring, so maybe the US companies know better than to poke the bear.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: They’re not doing it the way I’d have done it at Google, that’s for sure.

Patrick McKenzie: Didn’t Uber actually make in-app CTAs for city-by-city political activism? Best citation I could find, but I felt contemporaneously that this was part of the playbook.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: Huh! Well, chalk one up for my brain’s correct sense that this seemed like something Travis ought to have tried, given who he otherwise was.

When you put it that way, perhaps it was not the smartest move?

It has been known for some time that a voter calling their congressperson’s office, or writing a letter to their congressperson, has an oversized impact. Almost no one does it, and it is not something anyone has been able to astroturf effectively. So being willing to risk mild social awkwardness or actually write a physical letter, or even a personalized email, is a strong signal, if you are indeed a local voter.

At some point, it was inevitable that a tech company was going to weaponize this. Uber did that somewhat when officials noticed that it was at the time technically a completely illegal operation, to turn it into a legal one, by pointing out that life was a lot better if you could hail an Uber. That essentially worked.

This instead predictably backfired. It misrepresented the bill. It drove home to everyone exactly what they were up against, and why they needed to take action, and also in a very practical sense made their lives worse, scared them and pissed them off. How would you react in this spot?

Congress reacted by having the TikTok bill, H.R. 7521, pass 50-0 out of the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

In the past, everyone agrees TikTok had a data sharing problem, where its user information was given to and used by ByteDance. This seemingly included a bunch of data that TikTok should not by the terms of the Apple and Google stores, or by any reasonable interpretation of national security, be allowed to collect, such as customer exact location data, which it has used to track journalists criticizing the company (although, I mean, if you are that journalist, how did you not know to delete the app, You Had One Job).

Katherine Dee: What data could the CCP weaponize from TikTok, and how would they do it?

Park MacDougald: Beijing-based employees of ByteDance have used data from TikTok—which TikTok says they are unable to access—to track the movements of U.S. journalists reporting on TikTok in order to hunt for their sources within the company.

Forbes: We stress that it was Baker-White, specifically, who broke all these stories, because Baker-White reported in 2022 that China-based Byte Dance employees had used Tik Tok to spy on her and other U.S.-based journalists covering the company. ByteDance employees in Beijing improperly gained access to the U.S. journalists’ IP addresses and user data, tracking their locations to see who they were meeting with in an effort to identify their sources within the company.

When the story first broke, Byte Dance and Tik Tok not only denied that the spying had taken place but also claimed that it was technically impossible for Byte Dance employees to monitor U.S. users due to TikTok’s data security provisions.

ByteDance later admitted that it had spied on journalists through Tik Tok in exactly the way the article had reported, but blamed the spying on rogue employees. Those same “rogue employees,” who led Byte Dance’s internal audit team, had also spied on the TikTok executive responsible for limiting Chinese access to U.S. user data. He left the company in 2022.

Andrew Rettek: Banning TikTok because you think the algorithm is malicious is, charitably, a stretch on 1st amendment grounds. This is bad behavior that isn’t covered by the Bill of Rights.

It also includes the usual stuff like emails, birth dates, IP addresses and so on.

Then TikTok claimed it would silo all the American user data, which has been code named Project Texas (which, contrary to some claims, was developed by ByteDance during the Biden administration). ByteDance says it has successfully walled the data off. The Wall Street Journal report on this is highly skeptical, saying that data sharing often still happens without ‘going through proper channels,’ and the hardware used by the American division is potentially insecure, and the Chinese division changes the algorithm constantly in ways the American division does not have the resources to understand.

With Project Texas, “I’m skeptical that TikTok’s efforts here ever had any value,” said Jacob Helberg, a member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a congressional research and advisory panel, who has organized a bipartisan, bicoastal alliance of China hawks.

TikTok executives have said internally that they sometimes need to share protected U.S. data with ByteDance to help train the algorithm, or with employees outside Project Texas who work on keeping problematic content off TikTok, according to people familiar with the unit.

TikTok has said Texas-based Oracle—the inspiration for the unit’s name—is monitoring all the data that leaves Project Texas and is also checking every line of code in the app’s algorithm for suspicious changes.

But Oracle doesn’t monitor the data employees share with each other over TikTok’s internal messaging tools, according to people familiar with the data-sharing.

Project Texas started to informally roll back some of the data-sharing rules last spring. Managers told employees that they actually could save data to their computers, and that there would be exceptions to the requirement that they could only share data in aggregate.

Now many of the Project Texas data protections have devolved into what one employee called “a wink and a nod.”

One Project Texas executive recently told employees that TikTok workers outside of Project Texas are tired of hearing “no” when they ask for U.S. user data.

I doubt there is actual zero value in this. Frictions like this increase the practical costs of interference. Friction matters. They also create more attack surface and blameworthiness for the future. What they certainly should not do is give us confidence that users are being protected the way ByteDance claims they are.

There is also the fact that this recent bill moved forward right after a closed door meeting on Chinese espionage efforts. I have no idea what was said, but the timing has clear implications.

Michael Tracy (Newsweek): Drafters of the bill are said to have received “technical assistance” from the White House; President Biden swiftly pledged to sign it. Among the factors that are said to have spurred this latest outburst of legislative activity was a secret briefing last week by the FBI, the Department of Justice, and the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). “Because it was a classified hearing, I cannot discuss the details,” explained Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA), a member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which sprung into action after receiving the secret “Intelligence Community” presentation.

You can read this as ‘deep state helps write bill’ and you can also read this as ‘private information from deep state was convincing to congress that this bill was needed.’ Is this, as Tracy suggests, a ‘power grab by the deep state?’ It seems like everyone involved is doing normal everyone involved things, and it is a power grab to the extent that the law grants additional government authority, see the relevant section where I examine the bill.

Also via community notes we have this from June 21, 2023, that after ByteDance said under oath to Congress that Americans data has always been stored outside China, that this (at least at that time) continued not to be the case, and that ByteDance was forced to admit this.

There is little doubt that China has total leverage over ByteDance if and when it wants to exercise that leverage. When the CCP cares about something, it happens, apology letters get issued, and woe to anyone who stands in their way.

Here is a rather dramatic illustration:

Hu Xijin: I support #TikTok’s tough response. Either it is ByteDance’s TikTok, or the US government might as well shut it down — but ask the 170 million TikTok users in the US first: do they agree?

CommitteOnCCP: BREAKING: Chinese Communist Party propagandist and former editor-in-chief of state media says: “Either it is ByteDance’s TikTok, or the US government might as well shut it down.” Why is the CCP so scared over losing control of TikTok?

Brad Hargreaves: The fact that ByteDance would shut down TikTok rather than earn (at least) tens of billions of dollars from a sale gives up the game here.

ByteDance is not a normal tech company driven by profit motives. It’s a tool of a hostile foreign power.

It’s gotta go.

Heterodox Progressivism: It would be hundreds of billions of dollars. My guess is there’s no way for them to truly divest the asset and hand over servers and code without handing over evidence of the manipulation and data theft that’s been going on.

Brad Hargreaves: I think that’s right on both counts.

Noah Smith: The fact that both TikTok’s current ownership and prominent CCP propagandists are absolutely DESPERATE to stop a forced sale of TikTok shows that they view it as an indispensable propaganda tool.

Jimmy Quinn: This needs to be pointed out more: ByteDance is part of the CCP’s military-civil fusion system. It’s possibly the most compelling reason to crack down on ByteDance/ TikTok.

“ByteDance is not just a tech company; it is a cog in China’s vast military machinery.”

Also, I mean, this is hella suspicious, don’t you think?

Current and former TikTok employees who criticize the company risk losing any stock they own—in some cases worth millions of dollars—under a shareholder agreement that bans disparaging the social media service…Five attorneys who practice shareholder law told Fortune that TikTok’s non-disparagement provision is unusual, but not illegal…

TikTok’s shareholder contract, viewed by Fortune, says shareholders cannot “directly or indirectly make any critical, adverse or disparaging statement or comment about the Company or any of the Company’s subsidiaries, affiliates, directors, officers, or employees.” If shareholders are caught doing so, “all of the participant’s restricted share units will be immediately forfeited.” 

TikTok claims that in terms of presenting content they will ever and always be neutral. Even if that is their preference, they are lying, because the decision is not ultimately up to them. Regardless of how many orders have or have not yet come down from the CPP, ByteDance’s claims that they would never do as the CCP orders are not credible.

How much and how they use that power is difficult to know. TikTok is highly specialized, so it is hard to rely on anecdotes if we want to describe its general behavior.

Matthew Yglesias: YMMV but I put “Uyghur genocide” into the TikTok search bar just now and three of the top four videos that came up were saying anti-Uyghur repression is a big myth that needs to be debunked.

Jostein: TikTok suggested “Uyghur genocide” when I entered the letters uyg. The top 4 results were critical of the Chinese government or discussed suppression of speech. TikTok is successful because its algorithm works. It knows I would have scrolled past any CCP propaganda.

Timothy Lee (distinct thread): People who say “what’s the big deal, I almost never see political content in my TikTok feed” should think harder about how propaganda works.

For example, TikTok could help a candidate by suppressing negative videos about that candidate and positive videos against her opponent. That could move public opinion while making the platform seem “less political.”

One can of course create a fresh account and do this and other similar things. The answers are knowable, if one wishes. Even then, how do you distinguish what users of TikTok choose within this setting from interference in the algorithm, including ‘correct it if it goes one way, let it ride if it goes the other’ style considerations?

So for the obvious first example that reignited calls for the ban, it is known that TikTok is heavily anti-Israel, very differently from other platforms and from the American public. Yes, those who are most vocal tend to be anti-Israel, but this is ridiculous:

In Time, Anthony Goldbloom offers this, 17.3% is both a ton and would not suggest an 80:1 ratio should happen by accident.

Perhaps that is a natural outcome of who is on the platform doing what, and the nature of its videos, and due to snowball effects where everyone is scared to express a dissenting point of view on the platform or chooses to leave it? Again, somewhat, but the extent seems highly implausible.

Nate Silver: TikTok’s users are young, and young people are comparatively more sympathetic to Palestine than older ones — but not by the roughly 80:1 ratio that you see in the hashtag distribution. I would not treat this data as dispositive — expression on social media can be contagious and overstate the degree of consensus. But this matches a pattern in other TikTok content that is sensitive to China, such as tags critiquing its policy toward Hong Kong.

Then we extend this to more of the obvious, from this study.

As opposed to, say:

Noath Smith presents the information this way, from NCRI:

Timothy Lee: A study last year found that topics that aligned with the interests of the Chinese government receive wildly disproportionate attention on TikTok, while topics Beijing considers sensitive tend not to go viral on the platform.

Yes, these could in theory each be a coincidence, or the result of dynamics from the user base and video stylings and natural algorithmic dynamics, with anti-China people not using TikTok.

But also, come on.

If all of this was one big coincidence and the result of cherry-picking, then it would be easy to point to other examples that point in the opposite direction as counterarguments. I have never seen anyone cite a convincing counterexample, or any that I could recall.

After this study was published, ByteDance reduced data transparency.

Oh also this from Noah Smith:

Noah Smith: This is very damning evidence indeed. And even if you’re skeptical of circumstantial evidence like this, there are leaked documents that prove the company has done exactly the kind of censoring that the study found:

TikTok, the popular Chinese-owned social network, instructs its moderators to censor videos that mention Tiananmen Square, Tibetan independence, or the banned religious group Falun Gong, according to leaked documents detailing the site’s moderation guidelines.

If this isn’t a smoking gun, there’s no such thing as a smoking gun.

Armand Domalewski: I did not know leaked documents from TikTok revealed it had instructed its moderators to censor videos that mentioned topics the Chinese government wanted suppressed

And yes, I think this matters, and keep in mind one should expect such trendlines to continue:

Katie Britt said in her State of the Union response (obviously without stating her evidence) that TikTok was ‘poisoning the minds” of a generation of children.

Even if there were no smoking guns, this does not seem like a situation in which one should need one in order to proceed?

Matthew Yglesias: Here’s the analogy I like to use. It’s 1975 and a state-owned Soviet firm wants to buy CBS. What happens? Well, what happens is they wouldn’t be allowed to. The FCC would block it. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the US or its predecessors would block it. If they didn’t have the power, congress would write a new law. And even if it wasn’t CBS, if it was a chain of local TV affiliate stations, the outcome would be the same. There would be no detailed factual analysis or demand for gold standard evidence that a Soviet-owned television statement might do Moscow’s bidding or that television is capable of influencing public opinion. We’d reject the idea out of hand. And rightly so, because the downsides would be very clear, and the upside minimal.

That’s how the TikTok situation looks to me.

Alec Stapp: This is not unprecedented. In fact, it’s standard national security policy for politically sensitive media & communications networks.

We would never have allowed the Soviet Union to own CBS/NBC/ABC during the Cold War.

But we let the Chinese Communist Party control the black box algorithm for the most popular social media app in our country.

Justin Wolfers: “We must ensure the Chinese government cannot weaponize TikTok against American users and our government through data collection and propaganda.” …because that’s a job we only trust Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg with.

Nate Silver: It is fine to be inherently more distrustful of platforms run by countries officially designated by the United States government as foreign adversary countries.

Robin Hanson: Because we all trust the US government so much?

I would say to Robin Hanson and Justin Wolfers, fully trust absolutely not, obviously that would be crazy, and we have to be careful about exactly what powers we entrust USG and also the others with as well, but yes I trust USG or Musk or Zuckerberg to look out for Americans a lot more than CCP.

Matthew Yglesias also reminds us extensively that China systematically uses all the economic levers at its disposal to silence foreigners on the issues it most cares about, strongarming companies like Disney, Apple and Mercedes-Benz. It seems crazy to think that they will not their leverage over TikTok in at least similar fashion.

His response struck me as remarkably similar to his position against taking government action on AI. Claim that the problem has not been sufficiently modeled, that one must point to specific concrete harms. Point out that existing laws exist. Warn of a ‘rush to judgment’ as the years pass and the problems intensify.

Tyler Cowen: I’ve blogged this in the past, and don’t have much to add to my previous views. I will say this, however: if TikTok truly is breaking laws on a major scale, let us start a legal case with fact-finding and an adversarial process. Surely such a path would uncover the wrongdoing under consideration, or at least strongly hint at it. Alternately, how about some research, such as say RCTs, showing the extreme reach and harmful influence of TikTok? Is that asking for too much?

Now maybe all that has been done and I am just not aware of it. Alternatively, perhaps this is another of those bipartisan rushes to judgment that we are likely to regret in the longer run. In which case this would be filed under “too important to be left to legal fact-finding and science,” a class of issues which is sadly already too large.

Looking over his previous statements, I see two basic themes.

One, continued demands that we ‘prove’ that China or ByteDance has its finger on the scale. I say that the information elsewhere in this post, in the absence of counterexamples, is very strong evidence. At minimum, they are fixing content balance issues they dislike and allowing those they like, with an algorithm that snowballs. More likely, they are doing exactly what it looks like they are doing. This is not a criminal conviction, we do not need to know beyond a reasonable doubt.

As Noah Smith says, we see some guns. They are smoking.

I do think it would be good to have more data and better studies, regardless of what is decided by Congress.

Two, pointing out that the Restrict Act was a terrible bill. Here, I strongly agree. We cannot trust the authority we are counting on to ban TikTok to stay its hand when it should stay its hand, so we need to be careful of the contents of the bill we pass.

I would be open to arguments that this bill is similarly bad, if that were the case. I however notice Tyler is not making comment on the contents of this particular bill.

I also find his lack of concern interesting in the context of what is otherwise strong nationalism, and concern about Chinese competition, especially technological competition.

Donald Trump met with billionaire investor and Club for Growth donor Jeff Yass, who holds a 15% stake in ByteDance. Shortly after, Trump started opposing the ban, despite having previously actually issued an order requiring divestiture back in August 2020, which Biden reversed while it was stalled under legal challenges.

In some sense the least surprising story of all time is ‘politician shifts position to reflect that of their biggest donors,’ especially when the politician is Donald Trump.

Matthew Yglesias: Trump sold out what’s supposed to be one of his signature causes for the promise of some campaign contributions, a play that authoritarian states will be able to run over and over again as long as he’s in charge.

In this case, with how much emphasis he puts on being tough on China and interfering with international trade even when it makes zero economic sense, and how the ban has such broad political support and majority popular support, and there presumably going to be enough money on all sides for 2024 to essentially make the rubble bounce, although Noah Smith says instead that Trump’s campaigns are currently hurting for funds in addition to his legal bills?

Noah Smith reasonably calls this Trump move a ‘rug pull’ of China hawks. Josh Rogin in The Washington Post says this ‘suggests’ his China policy is for sale.

So if this doesn’t involve outright bribes or a deal to use TikTok to his advantage?

Then actually yeah, it would be kind of weird.

Matthew Yglesias: On March 1, Trump got a bunch of money from formerly critical GOP mega-donor Jeff Yass, an investor in ByteDance.

Less than a week later, he is now suddenly in favor of continued Chinese ownership of TikTok.

I know a lot of relatively serious-minded conservatives think it’s worth downplaying Trump’s corruption and other personal flaws for the sake of larger policy aims, but the whole deal with him being corrupt is those aims can always change after a check.

Mike Solana: If a billionaire TikTok investor pivoted from ‘never Joe Biden’ to ‘geezers only 2024’ and then, following a meeting with that billionaire TikTok investor Biden reversed his years-long position on TikTok and publicly defended the company you would absolutely LOSE YOUR MINDS.

Tim Miller (MSNBC): Looks like Mike Solana deleted this attack on Trump for flip flopping on TikTok after meeting with a top investor.

Mike Solana: MSNBC analysts following me closer than my mom

Bearded Miguel: Also the tweet he quoted is correct.

Mike Solana: Well of course.

Noah Smith: It was a good burn btw.

It seems Trump is not actually expending effort and lobbying to kill the bill. Which makes sense. That would be highly out of character.

This is perhaps not entirely out of left field, Kellyanne Conway has apparently been defending TikTok for weeks with terrible arguments? And others in his orbit have been making similar moves as well.

Shoshana Weissmann: I’ve heard about these meetings from others over the past weeks. The worst part is the arguments they’re making in meetings have nothing to do with either free speech or national security. It’s extremely shallow, vapid stuff on a serious matter.

Daniel Lippman (Politico) on March 9: Kellyanne Conway, the former senior Trump aide, is being paid by the conservative Club for Growth to advocate for TikTok in Congress and has had at least 10 meetings with lawmakers in recent months about the app, according to three people familiar with the meetings.

Some Trump allies, including former presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy, have recently become more amenable to the app. Tucker Carlson joined late last summer. Elon Musk, who recently met with Trump, on Friday publicly agreed with his recent post in defense of TikTok.

Matthew Yglesias: To be fair, she’s just following what’s now the true MAGA line.

It’s the anti-TikTok folks who are RINOs now.

Most others only changed their minds in response to Trump. For example, here is Vivek Ramaswamy (who also got millions from Jeff Yass) on February 26.

And here he is on March 8.

And of course here’s Vivek back on 5/8/23:

Here’s a clip of him explaining his position and accusing ‘professional politicians’ of flip-flopping in this context, which is some grade-A chutzpah.

That seems like a deeply silly argument. If you want something even broader, then propose something even broader. I don’t even know what ‘ban all data transfers’ would mean in practice if it wasn’t a ban on Chinese companies doing business at all, and neither does Vivek. Nor is he making a case that this bill is negative on the margin, which is the question that matters.

For example, here is Senator Tom Cotton saying “sitting down with TikTok’s CEO is ‘no better than meeting with Hamas or the Taliban.”

Which is technically true. Meeting people you disagree with, even terrorists you disagree with, is not bad. The ‘you cannot meet with the baddies’ thing is dumb. But this is not the perspective of Tom Cotton, and his intended implication is clear.

I see the case for forcing divestiture of TikTok as overdetermined. It is functionally Chinese spyware, with a history of lying about it and doing things like tracking journalists. China does the same to similar American companies. China seems to very clearly be using its influence to move public opinion, and has now put out 150 million push notifications to call Congress on its behalf, and one has to wonder what deal was made with known dealmaker Donald Trump.

The status quo is not something we can tolerate under these circumstances.

I also think that TikTok’s core product poses a serious problem even in the absence of all that, that we would be better off without it, and that one would be wise to personally avoid using it. But many are addicted, or feel trapped by social issues. I would not act on this alone, but it is a contributing factor.

As always, the concern is in the details of the bill. Last time, the Restrict Act, was a vast overreach that I am very happy did not become law. This time, it appears the law was much more narrowly constructed, applying only to providers not users, without any criminal penalties or any insane civil penalties. What services are impacted seems far more limited as well.

Is it perfect? No, the actual bills never are. But based on my reading of it, this is a bill I can support.

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