Security

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A “ridiculously weak“ password causes disaster for Spain’s No. 2 mobile carrier

A “ridiculously weak“ password causes disaster for Spain’s No. 2 mobile carrier

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Orange España, Spain’s second-biggest mobile operator, suffered a major outage on Wednesday after an unknown party obtained a “ridiculously weak” password and used it to access an account for managing the global routing table that controls which networks deliver the company’s Internet traffic, researchers said.

The hijacking began around 9: 28 Coordinated Universal Time (about 2: 28 Pacific time) when the party logged into Orange’s RIPE NCC account using the password “ripeadmin” (minus the quotation marks). The RIPE Network Coordination Center is one of five Regional Internet Registries, which are responsible for managing and allocating IP addresses to Internet service providers, telecommunication organizations, and companies that manage their own network infrastructure. RIPE serves 75 countries in Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

“Things got ugly”

The password came to light after the party, using the moniker Snow, posted an image to social media that showed the orange.es email address associated with the RIPE account. RIPE said it’s working on ways to beef up account security.

Screenshot showing RIPE account, including the orange.es email address associated with it.

Enlarge / Screenshot showing RIPE account, including the orange.es email address associated with it.

Security firm Hudson Rock plugged the email address into a database it maintains to track credentials for sale in online bazaars. In a post, the security firm said the username and “ridiculously weak” password were harvested by information-stealing malware that had been installed on an Orange computer since September. The password was then made available for sale on an infostealer marketplace.

Partially redacted screenshot from Hudson Rock database showing the credentials for the Orange RIPE account.

Enlarge / Partially redacted screenshot from Hudson Rock database showing the credentials for the Orange RIPE account.

HJudson Rock

Researcher Kevin Beaumont said thousands of credentials protecting other RIPE accounts are also available in such marketplaces.

Once logged into Orange’s RIPE account, Snow made changes to the global routing table the mobile operator relies on to specify what backbone providers are authorized to carry its traffic to various parts of the world. These tables are managed using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which connects one regional network to the rest of the Internet. Specifically, Snow added several new ROAs, short for Route Origin Authorizations. These entries allow “autonomous systems” such as Orange’s AS12479 to designate other autonomous systems or large chunks of IP addresses to deliver its traffic to various regions of the world.

In the initial stage, the changes had no meaningful effect because the ROAs Snow added announcing the IP addresses—93.117.88.0/22 and 93.117.88.0/21, and 149.74.0.0/16—already originated with Orange’s AS12479. A few minutes later, Snow added ROAs to five additional routes. All but one of them also originated with the Orange AS, and once again had no effect on traffic, according to a detailed writeup of the event by Doug Madory, a BGP expert at security and networking firm Kentik.

The creation of the ROA for 149.74.0.0/16 was the first act by Snow to create problems, because the maximum prefix length was set to 16, rendering any smaller routes using the address range invalid

“It invalidated any routes that are more specific (longer prefix length) than a 16,” Madory told Ars in an online interview. “So routes like 149.74.100.0/23 became invalid and started getting filtered. Then [Snow] created more ROAs to cover those routes. Why? Not sure. I think, at first, they were just messing around. Before that ROA was created, there was no ROA to assert anything about this address range.”

A “ridiculously weak“ password causes disaster for Spain’s No. 2 mobile carrier Read More »

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Researchers come up with better idea to prevent AirTag stalking

Picture of AirTag

BackyardProduction via Getty Images

Apple’s AirTags are meant to help you effortlessly find your keys or track your luggage. But the same features that make them easy to deploy and inconspicuous in your daily life have also allowed them to be abused as a sinister tracking tool that domestic abusers and criminals can use to stalk their targets.

Over the past year, Apple has taken protective steps to notify iPhone and Android users if an AirTag is in their vicinity for a significant amount of time without the presence of its owner’s iPhone, which could indicate that an AirTag has been planted to secretly track their location. Apple hasn’t said exactly how long this time interval is, but to create the much-needed alert system, Apple made some crucial changes to the location privacy design the company originally developed a few years ago for its “Find My” device tracking feature. Researchers from Johns Hopkins University and the University of California, San Diego, say, though, that they’ve developed a cryptographic scheme to bridge the gap—prioritizing detection of potentially malicious AirTags while also preserving maximum privacy for AirTag users.

The Find My system uses both public and private cryptographic keys to identify individual AirTags and manage their location tracking. But Apple developed a particularly thoughtful mechanism to regularly rotate the public device identifier—every 15 minutes, according to the researchers. This way, it would be much more difficult for someone to track your location over time using a Bluetooth scanner to follow the identifier around. This worked well for privately tracking the location of, say, your MacBook if it was lost or stolen, but the downside of constantly changing this identifier for AirTags was that it provided cover for the tiny devices to be deployed abusively.

In reaction to this conundrum, Apple revised the system so an AirTag’s public identifier now only rotates once every 24 hours if the AirTag is away from an iPhone or other Apple device that “owns” it. The idea is that this way other devices can detect potential stalking, but won’t be throwing up alerts all the time if you spend a weekend with a friend who has their iPhone and the AirTag on their keys in their pockets.

In practice, though, the researchers say that these changes have created a situation where AirTags are broadcasting their location to anyone who’s checking within a 30- to 50-foot radius over the course of an entire day—enough time to track a person as they go about their life and get a sense of their movements.

“We had students walk through cities, walk through Times Square and Washington, DC, and lots and lots of people are broadcasting their locations,” says Johns Hopkins cryptographer Matt Green, who worked on the research with a group of colleagues, including Nadia Heninger and Abhishek Jain. “Hundreds of AirTags were not near the device they were registered to, and we’re assuming that most of those were not stalker AirTags.”

Apple has been working with companies like Google, Samsung, and Tile on a cross-industry effort to address the threat of tracking from products similar to AirTags. And for now, at least, the researchers say that the consortium seems to have adopted Apple’s approach of rotating the device public identifiers once every 24 hours. But the privacy trade-off inherent in this solution made the researchers curious about whether it would be possible to design a system that better balanced both privacy and safety.

Researchers come up with better idea to prevent AirTag stalking Read More »

4-year-campaign-backdoored-iphones-using-possibly-the-most-advanced-exploit-ever

4-year campaign backdoored iPhones using possibly the most advanced exploit ever

NO ORDINARY VULNERABILITY —

“Triangulation” infected dozens of iPhones belonging to employees of Moscow-based Kaspersky.

iphone with text background

Researchers on Wednesday presented intriguing new findings surrounding an attack that over four years backdoored dozens if not thousands of iPhones, many of which belonged to employees of Moscow-based security firm Kaspersky. Chief among the discoveries: the unknown attackers were able to achieve an unprecedented level of access by exploiting a vulnerability in an undocumented hardware feature that few if anyone outside of Apple and chip suppliers such as ARM Holdings knew of.

“The exploit’s sophistication and the feature’s obscurity suggest the attackers had advanced technical capabilities,” Kaspersky researcher Boris Larin wrote in an email. “Our analysis hasn’t revealed how they became aware of this feature, but we’re exploring all possibilities, including accidental disclosure in past firmware or source code releases. They may also have stumbled upon it through hardware reverse engineering.”

Four zero-days exploited for years

Other questions remain unanswered, wrote Larin, even after about 12 months of intensive investigation. Besides how the attackers learned of the hardware feature, the researchers still don’t know what, precisely, its purpose is. Also unknown is if the feature is a native part of the iPhone or enabled by a third-party hardware component such as ARM’s CoreSight

The mass backdooring campaign, which according to Russian officials also infected the iPhones of thousands of people working inside diplomatic missions and embassies in Russia, according to Russian government officials, came to light in June. Over a span of at least four years, Kaspersky said, the infections were delivered in iMessage texts that installed malware through a complex exploit chain without requiring the receiver to take any action.

With that, the devices were infected with full-featured spyware that, among other things, transmitted microphone recordings, photos, geolocation, and other sensitive data to attacker-controlled servers. Although infections didn’t survive a reboot, the unknown attackers kept their campaign alive simply by sending devices a new malicious iMessage text shortly after devices were restarted.

A fresh infusion of details disclosed Wednesday said that “Triangulation”—the name Kaspersky gave to both the malware and the campaign that installed it—exploited four critical zero-day vulnerabilities, meaning serious programming flaws that were known to the attackers before they were known to Apple. The company has since patched all four of the vulnerabilities, which are tracked as:

Besides affecting iPhones, these critical zero-days and the secret hardware function resided in Macs, iPods, iPads, Apple TVs, and Apple Watches. What’s more, the exploits Kaspersky recovered were intentionally developed to work on those devices as well. Apple has patched those platforms as well. Apple declined to comment for this article.

Detecting infections is extremely challenging, even for people with advanced forensic expertise. For those who want to try, a list of Internet addresses, files, and other indicators of compromise is here.

Mystery iPhone function proves pivotal to Triangulation’s success

The most intriguing new detail is the targeting of the heretofore-unknown hardware feature, which proved to be pivotal to the Operation Triangulation campaign. A zero-day in the feature allowed the attackers to bypass advanced hardware-based memory protections designed to safeguard device system integrity even after an attacker gained the ability to tamper with memory of the underlying kernel. On most other platforms, once attackers successfully exploit a kernel vulnerability they have full control of the compromised system.

On Apple devices equipped with these protections, such attackers are still unable to perform key post-exploitation techniques such as injecting malicious code into other processes, or modifying kernel code or sensitive kernel data. This powerful protection was bypassed by exploiting a vulnerability in the secret function. The protection, which has rarely been defeated in exploits found to date, is also present in Apple’s M1 and M2 CPUs.

Kaspersky researchers learned of the secret hardware function only after months of extensive reverse engineering of devices that had been infected with Triangulation. In the course, the researchers’ attention was drawn to what are known as hardware registers, which provide memory addresses for CPUs to interact with peripheral components such as USBs, memory controllers, and GPUs. MMIOs, short for Memory-mapped Input/Outputs, allow the CPU to write to the specific hardware register of a specific peripheral device.

The researchers found that several of MMIO addresses the attackers used to bypass the memory protections weren’t identified in any so-called device tree, a machine-readable description of a particular set of hardware that can be helpful to reverse engineers. Even after the researchers further scoured source codes, kernel images, and firmware, they were still unable to find any mention of the MMIO addresses.

4-year campaign backdoored iPhones using possibly the most advanced exploit ever Read More »

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AlphV ransomware site is “seized” by the FBI. Then it’s “unseized.” And so on.

DUELING SEIZURES —

In a bizarre twist, both groups issue dueling notices to ransomware website.

Shortly after the FBI posted a notice saying it had seized the dark-web site of AlphV, the ransomware group posted this notice claiming otherwise.

Enlarge / Shortly after the FBI posted a notice saying it had seized the dark-web site of AlphV, the ransomware group posted this notice claiming otherwise.

The FBI spent much of Tuesday locked in an online tug-of-war with one of the Internet’s most aggressive ransomware groups after taking control of infrastructure the group has used to generate more than $300 million in illicit payments to date.

Early Tuesday morning, the dark-web site belonging to AlphV, a ransomware group that also goes by the name BlackCat, suddenly started displaying a banner that said it had been seized by the FBI as part of a coordinated law enforcement action. Gone was all the content AlphV had posted to the site previously.

Around the same time, the Justice Department said it had disrupted AlphV’s operations by releasing a software tool that would allow roughly 500 AlphV victims to restore their systems and data. In all, Justice Department officials said, AlphV had extorted roughly $300 million from 1,000 victims.

An affidavit unsealed in a Florida federal court, meanwhile, revealed that the disruption involved FBI agents obtaining 946 private keys used to host victim communication sites. The legal document said the keys were obtained with the help of a confidential human source who had “responded to an advertisement posted to a publicly accessible online forum soliciting applicants for Blackcat affiliate positions.”

“In disrupting the BlackCat ransomware group, the Justice Department has once again hacked the hackers,” Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco said in Tuesday’s announcement. “With a decryption tool provided by the FBI to hundreds of ransomware victims worldwide, businesses and schools were able to reopen, and health care and emergency services were able to come back online. We will continue to prioritize disruptions and place victims at the center of our strategy to dismantle the ecosystem fueling cybercrime.”

Within hours, the FBI seizure notice displayed on the AlphV dark-web site was gone. In its place was a new notice proclaiming: “This website has been unseized.” The new notice, written by AlphV officials, downplayed the significance of the FBI’s action. While not disputing the decryptor tool worked for 400 victims, AlphV officials said that the disruption would prevent data belonging to another 3,000 victims from being decrypted.

“Now because of them, more than 3,000 companies will never receive their keys.”

As the hours went on, the FBI and AlphV sparred over control of the dark-web site, with each replacing the notices of the other.

One researcher described the ongoing struggle as a “tug of Tor,” a reference to Tor, the network of servers that allows people to browse and publish websites anonymously. Like most ransomware groups, AlphV hosts its sites over Tor. Not only does this arrangement prevent law enforcement investigators from identifying group members, it also hampers investigators from obtaining court orders compelling the web host to turn over control of the site.

The only way to control a Tor address is with possession of a dedicated private encryption key. Once the FBI obtained it, investigators were able to publish Tuesday’s seizure notice to it. Since AlphV also maintained possession of the key, group members were similarly free to post their own content. Since Tor makes it impossible to change the private key corresponding to an address, neither side has been able to lock the other out.

With each side essentially deadlocked, AlphV has resorted to removing some of the restrictions it previously placed on affiliates. Under the common ransomware-as-a-service model, affiliates are the ones who actually hack victims. When successful, the affiliates use the AlphV ransomware and infrastructure to encrypt data and then negotiate and facilitate a payment by bitcoin or another cryptocurrency.

Up to now, AlphV placed rules on affiliates forbidding them from targeting hospitals and critical infrastructure. Now, those rules no longer apply unless the victim is located in the Commonwealth of Independent States—a list of countries that were once part of the former Soviet Union.

“Because of their actions, we are introducing new rules, or rather, we are removing ALL rules except one, you cannot touch the CIS, you can now block hospitals, nuclear power plants, anything, anywhere,” the AlphV notice said. The notice said that AlphV was also allowing affiliates to retain 90 percent of any ransom payments they get, and that ‘VIP’ affiliates would receive a private program on separate isolated data centers. The move is likely an attempt to stanch the possible defection by affiliates spooked by the FBI’s access to the AlphV infrastructure.

The back and forth has prompted some to say that the disruption failed, since AlphV retains control of its site and continues to possess the data it stole from victims. In a discussion on social media with one such critic, ransomware expert Allan Liska pushed back.

“The server and all of its data is still in possession of FBI—and ALPHV ain’t getting none of that back,” Liska, a threat researcher at security firm Recorded Future, wrote.

Social media post by Liska arguing the FBI maintains access to AlphV infrastructure.

Enlarge / Social media post by Liska arguing the FBI maintains access to AlphV infrastructure.

“But, hey you are correct and I am 100% wrong. I encourage you, and all ransomware groups to sign up to be an ALPHV affiliate now, it is definitely safe. Do it, Chicken!”

AlphV ransomware site is “seized” by the FBI. Then it’s “unseized.” And so on. Read More »

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Xfinity waited 13 days to patch critical Citrix Bleed 0-day. Now it’s paying the price

MORE CITRIX BLEED CASUALTIES —

Data for almost 36 million customers now in the hands of unknown hackers.

A parked Comcast service van with the

Enlarge / A Comcast Xfinity service van in San Ramon, California on February 25, 2020.

Getty Images | Smith Collection/Gado

Comcast waited 13 days to patch its network against a high-severity vulnerability, a lapse that allowed hackers to make off with password data and other sensitive information belonging to 36 million Xfinity customers.

The breach, which was carried out by exploiting a vulnerability in network hardware sold by Citrix, gave hackers access to usernames and cryptographically hashed passwords for 35.9 million Xfinity customers, the cable TV and Internet provider said in a notification filed Monday with the Maine attorney general’s office. Citrix disclosed the vulnerability and issued a patch on October 10. Eight days later, researchers reported that the vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2023-4966 and by the name Citrix Bleed, had been under active exploitation since August. Comcast didn’t patch its network until October 23, 13 days after a patch became available and five days after the report of the in-the-wild attacks exploiting it.

“However, we subsequently discovered that prior to mitigation, between October 16 and October 19, 2023, there was unauthorized access to some of our internal systems that we concluded was a result of this vulnerability,” an accompanying notice stated. “We notified federal law enforcement and conducted an investigation into the nature and scope of the incident. On November 16, 2023, it was determined that information was likely acquired.”

Comcast is still investigating precisely what data the attackers obtained. So far, Monday’s disclosure said, information known to have been taken includes usernames and hashed passwords, names, contact information, the last four digits of social security numbers, dates of birth, and/or secret questions and answers. Xfinity is Comcast’s cable television and Internet division.

Citrix Bleed has emerged as one of the year’s most severe and widely exploited vulnerabilities, with a severity rating of 9.4 out of 10. The vulnerability, residing in Citrix’s NetScaler Application Delivery Controller and NetScaler Gateway, can be exploited without any authentication or privileges on affected networks. Exploits disclose session tokens, which the hardware assigns to devices that have already successfully provided login credentials. Possession of the tokens allows hackers to override any multi-factor authentication in use and log into the device.

Other companies that have been hacked through Citrix Bleed include Boeing; Toyota; DP World Australia, a branch of the Dubai-based logistics company DP World; Industrial and Commercial Bank of China; and law firm Allen & Overy.

The name Citrix Bleed is an allusion to Heartbleed, a different critical information disclosure zero-day that turned the Internet on its head in 2014. That vulnerability, which resided in the OpenSSL code library, came under mass exploitation and allowed the pilfering of passwords, encryption keys, banking credentials, and all kinds of other sensitive information. Citrix Bleed hasn’t been as dire because fewer vulnerable devices are in use.

A sweep of the most active ransomware sites didn’t turn up any claims of responsibility for the hack of the Comcast network. An Xfinity representative said in an email that the company has yet to receive any ransom demands, and investigators aren’t aware of any customer data being leaked or of any attacks on affected customers.

Comcast is requiring Xfinity customers to reset their passwords to protect against the possibility that attackers can crack the stolen hashes. The company is also encouraging customers to enable two-factor authentication. The representative declined to say why company admins didn’t patch sooner.

Xfinity waited 13 days to patch critical Citrix Bleed 0-day. Now it’s paying the price Read More »

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How Microsoft’s cybercrime unit has evolved to combat increased threats

a more sophisticated DCU —

Microsoft has honed its strategy to disrupt global cybercrime and state-backed actors.

Microsoft's Cybercrime Center.

Microsoft’s Cybercrime Center.

Microsoft

Governments and the tech industry around the world have been scrambling in recent years to curb the rise of online scamming and cybercrime. Yet even with progress on digital defenses, enforcement, and deterrence, the ransomware attacks, business email compromises, and malware infections keep on coming. Over the past decade, Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) has forged its own strategies, both technical and legal, to investigate scams, take down criminal infrastructure, and block malicious traffic.

The DCU is fueled, of course, by Microsoft’s massive scale and the visibility across the Internet that comes from the reach of Windows. But DCU team members repeatedly told WIRED that their work is motivated by very personal goals of protecting victims rather than a broad policy agenda or corporate mandate.

In just its latest action, the DCU announced Wednesday evening efforts to disrupt a cybercrime group that Microsoft calls Storm-1152. A middleman in the criminal ecosystem, Storm-1152 sells software services and tools like identity verification bypass mechanisms to other cybercriminals. The group has grown into the number one creator and vendor of fake Microsoft accounts—creating roughly 750 million scam accounts that the actor has sold for millions of dollars.

The DCU used legal techniques it has honed over many years related to protecting intellectual property to move against Storm-1152. The team obtained a court order from the Southern District of New York on December 7 to seize some of the criminal group’s digital infrastructure in the US and take down websites including the services 1stCAPTCHA, AnyCAPTCHA, and NoneCAPTCHA, as well as a site that sold fake Outlook accounts called Hotmailbox.me.

The strategy reflects the DCU’s evolution. A group with the name “Digital Crimes Unit” has existed at Microsoft since 2008, but the team in its current form took shape in 2013 when the old DCU merged with a Microsoft team known as the Intellectual Property Crimes Unit.

“Things have become a lot more complex,” says Peter Anaman, a DCU principal investigator. “Traditionally you would find one or two people working together. Now, when you’re looking at an attack, there are multiple players. But if we can break it down and understand the different layers that are involved it will help us be more impactful.”

The DCU’s hybrid technical and legal approach to chipping away at cybercrime is still unusual, but as the cybercriminal ecosystem has evolved—alongside its overlaps with state-backed hacking campaigns—the idea of employing creative legal strategies in cyberspace has become more mainstream. In recent years, for example, Meta-owned WhatsApp and Apple both took on the notorious spyware maker NSO Group with lawsuits.

Still, the DCU’s particular progression was the result of Microsoft’s unique dominance during the rise of the consumer Internet. As the group’s mission came into focus while dealing with threats from the late 2000s and early 2010s—like the widespread Conficker worm—the DCU’s unorthodox and aggressive approach drew criticism at times for its fallout and potential impacts on legitimate businesses and websites.

“There’s simply no other company that takes such a direct approach to taking on scammers,” WIRED wrote in a story about the DCU from October 2014. “That makes Microsoft rather effective, but also a little bit scary, observers say.”

Richard Boscovich, the DCU’s assistant general counsel and a former assistant US attorney in Florida’s Southern District, told WIRED in 2014 that it was frustrating for people within Microsoft to see malware like Conficker rampage across the web and feel like the company could improve the defenses of its products, but not do anything to directly deal with the actors behind the crimes. That dilemma spurred the DCU’s innovations and continues to do so.

“What’s impacting people? That’s what we get asked to take on, and we’ve developed a muscle to change and to take on new types of crime,” says Zoe Krumm, the DCU’s director of analytics. In the mid-2000s, Krumm says, Brad Smith, now Microsoft’s vice chair and president, was a driving force in turning the company’s attention toward the threat of email spam.

“The DCU has always been a bit of an incubation team. I remember all of a sudden, it was like, ‘We have to do something about spam.’ Brad comes to the team and he’s like, ‘OK, guys, let’s put together a strategy.’ I’ll never forget that it was just, ‘Now we’re going to focus here.’ And that has continued, whether it be moving into the malware space, whether it be tech support fraud, online child exploitation, business email compromise.”

How Microsoft’s cybercrime unit has evolved to combat increased threats Read More »

unifi-devices-broadcasted-private-video-to-other-users’-accounts

UniFi devices broadcasted private video to other users’ accounts

CASE OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY —

“I was presented with 88 consoles from another account,” one user reports.

an assortment of ubiquiti cameras

Enlarge / An assortment of Ubiquiti cameras.

Users of UniFi, the popular line of wireless devices from manufacturer Ubiquiti, are reporting receiving private camera feeds from, and control over, devices belonging to other users, posts published to social media site Reddit over the past 24 hours show.

“Recently, my wife received a notification from UniFi Protect, which included an image from a security camera,” one Reddit user reported. “However, here’s the twist—this camera doesn’t belong to us.”

Stoking concern and anxiety

The post included two images. The first showed a notification pushed to the person’s phone reporting that their UDM Pro, a network controller and network gateway used by tech-enthusiast consumers, had detected someone moving in the backyard. A still shot of video recorded by a connected surveillance camera showed a three-story house surrounded by trees. The second image showed the dashboard belonging to the Reddit user. The user’s connected device was a UDM SE, and the video it captured showed a completely different house.

Less than an hour later, a different Reddit user posting to the same thread replied: “So it’s VERY interesting you posted this, I was just about to post that when I navigated to unifi.ui.com this morning, I was logged into someone else’s account completely! It had my email on the top right, but someone else’s UDM Pro! I could navigate the device, view, and change settings! Terrifying!!”

Two other people took to the same thread to report similar behavior happening to them.

Other Reddit threads posted in the past day reporting UniFi users connecting to private devices or feeds belonging to others are here and here. The first one reported that the Reddit poster gained full access to someone else’s system. The post included two screenshots showing what the poster said was the captured video of an unrecognized business. The other poster reported logging into their Ubiquiti dashboard to find system controls for someone else. “I ended up logging out, clearing cookies, etc seems fine now for me…” the poster wrote.

Yet another person reported the same problem in a post published to Ubiquiti’s community support forum on Thursday, as this Ars story was being reported. The person reported logging into the UniFi console as is their routine each day.

“However this time I was presented with 88 consoles from another account,” the person wrote. “I had full access to these consoles, just as I would my own. This was only stopped when I forced a browser refresh, and I was presented again with my consoles.”

Ubiquity on Thursday said it had identified the glitch and fixed the errors that caused it.

“Specifically, this issue was caused by an upgrade to our UniFi Cloud infrastructure, which we have since solved,” officials wrote. They went on:

1. What happened?

1,216 Ubiquiti accounts (“Group 1”) were improperly associated with a separate group of 1,177 Ubiquiti accounts (“Group 2”).

2. When did this happen?

December 13, from 6: 47 AM to 3: 45 PM UTC.

3. What does this mean?

During this time, a small number of users from Group 2 received push notifications on their mobile devices from the consoles assigned to a small number of users from Group 1.

Additionally, during this time, a user from Group 2 that attempted to log into his or her account may have been granted temporary remote access to a Group 1 account.

The reports are understandably stoking concern and even anxiety for users of UniFi products, which include wireless access points, switches, routers, controller devices, VoIP phones, and access control products. As the Internet-accessible portals into the local networks of users, UniFi devices provide a means for accessing cameras, mics, and other sensitive resources inside the home.

“I guess I should stop walking around naked in my house now,” a participant in one of the forums joked.

To Ubiquiti’s credit, company employees proactively responded to reports, signaling they took the reports seriously and began actively investigating early on. The employees said the problem has been corrected, and the account mix-ups are no longer occurring.

It’s useful to remember that this sort of behavior—legitimately logging into an account only to find the data or controls belonging to a completely different account—is as old as the Internet. Recent examples: A T-Mobile mistake in September, and similar glitches involving Chase Bank, First Virginia Banks, Credit Karma, and Sprint.

The precise root causes of this type of system error vary from incident to incident, but they often involve “middlebox” devices, which sit between the front- and back-end devices. To improve performance, middleboxes cache certain data, including the credentials of users who have recently logged in. When mismatches occur, credentials for one account can be mapped to a different account.

In an email, a Ubiquiti official said company employees are still gathering “information to provide an accurate assessment.”

UniFi devices broadcasted private video to other users’ accounts Read More »

ukrainian-cells-and-internet-still-out,-1-day-after-suspected-russian-cyberattack

Ukrainian cells and Internet still out, 1 day after suspected Russian cyberattack

PLEASE STAND BY —

Hackers tied to Russian military take responsibility for hack on Ukraine’s biggest provider.

A service center for

Enlarge / A service center for “Kyivstar”, a Ukrainian telecommunications company, that provides communication services and data transmission based on a broad range of fixed and mobile technologies.

Getty Images

Ukrainian civilians on Wednesday grappled for a second day of widespread cellular phone and Internet outages after a cyberattack, purportedly carried out by Kremlin-supported hackers, hit the country’s biggest mobile phone and Internet provider a day earlier.

Two separate hacking groups with ties to the Russian government took responsibility for Tuesday’s attack striking Kyivstar, which has said it serves 24.3 million mobile subscribers and more than 1.1 million home Internet users. One group, calling itself Killnet, said on Telegram that “an attack was carried out on Ukrainian mobile operators, as well as on some banks,” but didn’t elaborate or provide any evidence. A separate group known as Solntsepek said on the same site that it took “full responsibility for the cyberattack on Kyivstar” and had “destroyed 10,000 computers, more than 4,000 servers, and all cloud storage and backup systems.” The post was accompanied by screenshots purporting to show someone with control over the Kyivstar systems.

In the city of Lviv, street lights remained on after sunrise and had to be disconnected manually, because Internet-dependent automated power switches didn’t work, according to NBC News. Additionally, the outage prevented shops throughout the country from processing credit payments and many ATMs from functioning, the Kyiv Post said.

The outage also disrupted air alert systems that warn residents in multiple cities of incoming missile attacks, a Ukrainian official said on Telegram. The outage forced authorities to rely on backup alarms.

“Cyber ​​specialists of the Security Service of Ukraine and ‘Kyivstar’ specialists, in cooperation with other state bodies, continue to restore the network after yesterday’s hacker attack,” officials with the Security Service of Ukraine said. “According to preliminary calculations, it is planned to restore fixed Internet for households on December 13, as well as start the launch of mobile communication and Internet. The digital infrastructure of ‘Kyivstar’ was critically damaged, so the restoration of all services in compliance with the necessary security protocols takes time.”

Kyivstar suspended mobile and Internet service on Tuesday after experiencing what company CEO Oleksandr Komarov said was an “unprecedented cyberattack” by Russian hackers. The attack represents one of the biggest compromises on a civilian telecommunications provider ever and one of the most disruptive so far in the 21-month Russia-Ukraine war. Kyivstar’s website remained unavailable at the time this post went live on Ars.

According to a report by the New Voice of Ukraine, hackers infiltrated Kyivstar’s infrastructure after first hacking into an internal employee account.

Solntsepek, one of two groups taking responsibility for the attack, has links to “Sandworm,” the name researchers use to track a hacking group that works on behalf of a unit within the Russian military known as the GRU. Sandworm has been tied to some of the most destructive cyberattacks in history, most notably the NotPetya worm, which caused an estimated $10 billion in damage worldwide. Researchers have also attributed Ukrainian power outages in 2015 and 2016 to the group.

Ukrainian cells and Internet still out, 1 day after suspected Russian cyberattack Read More »

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The growing abuse of QR codes in malware and payment scams prompts FTC warning

SCAN THIS! —

The convenience of QR codes is a double-edged sword. Follow these tips to stay safe.

A woman scans a QR code in a café to see the menu online.

Enlarge / A woman scans a QR code in a café to see the menu online.

The US Federal Trade Commission has become the latest organization to warn against the growing use of QR codes in scams that attempt to take control of smartphones, make fraudulent charges, or obtain personal information.

Short for quick response codes, QR codes are two-dimensional bar codes that automatically open a Web browser or app when they’re scanned using a phone camera. Restaurants, parking garages, merchants, and charities display them to make it easy for people to open online menus or to make online payments. QR codes are also used in security-sensitive contexts. YouTube, Apple TV, and dozens of other TV apps, for instance, allow someone to sign into their account by scanning a QR code displayed on the screen. The code opens a page on a browser or app of the phone, where the account password is already stored. Once open, the page authenticates the same account to be opened on the TV app. Two-factor authentication apps provide a similar flow using QR codes when enrolling a new account.

The ubiquity of QR codes and the trust placed in them hasn’t been lost on scammers, however. For more than two years now, parking lot kiosks that allow people to make payments through their phones have been a favorite target. Scammers paste QR codes over the legitimate ones. The scam QR codes lead to look-alike sites that funnel funds to fraudulent accounts rather than the ones controlled by the parking garage.

In other cases, emails that attempt to steal passwords or install malware on user devices use QR codes to lure targets to malicious sites. Because the QR code is embedded into the email as an image, anti-phishing security software isn’t able to detect that the link it leads to is malicious. By comparison, when the same malicious destination is presented as a text link in the email, it stands a much higher likelihood of being flagged by the security software. The ability to bypass such protections has led to a torrent of image-based phishes in recent months.

Last week, the FTC warned consumers to be on the lookout for these types of scams.

“A scammer’s QR code could take you to a spoofed site that looks real but isn’t,” the advisory stated. “And if you log in to the spoofed site, the scammers could steal any information you enter. Or the QR code could install malware that steals your information before you realize it.”

The warning came almost two years after the FBI issued a similar advisory. Guidance issued from both agencies include:

  • After scanning a QR code, ensure that it leads to the official URL of the site or service that provided the code. As is the case with traditional phishing scams, malicious domain names may be almost identical to the intended one, except for a single misplaced letter.
  • Enter login credentials, payment card information, or other sensitive data only after ensuring that the site opened by the QR code passes a close inspection using the criteria above.
  • Before scanning a QR code presented on a menu, parking garage, vendor, or charity, ensure that it hasn’t been tampered with. Carefully look for stickers placed on top of the original code.
  • Be highly suspicious of any QR codes embedded into the body of an email. There are rarely legitimate reasons for benign emails from legitimate sites or services to use a QR code instead of a link.
  • Don’t install stand-alone QR code scanners on a phone without good reason and then only after first carefully scrutinizing the developer. Phones already have a built-in scanner available through the camera app that will be more trustworthy.

An additional word of caution when it comes to QR codes. Codes used to enroll a site into two-factor authentication from Google Authenticator, Authy, or another authenticator app provide the secret seed token that controls the ever-chaning one-time password displayed by these apps. Don’t allow anyone to view such QR codes. Re-enroll the site in the event the QR code is exposed.

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stealthy-linux-rootkit-found-in-the-wild-after-going-undetected-for-2-years

Stealthy Linux rootkit found in the wild after going undetected for 2 years

Trojan horse on top of blocks of hexadecimal programming codes. Illustration of the concept of online hacking, computer spyware, malware and ransomware.

Stealthy and multifunctional Linux malware that has been infecting telecommunications companies went largely unnoticed for two years until being documented for the first time by researchers on Thursday.

Researchers from security firm Group-IB have named the remote access trojan “Krasue,” after a nocturnal spirit depicted in Southeast Asian folklore “floating in mid-air, with no torso, just her intestines hanging from below her chin.” The researchers chose the name because evidence to date shows it almost exclusively targets victims in Thailand and “poses a severe risk to critical systems and sensitive data given that it is able to grant attackers remote access to the targeted network.

According to the researchers:

  • Krasue is a Linux Remote Access Trojan that has been active since 20 and predominantly targets organizations in Thailand.
  • Group-IB can confirm that telecommunications companies were targeted by Krasue.
  • The malware contains several embedded rootkits to support different Linux kernel versions.
  • Krasue’s rootkit is drawn from public sources (3 open-source Linux Kernel Module rootkits), as is the case with many Linux rootkits.
  • The rootkit can hook the `kill()` syscall, network-related functions, and file listing operations in order to hide its activities and evade detection.
  • Notably, Krasue uses RTSP (Real-Time Streaming Protocol) messages to serve as a disguised “alive ping,” a tactic rarely seen in the wild.
  • This Linux malware, Group-IB researchers presume, is deployed during the later stages of an attack chain in order to maintain access to a victim host.
  • Krasue is likely to either be deployed as part of a botnet or sold by initial access brokers to other cybercriminals.
  • Group-IB researchers believe that Krasue was created by the same author as the XorDdos Linux Trojan, documented by Microsoft in a March 2022 blog post, or someone who had access to the latter’s source code.

During the initialization phase, the rootkit conceals its own presence. It then proceeds to hook the `kill()` syscall, network-related functions, and file listing operations, thereby obscuring its activities and evading detection.

The researchers have so far been unable to determine precisely how Krasue gets installed. Possible infection vectors include through vulnerability exploitation, credential-stealing or -guessing attacks, or by unwittingly being installed as trojan stashed in an installation file or update masquerading as legitimate software.

The three open source rootkit packages incorporated into Krasue are:

An image showing salient research points of Krasue.

Enlarge / An image showing salient research points of Krasue.

Group-IB

Rootkits are a type of malware that hides directories, files, processes, and other evidence of its presence to the operating system it’s installed on. By hooking legitimate Linux processes, the malware is able to suspend them at select points and interject functions that conceal its presence. Specifically, it hides files and directories beginning with the names “auwd” and “vmware_helper” from directory listings and hides ports 52695 and 52699, where communications to attacker-controlled servers occur. Intercepting the kill() syscall also allows the trojan to survive Linux commands attempting to abort the program and shut it down.

Stealthy Linux rootkit found in the wild after going undetected for 2 years Read More »