Boeing

lawmakers-writing-nasa’s-budget-want-a-cheaper-upper-stage-for-the-sls-rocket

Lawmakers writing NASA’s budget want a cheaper upper stage for the SLS rocket


Eliminating the Block 1B upgrade now would save NASA at least $500 million per year.

Artist’s illustration of the Boeing-developed Exploration Upper Stage, with four hydrogen-fueled RL10 engines. Credit: NASA

Not surprisingly, Congress is pushing back against the Trump administration’s proposal to cancel the Space Launch System, the behemoth rocket NASA has developed to propel astronauts back to the Moon.

Spending bills making their way through both houses of Congress reject the White House’s plan to wind down the SLS rocket after two more launches, but the text of a draft budget recently released by the House Appropriations Committee suggests an openness to making some major changes to the program.

The next SLS flight, called Artemis II, is scheduled to lift off early next year to send a crew of four astronauts around the far side of the Moon. Artemis III will follow a few years later on a mission to attempt a crew lunar landing at the Moon’s south pole. These missions follow Artemis I, a successful unpiloted test flight in 2022.

After Artemis III, the official policy of the Trump administration is to terminate the SLS program, along with the Orion crew capsule designed to launch on top of the rocket. The White House also proposed canceling NASA’s Gateway, a mini-space station to be placed in orbit around the Moon. NASA would instead procure commercial launches and commercial spacecraft to ferry astronauts between the Earth and the Moon, while focusing the agency’s long-term gaze toward Mars.

CYA EUS?

House and Senate appropriations bills would preserve SLS, Orion, and the Gateway. However, the House version of NASA’s budget has an interesting paragraph directing NASA to explore cheaper, faster options for a new SLS upper stage.

NASA has tasked Boeing, which also builds SLS core stages, to develop an Exploration Upper Stage for debut on the Artemis IV mission, the fourth flight of the Space Launch System. This new upper stage would have large propellant tanks and carry four engines instead of the single engine used on the rocket’s interim upper stage, which NASA is using for the first three SLS flights.

The House version of NASA’s fiscal year 2026 budget raises questions about the long-term future of the Exploration Upper Stage. In one section of the bill, House lawmakers would direct NASA to “evaluate alternatives to the current Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) design for SLS.” The committee members wrote the evaluation should focus on reducing development and production costs, shortening the schedule, and maintaining the SLS rocket’s lift capability.

“NASA should also evaluate how alternative designs could support the long-term evolution of SLS and broader exploration goals beyond low-Earth orbit,” the lawmakers wrote. “NASA is directed to assess various propulsion systems, stage configurations, infrastructure compatibility, commercial and international collaboration opportunities, and the cost and schedule impacts of each alternative.”

The SLS rocket is expensive, projected to cost at least $2.5 billion per launch, not counting development costs or expenses related to the Orion spacecraft and the ground systems required to launch it at Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Those figures bring the total cost of an Artemis mission using SLS and Orion to more than $4 billion, according to NASA’s inspector general.

NASA’s Block 1B version of the SLS rocket will be substantially larger than Block 1. Credit: NASA

The EUS is likewise an expensive undertaking. Last year, NASA’s inspector general reported that the new upper stage’s development costs had ballooned from $962 million to $2.8 billion, and the Boeing-led project had been delayed more than six years. The version of the SLS rocket with the EUS, known as Block 1B, is supposed to deliver a 40 percent increase in performance over the Block 1 configuration used on the first three Space Launch System flights. Overall, NASA’s inspector general projected Block 1B’s development costs to total $5.7 billion.

Eliminating the Block 1B upgrade now would save NASA at least $500 million per year, and perhaps more if NASA could also end work on a costly mobile launch tower specifically designed to support SLS Block 1B missions.

NASA can’t go back to the interim upper stage, which is based on the design of the upper stage that flew on United Launch Alliance’s (ULA’s) now-retired Delta IV Heavy rocket. ULA has shut down its Delta production line, so there’s no way to build any more. What ULA does have is a new high-energy upper stage called Centaur V. This upper stage is sized for ULA’s new Vulcan rocket, with more capability than the interim upper stage but with lower performance than the larger EUS.

A season of compromise, maybe

Ars’ Eric Berger wrote last year about the possibility of flying the Centaur V upper stage on SLS missions.

Incorporating the Centaur V wouldn’t maintain the SLS rocket’s lift capability, as the House committee calls for in its appropriations bill. The primary reason for improving the rocket’s performance is to give SLS Block 1B enough oomph to carry “co-manifested” payloads, meaning it can launch an Orion crew capsule and equipment for NASA’s Gateway lunar space station on a single flight. The lunar Gateway is also teed up for cancellation in Trump’s budget proposal, but both congressional appropriations bills would save it, too. If the Gateway escapes cancellation, there are ways to launch its modules on commercial rockets.

Blue Origin also has an upper stage that could conceivably fly on the Space Launch System. But the second stage for Blue Origin’s New Glenn rocket would be a more challenging match for SLS for several reasons, chiefly its 7-meter (23-foot) diameter—too wide to be a drop-in replacement for the interim upper stage used on Block 1. ULA’s Centaur V is much closer in size to the existing upper stage.

The House budget bill has passed a key subcommittee vote but won’t receive a vote from the full appropriations committee until after Congress’s August recess. A markup of the bill by the House Appropriations Committee scheduled for Thursday was postponed after Speaker Mike Johnson announced an early start to the recess this week.

Ars reported last week on the broad strokes of how the House and Senate appropriations bills would affect NASA. Since then, members of the House Appropriations Committee released the text of the report attached to their version of the NASA budget. The report, which includes the paragraph on the Exploration Upper Stage, provides policy guidance and more detailed direction on where NASA should spend its money.

The House’s draft budget includes $2.5 billion for the Space Launch System, close to this year’s funding level and $500 million more than the Trump administration’s request for the next fiscal year, which begins October 1. The budget would continue development of SLS Block 1B and the Exploration Upper Stage while NASA completes a six-month study of alternatives.

The report attached to the Senate appropriations bill for NASA has no specific instructions regarding the Exploration Upper Stage. But like the House bill, the Senate’s draft budget directs NASA to continue ordering spares and long-lead parts for SLS and Orion missions beyond Artemis III. Both versions of the NASA budget require the agency to continue with SLS and Orion until a suitable commercial, human-rated rocket and crew vehicle are proven ready for service.

In a further indication of Congress’ position on the SLS and Orion programs, lawmakers set aside more than $4 billion for the procurement of SLS rockets for the Artemis IV and Artemis V rockets in the reconciliation bill signed into law by President Donald Trump earlier this month.

Congress must pass a series of federal appropriations bills by October 1, when funding for the current fiscal year runs out. If Congress doesn’t act by then, it could pass a continuing resolution to maintain funding at levels close to this year’s budget or face a government shutdown.

Lawmakers will reconvene in Washington, DC, in early September in hopes of finishing work on the fiscal year 2026 budget. The section of the budget that includes NASA still must go through a markup hearing by the House Appropriations Committee and pass floor votes in the House and Senate. Then the two chambers will have to come to a compromise on the differences in their appropriations bill. Only then can the budget be put to another vote in each chamber and go to the White House for Trump’s signature.

Photo of Stephen Clark

Stephen Clark is a space reporter at Ars Technica, covering private space companies and the world’s space agencies. Stephen writes about the nexus of technology, science, policy, and business on and off the planet.

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The ISS is nearing retirement, so why is NASA still gung-ho about Starliner?


NASA is doing all it can to ensure Boeing doesn’t abandon the Starliner program.

Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft atop a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket before a test flight in 2019. Credit: NASA/Joel Kowsky

Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft atop a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket before a test flight in 2019. Credit: NASA/Joel Kowsky

After so many delays, difficulties, and disappointments, you might be inclined to think that NASA wants to wash its hands of Boeing’s troubled Starliner spacecraft.

But that’s not the case.

The manager of NASA’s commercial crew program, Steve Stich, told reporters Thursday that Boeing and its propulsion supplier, Aerojet Rocketdyne, are moving forward with several changes to the Starliner spacecraft to resolve problems that bedeviled a test flight to the International Space Station (ISS) last year. These changes include new seals to plug helium leaks and thermal shunts and barriers to keep the spacecraft’s thrusters from overheating.

Boeing, now more than $2 billion in the hole to pay for all Starliner’s delays, is still more than a year away from executing on its multibillion-dollar NASA contract and beginning crew rotation flights to the ISS. But NASA officials say Boeing remains committed to Starliner.

“We really are working toward a flight as soon as early next year with Starliner, and then ultimately, our goal is to get into crew rotation flights with Starliner,” Stich said. “And those would start no earlier than the second crew rotation slot at the end of next year.”

That would be 11 years after Boeing officials anticipated the spacecraft would enter operational service for NASA when they announced the Starliner program in 2010.

Decision point

The next Starliner flight will probably transport only cargo to the ISS, not astronauts. But NASA hasn’t made any final decisions on the matter. The agency has enough crew rotation missions booked to fly on SpaceX’s Dragon spacecraft to cover the space station’s needs until well into 2027 or 2028.

“I think there are a lot of advantages, I would say, to fly the cargo flight first,” Stich said. “If we really look at the history of Starliner and Dragon, I think Dragon benefited a lot from having earlier [cargo] flights before the crew contract was let for the space station.”

One drawback of flying a Starliner cargo mission is that it will use up one of United Launch Alliance’s remaining Atlas V rockets currently earmarked for a future Starliner crew launch. That means Boeing would have to turn to another rocket to accomplish its full contract with NASA, which covers up to six crew missions.

While Boeing says Starliner can launch on several different rockets, the difficulty of adapting the spacecraft to a new launch vehicle, such as ULA’s Vulcan, shouldn’t be overlooked. Early in Starliner’s development, Boeing and ULA had to overcome an issue with unexpected aerodynamic loads discovered during wind tunnel testing. This prompted engineers to design an aerodynamic extension, or skirt, to go underneath the Starliner spacecraft on top of its Atlas V launcher.

Starliner has suffered delays from the beginning. A NASA budget crunch in the early 2010s pushed back the program about two years, but the rest of the schedule slips have largely fallen on Boeing’s shoulders. The setbacks included a fuel leak and fire during a critical ground test, parachute problems, a redesign to accommodate unanticipated aerodynamic forces, and a computer timing error that cut short Starliner’s first attempt to reach the space station in 2019.

This all culminated in the program’s first test flight with astronauts last summer. But after running into helium leaks and overheating thrusters, the mission ended with Starliner returning to Earth empty, while the spacecraft’s two crew members remained on the International Space Station until they could come home on a SpaceX Dragon spacecraft this year.

The outcome was a stinging disappointment for Boeing. Going into last year’s crew test flight, Boeing appeared to be on the cusp of joining SpaceX and finally earning revenue as one of NASA’s certified crew transportation providers for the ISS.

For several months, Boeing officials were strikingly silent on Starliner’s future. The company declined to release any statements on their long-term commitment to the program, and a Boeing program manager unexpectedly withdrew from a NASA press conference marking the end of the Starliner test flight last September.

Kelly Ortberg, Boeing’s president and CEO, testifies before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee on April 2, 2025, in Washington, DC. Credit: Win McNamee/Getty Images

But that has changed in the last few months. Kelly Ortberg, who took over as Boeing’s CEO last year, told CNBC in April that the company planned “more missions on Starliner” and said work to overcome the thruster issues the spacecraft encountered last year is “pretty straightforward.”

“We know what the problems were, and we’re making corrective actions,” Ortberg said. “So, we hope to do a few more flights here in the coming years.”

Task and purpose

NASA officials remain eager for Starliner to begin these regular crew rotation flights, even as its sole destination, the ISS, enters its sunset years. NASA and its international partners plan to decommission and scuttle the space station in 2030 and 2031, more than 30 years after the launch of the lab’s first module.

NASA’s desire to bring Starliner online has nothing to do with any performance issues with SpaceX, the agency’s other commercial crew provider. SpaceX has met or exceeded all of NASA’s expectations in 11 long-duration flights to the ISS with its Dragon spacecraft. Since its first crew flight in 2020, SpaceX has established a reliable cadence with Dragon missions serving NASA and private customers.

However, there are some questions about SpaceX’s long-term plans for the Dragon program, and those concerns didn’t suddenly spring up last month, when SpaceX founder and chief executive Elon Musk suggested on X that SpaceX would “immediately” begin winding down the Dragon program. The suggestion came as Musk and President Donald Trump exchanged threats and insults on social media amid a feud as the one-time political allies had a dramatic falling out months into Trump’s second term in the White House.

In a subsequent post on X, Musk quickly went back on his threat to soon end the Dragon program. SpaceX officials participating in NASA press conferences in the last few weeks have emphasized the company’s dedication to human spaceflight without specifically mentioning Dragon. SpaceX’s fifth and final human-rated Dragon capsule debuted last month on its first flight to the ISS.

“I would say we’re pretty committed to the space business,” said Bill Gerstenmaier, SpaceX’s vice president of build and flight reliability. “We’re committed to flying humans in space and doing it safely.”

There’s a kernel of truth behind Musk’s threat to decommission Dragon. Musk has long had an appetite to move on from the Dragon program and pivot more of SpaceX’s resources to Starship, the company’s massive next-generation rocket. Starship is envisioned by SpaceX as an eventual replacement for Dragon and the Falcon 9 launcher.

A high-resolution commercial Earth-imaging satellite owned by Maxar captured this view of the International Space Station on June 7, 2024, with Boeing’s Starliner capsule docked at the lab’s forward port (lower right). Credit: Satellite image (c) 2024 Maxar Technologies

NASA hopes commercial space stations can take over for the ISS after its retirement, but there’s no guarantee SpaceX will still be flying Dragon in the 2030s. This injects some uncertainty into plans for commercial space stations.

One possible scenario is that, sometime in the 2030s, the only options for transporting people to and from commercial space stations in low-Earth orbit could be Starliner and Starship. We’ll discuss the rationale for this scenario later in this story.

While the cost of a seat on SpaceX’s Dragon is well known, there’s low confidence in the price of a ticket to low-Earth orbit on Starliner or Starship. What’s more, some of the commercial outposts may be incompatible with Starship because of its enormous mass, which could overcome the ability of a relatively modest space station to control its orientation. NASA identified this as an issue with its Gateway mini-space station in development to fly in orbit around the Moon.

It’s impossible to predict when SpaceX will pull the plug on Dragon. The same goes with Boeing and Starliner. But NASA and other customers are interested in buying more Dragon flights.

If SpaceX can prove Starship is safe enough to launch and land with people onboard, Dragon’s days will be numbered. But Starship is likely at least several years from being human-rated for flights to and from low-Earth orbit. NASA’s contract with SpaceX to develop a version of Starship to land astronauts on the Moon won’t require the ship to be certified for launches and landings on Earth. In some ways, that’s a more onerous challenge than the Moon mission because of the perils of reentering Earth’s atmosphere, which Starship won’t need to endure for a lunar landing, and the ship’s lack of a launch abort system.

Once operational, Starship is designed to carry significantly more cargo and people than Falcon 9 and Dragon, but it’s anyone’s guess when it might be ready for crew missions. Until then, if SpaceX wants to have an operational human spaceflight program, it’s Dragon or bust.

For the International Space Station, it’s also Dragon or bust, at least until Boeing gets going. SpaceX’s capsules are the only US vehicles certified to fly to space with NASA astronauts, and any more US government payments to Russia to launch Americans on Soyuz missions would be politically unpalatable.

From the start of the commercial crew program, NASA sought two contractors providing their own means of flying to and from the ISS. The main argument for this “dissimilar redundancy” was to ensure NASA could still access the space station in the event of a launch failure or some other technical problem. The same argument could be made now that NASA needs two options to avoid being at the whim of one company’s decisions.

Stretching out

All of this is unfolding as the Trump administration seeks to slash funding for the International Space Station, cut back on the lab’s research program, and transition to “minimal safe operations” for the final few years of its life. Essentially, the space station would limp to the finish line, perhaps with a smaller crew than the seven-person staff living and working in it today.

At the end of this month, SpaceX is scheduled to launch the Crew-11 mission—the 12th Dragon crew mission for NASA and the 11th fully operational crew ferry flight to the ISS. Two Americans, one Japanese astronaut, and a Russian cosmonaut will ride to the station for a stay of at least six months.

NASA’s existing contract with SpaceX covers four more long-duration flights to the space station with Dragon, including the mission set to go on July 31.

One way NASA can save money in the space station’s budget is by simply flying fewer missions. Stich said Thursday that NASA is working with SpaceX to extend the Dragon spacecraft’s mission duration limit from seven months to eight months. The recertification of Dragon for a longer mission could be finished later this year, allowing NASA to extend Crew-11’s stay at the ISS if needed. Over time, longer stays mean fewer crew rotation missions.

“We can extend the mission in real-time as needed as we better understand… the appropriations process and what that means relative to the overall station manifest,” Stich said.

Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft backs away from the International Space Station on September 6, 2024, without its crew. Credit: NASA

Boeing’s fixed-price contract with NASA originally covered an unpiloted test flight of Starliner, a demonstration flight with astronauts, and then up to six operational missions delivering crews to the ISS. But NASA has only given Boeing the “Authority To Proceed” for three of its six potential operational Starliner missions. This milestone, known as ATP, is a decision point in contracting lingo where the customer—in this case, NASA—places a firm order for a deliverable. NASA has previously said it awards these task orders about two to three years prior to a mission’s launch.

If NASA opts to go to eight-month missions on the ISS with Dragon and Starliner, the agency’s firm orders for three Boeing missions and four more SpaceX crew flights would cover the agency’s needs into early 2030, not long before the final crew will depart the space station.

Stich said NASA officials are examining their options. These include whether NASA should book more crew missions with SpaceX, authorize Boeing to prepare for additional Starliner flights beyond the first three, or order no more flights at all.

“As we better understand the budget and better understand what’s in front of us, we’re working through that,” Stich said. “It’s really too early to speculate how many flights we’ll fly with each provider, SpaceX and Boeing.”

Planning for the 2030s

NASA officials also have an eye for what happens after 2030. The agency has partnered with commercial teams led by Axiom, Blue Origin, and Voyager Technologies on plans for privately owned space stations in low-Earth orbit to replace some of the research capabilities lost with the end of the ISS program.

The conventional wisdom goes that these new orbiting outposts will be less expensive to operate than the ISS, making them more attractive to commercial clients, ranging from pharmaceutical research and in-space manufacturing firms to thrill-seeking private space tourists. NASA, which seeks to maintain a human presence in low-Earth orbit as it turns toward the Moon and Mars, will initially be an anchor customer until the space stations build up more commercial demand.

These new space stations will need a way to receive cargo and visitors. NASA wants to preserve the existing commercial cargo and crew transport systems so they’re available for commercial space stations in the 2030s. Stich said NASA is looking at transferring the rights for any of the agency’s commercial crew missions that don’t fly to ISS over to the commercial space stations. Among NASA’s two commercial crew providers, it currently looks more likely that Boeing’s contract will have unused capacity than SpaceX’s when the ISS program ends.

This is a sweetener NASA could offer to its stable of private space station developers as they face other hurdles in getting their hardware off the ground. It’s unclear whether a business case exists to justify the expense of building and operating a commercial outpost in orbit or if the research and manufacturing customers that could use a private space station might find a cheaper option in robotic flying laboratories, such as those being developed by Varda Space Industries.

A rendering of Voyager’s Starlab space station. Credit: Voyager Space

NASA’s policies haven’t helped matters. Analysts say NASA’s financial support for private space station developers has lagged, and the agency’s fickle decision-making on when to retire the International Space Station has made private fundraising more difficult. It’s not a business for the faint-hearted. For example, Axiom has gone through several rounds of layoffs in the last year.

The White House’s budget request for fiscal year 2026 proposes a 25 percent cut to NASA’s overall budget, but the funding line for commercial space stations is an area marked for an increase. Still, there’s a decent chance that none of the proposed commercial outposts will be flying when the ISS crashes back to Earth. In that event, China would be the owner and operator of the only space station in orbit.

At least at first, transportation costs will be the largest expense for any company that builds and operates a privately owned space station. It costs NASA about 40 percent more each year to ferry astronauts and supplies to and from the ISS than it does to operate the space station. For a smaller commercial outpost with reduced operating costs, the gap will likely be even wider.

If Boeing can right the ship with Starliner and NASA offers a few prepaid crew missions to private space station developers, the money saved could help close someone’s business case and hasten the launch of a new era in commercial spaceflight.

Photo of Stephen Clark

Stephen Clark is a space reporter at Ars Technica, covering private space companies and the world’s space agencies. Stephen writes about the nexus of technology, science, policy, and business on and off the planet.

The ISS is nearing retirement, so why is NASA still gung-ho about Starliner? Read More »

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Boeing will build the US Air Force’s next air superiority fighter

Today, it emerged that Boeing has won its bid to supply the United States Air Force with its next jet fighter. As with the last fighter aircraft design procurement in recent times, the Department of Defense was faced with a choice between awarding Boeing or Lockheed the contract for the Next Generation Air Dominance program, which will replace the Lockheed F-22 Raptor sometime in the 2030s.

Very little is known about the NGAD, which the Air Force actually refers to as a “family of systems,” as its goal of owning the skies requires more than just a fancy airplane. The program has been underway for a decade, and a prototype designed by the Air Force first flew in 2020, breaking records in the process (although what records and by how much was not disclosed).

Last summer, the Pentagon paused the program as it reevaluated whether the NGAD would still meet its needs and whether it could afford to pay for the plane, as well as a new bomber, a new early warning aircraft, a new trainer, and a new ICBM, all at the same time. But in late December, it concluded that, yes, a crewed replacement for the F-22 was in the national interest.

While no images have ever been made public, then-Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said in 2024 that “it’s an F-22 replacement. You can make some inferences from that.”

The decision is good news for Boeing’s plant in St. Louis, which is scheduled to end production of the F/A-18 Super Hornet in 2027. Boeing lost its last bid to build a fighter jet when its X-32 lost out to Lockheed’s X-35 in the Joint Strike Fighter competition in 2001.

A separate effort to award a contract for the NGAD’s engine, called the Next Generation Adaptive Propulsion, is underway between Pratt & Whitney and GE Aerospace, with an additional program aiming to develop “drone wingmen” also in the works between General Atomics and Anduril.

Boeing will build the US Air Force’s next air superiority fighter Read More »

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The X-37B spaceplane lands after helping pave the way for “maneuver warfare”

On this mission, military officials said the X-37B tested “space domain awareness technology experiments” that aim to improve the Space Force’s knowledge of the space environment. Defense officials consider the space domain—like land, sea, and aira contested environment that could become a battlefield in future conflicts.

Last month, the Space Force released the first image of Earth from an X-37B in space. This image was captured in 2024 as the spacecraft flew in its high-altitude orbit, and shows a portion of the X-37B’s power-generating solar array. Credit: US Space Force

The Space Force hasn’t announced plans for the next X-37B mission. Typically, the next X-37B flight has launched within a year of the prior mission’s landing. So far, all of the X-37B flights have launched from Florida, with landings at Vandenberg and at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center, where Boeing and the Space Force refurbish the spaceplanes between missions.

The aerobraking maneuvers demonstrated by the X-37B could find applications on future operational military satellites, according to Gen. Stephen Whiting, head of US Space Command.

“The X-37 is a test and experimentation platform, but that aerobraking maneuver allowed it to bridge multiple orbital regimes, and we think this is exactly the kind of maneuverability we’d like to see in future systems, which will unlock a whole new series of operational concepts,” Whiting said in December at the Space Force Association’s Spacepower Conference.

Space Command’s “astrographic” area of responsibility (AOR) starts at the top of Earth’s atmosphere and extends to the Moon and beyond.

“An irony of the space domain is that everything in our AOR is in motion, but rarely do we use maneuver as a way to gain positional advantage,” Whiting said. “We believe at US Space Command it is vital, given the threats we now see in novel orbits that are hard for us to get to, as well as the fact that the Chinese have been testing on-orbit refueling capability, that we need some kind of sustained space maneuver.”

Improvements in maneuverability would have benefits in surveilling an adversary’s satellites, as well as in defensive and offensive combat operations in orbit.

The Space Force could attain the capability for sustained maneuvers—known in some quarters as dynamic space operations—in several ways. One is to utilize in-orbit refueling that allows satellites to “maneuver without regret,” and another is to pursue more fuel-efficient means of changing orbits, such as aerobraking or solar-electric propulsion.

Then, Whiting said Space Command could transform how it operates by employing “maneuver warfare” as the Army, Navy and Air Force do. “We think we need to move toward a joint function of true maneuver advantage in space.”

The X-37B spaceplane lands after helping pave the way for “maneuver warfare” Read More »

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Judge rejects Boeing plea deal that was opposed by families of crash victims

The compliance monitor is supposed to ensure that “Boeing implements a program designed to prevent and detect violations of US fraud laws,” O’Connor wrote. Failing to retain a monitor would violate Boeing’s probation, but O’Connor said that Boeing wouldn’t actually have to comply with the monitor’s recommendations.

“[T]he plea agreement prohibits imposing as a condition of probation a requirement for Boeing to comply with the monitor’s anti-fraud recommendations. Additionally, the independent monitor is selected by and reports to the Government, not the Court,” O’Connor wrote.

O’Connor also rejected the deal on the grounds that “Boeing will have the opportunity to prevent the hiring of one of the six monitor candidates chosen by the Government,” and “the Government will select the independent monitor ‘in keeping with the Department’s commitment to diversity and inclusion.'”

Judge opposes diversity provision

O’Connor said that Boeing’s court briefs and its diversity policies suggest that “Boeing will exercise its strike of one of the Government’s six chosen monitor candidates in a discriminatory manner and with racial considerations.” O’Connor said he is also skeptical that the government will consider all possible monitors and choose one based solely on merit and talent.

“It seems fundamentally inconsistent for the Government to say ‘in keeping with the Department’s commitment to diversity and inclusion’ means that the Government will not consider race,” O’Connor wrote. “Otherwise, why would the Government represent to the Court in its briefing that the term ‘diversity’ in the plea agreement is ‘generally consistent’ with the 2021 Executive Order’s definition, which explicitly includes race? Indeed, the Government must adhere to this Executive Order, and, consequently, that definition of ‘diversity’ controls what is required by the plea agreement.”

“In a case of this magnitude, it is in the utmost interest of justice that the public is confident this monitor selection is done based solely on competency,” O’Connor also wrote. “The parties’ DEI [diversity, equity, and inclusion] efforts only serve to undermine this confidence in the Government and Boeing’s ethics and anti-fraud efforts.”

Judge rejects Boeing plea deal that was opposed by families of crash victims Read More »

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What is happening with Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft?

Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft safely landed empty in the New Mexico desert about eight weeks ago, marking a hollow end to the company’s historic first human spaceflight. The vehicle’s passengers during its upward flight to the International Space Station earlier this summer, Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams, remain in space, awaiting a ride home on SpaceX’s Crew Dragon.

Boeing has been steadfastly silent about the fate of Starliner since then. Two senior officials, including Boeing’s leader of human spaceflight, John Shannon, were originally due to attend a post-landing news conference at Johnson Space Center in Houston. However, just minutes before the news conference was to begin, two seats were removed—the Boeing officials were no-shows.

In lieu of speaking publicly, Boeing issued a terse statement early on the morning of September 8, attributing it to Mark Nappi, vice president and program manager of Boeing’s commercial crew program. “We will review the data and determine the next steps for the program,” Nappi said, in part.

And since then? Nothing. Requests for comment from Boeing have gone unanswered. The simple explanation is that the storied aviation company, which has a new chief executive named Kelly Ortberg, remains in the midst of evaluating Boeing’s various lines of business.

Figuring out what to do with Starliner

“There are probably some things on the fringe there that we can be more efficient with, or that just distract us from our main goal here. So, more to come on that,” Ortberg said during his first quarterly earnings call last week. “I don’t have a specific list of things that we’re going to keep and we’re not going to keep. That’s something for us to evaluate, and the process is underway.”

Also last week, The Wall Street Journal reported that Boeing is considering putting some of its space businesses, including Starliner, up for sale. This suggests that if Boeing can get a return on its investment in Starliner, it probably would be inclined to take the money. To date, the company has reported losses of $1.85 billion on Starliner. As a result, Boeing has told NASA it will no longer bid on fixed-price space contracts in the future.

What is happening with Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft? Read More »

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Are Boeing’s problems beyond fixable?


A new CEO promises a culture change as the aerospace titan is struggling hard.

A Boeing logo on the exterior of the company's headquarters.

Credit: Getty Images | Olivier Douliery

As Boeing’s latest chief executive, Kelly Ortberg’s job was never going to be easy. On Wednesday, it got harder still.

That morning, Ortberg had faced investors for the first time, telling them that ending a debilitating strike by Boeing’s largest union was the first step to stabilizing the plane maker’s business.

But as the day wore on, it became clear that nearly two-thirds of the union members who voted on the company’s latest contract offer had rejected it. The six-week strike goes on, costing Boeing an estimated $50 million a day, pushing back the day it can resume production of most aircraft and further stressing its supply chain.

The company that virtually created modern commercial aviation has spent the better part of five years in chaos, stemming from fatal crashes, a worldwide grounding, a guilty plea to a criminal charge, a pandemic that halted global air travel, a piece breaking off a plane in mid-flight and now a strike. Boeing’s finances look increasingly fragile and its reputation has been battered.

Bank of America analyst Ron Epstein says Boeing is a titan in a crisis largely of its own making, comparing it to the Hydra of Greek mythology: “For every problem that’s come to a head, then [been] severed, more problems sprout up.”

Resolving Boeing’s crisis is critical to the future of commercial air travel, as most commercial passenger aircraft are made by it or its European rival Airbus, which has little capacity for new customers until the 2030s.

Ortberg, a 64-year-old Midwesterner who took the top job three months ago, says his mission is “pretty straightforward—turn this big ship in the right direction and restore Boeing to the leadership position that we all know and want.”

Resolving the machinists’ strike is just the start of the challenges he faces. He needs to motivate the workforce, even as 33,000 are on strike and 17,000 face redundancy under a cost-cutting initiative.

He must persuade investors to support an equity raise in an industry where the returns could take years to materialize. He needs to fix Boeing’s quality control and manufacturing issues, and placate its increasingly frustrated customers, who have had to rejig their schedules and cut flights owing to delays in plane deliveries.

“I’ve never seen anything like it in our industry, to be honest. I’ve been around 30 years,” Carsten Spohr, chief executive of German flag carrier Lufthansa, said this month.

Eventually, Boeing needs to launch a new aircraft model to better compete with Airbus.

“If Kelly fixes this, he is a hero,” says Melius Research analyst Rob Spingarn. “But it’s very complex. There’s a lot of different things to fix.”

Ortberg started his career as a mechanical engineer and went on to run Rockwell Collins, an avionics supplier to Boeing, until it was sold to engineering conglomerate United Technologies in 2018.

His engineering background has been welcomed by many who regard previous executives’ emphasis on shareholder returns as the root cause of many of Boeing’s engineering and manufacturing problems.

Longtime employees often peg the shift in Boeing’s culture to its 1997 merger with rival McDonnell Douglas. Phil Condit and Harry Stonecipher, who ran Boeing in the late 1990s and early 2000s, were admirers of Jack Welch, the General Electric chief executive known for financial engineering and ruthless cost cuts.

Condit even moved Boeing’s headquarters from its manufacturing base in Seattle to Chicago in 2001, so the “corporate center” would no longer be “drawn into day-to-day business operations.”

Jim McNerney, another Welch acolyte, instituted a program to boost Boeing’s profits by squeezing its suppliers during his decade in charge. He remarked on a 2014 earnings call about employees “cowering” before him, a dark quip still cited a decade later to explain Boeing’s tense relationship with its workers.

Ken Ogren, a member of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers District 751, says managers at Boeing often felt pressured to move planes quickly through the factory.

“We’ve had a lot of bean counters come through, and I’m going to be in the majority with a lot of people who believe they’ve been tripping over dollars to save pennies,” he says.

Dennis Muilenburg headed the company in October 2018, when a new 737 Max crashed off the coast of Indonesia. Five months later, another Max crashed shortly after take-off in Ethiopia. In total, 346 people lost their lives.

Regulators worldwide grounded the plane—a cash cow and a vital product in Boeing’s competition with Airbus—for nearly two years. Investigations eventually showed a faulty sensor triggered an anti-stall system, repeatedly forcing the aircraft’s nose downward.

Boeing agreed in July to plead guilty to a criminal charge of fraud for misleading regulators about the plane’s design. Families of the crash victims are opposing the plea deal, which is before a federal judge for approval.

The manufacturer’s problems were compounded by COVID-19, which grounded aircraft worldwide and led many airlines to hold off placing new orders and pause deliveries of existing ones. Boeing’s debt ballooned as it issued $25 billion in bonds to see it through the crisis.

Regulators cleared the 737 Max to fly again, starting in November 2020. But hopes that Boeing was finally on top of its problems were shattered last January, when a door panel that was missing bolts blew off an Alaska Airlines jet at 16,000 feet.

While no one was injured, the incident triggered multiple investigations and an audit by the US Federal Aviation Administration, which found lapses in Boeing’s manufacturing and quality assurance processes and led to an uncomfortable appearance by then chief executive Dave Calhoun at a Senate subcommittee hearing.

The company also has struggled with its defense and space businesses. Fixed-price contracts on several military programs have resulted in losses and billions of dollars of one-off charges. Meanwhile, problems with its CST-100 Starliner spacecraft resulted in two astronauts being left on the International Space Station. SpaceX’s Crew Dragon vehicle will be used to return them to Earth early next year.

Boeing’s stumbles have resulted in loss of life, loss of prestige, and a net financial loss every year since 2019. On Wednesday, it reported a $6 billion loss between July and September, the second-worst quarterly result in its history.

One of Ortberg’s first big moves as chief executive was to move himself—from his Florida home to a house in Seattle. He told analysts that Boeing’s executives “need to be on the factory floors, in the back shops, and in our engineering labs” to be more in tune with the company’s products and workforce. Change in Boeing’s corporate culture must “be more than the poster on the wall,” he added.

His approach represents a shift from his predecessor Calhoun, who was criticized for spending more time in New Hampshire and South Carolina than in Boeing’s factories in Washington state.

Bill George, former chief executive at Medtronic and an executive fellow at Harvard Business School, says Ortberg is doing a “terrific job” so far, particularly for moving to the Pacific Northwest and pressuring other itinerant executives to follow.

“If you’re based in Florida, and you come occasionally, what do you really know about what’s going on in the business?” he says, adding that Boeing has “no business being in Arlington, Virginia,” where the company moved its headquarters in 2022.

Scott Kirby, chief executive at one of Boeing’s biggest customers, United Airlines, told his own investors this month that he was “encouraged” by Ortberg’s early moves, adding that the company suffered for decades from “a cultural challenge, where they focused on short-term profitability and the short-term stock price at the expense of what made Boeing great, which is building great products.”

“Kelly Ortberg is pivoting the company back to their roots,” he said. “All the employees of Boeing will rally around that.”

But Ogren of the machinists’ union cautions that previous commitments to culture change have been hollow. “You’ve got people at the top saying, ‘We’ve got to be safe, oh, and by the way, we need these planes out the door…’ They said the right thing. They didn’t emphasize it, and that’s not what they put pressure on the managers to achieve.”

When workers eventually return to work—Peter Arment, an analyst at Baird, expects the dispute to be resolved in November—Ortberg wants better execution, even if it means lower output. “It is so much more important we do this right than fast,” he said.

The company had planned to raise Max output from about 25 per month before the strike to 38 per month by the end of the year, a cap set by the FAA. It will not reach that goal and Spingarn, the Melius analyst, says the strike will probably delay any production increase by nine months to a year. Some workers would need retraining, Ortberg said, and the supply chain’s restart was likely to be “bumpy.” The manufacturer also has established a quality plan with the FAA that it must follow.

Boeing also needed to launch a new airplane “at the right time in the future,” Ortberg said. Epstein of BofA called this “one of the most important messages” from the new chief executive, likely “to reinvigorate the workforce and culture at Boeing.”

In the meantime, Boeing will continue to consume cash in 2025, having burnt through $10 billion so far this year, according to chief financial officer Brian West. Spingarn says that investors may be disappointed in the cash flow at first, but adds that “fixing airplanes isn’t one year, it’s three years.”

For all the challenges, Ortberg has the right personality to turn Boeing around, says Ken Herbert, an analyst at RBC Capital Markets.

“If he can’t do it, I don’t think anyone can.”

© 2024 The Financial Times Ltd. All rights reserved. Not to be redistributed, copied, or modified in any way.

Are Boeing’s problems beyond fixable? Read More »

boeing-is-still-bleeding-money-on-the-starliner-commercial-crew-program

Boeing is still bleeding money on the Starliner commercial crew program


“We signed up to some things that are problematic.”

Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft backs away from the International Space Station on September 6 without its crew. Credit: NASA

Sometimes, it’s worth noting when something goes unsaid.

On Wednesday, Boeing’s new CEO, Kelly Ortberg, participated in his first quarterly conference call with investment analysts. Under fire from labor groups and regulators, Boeing logged a nearly $6.2 billion loss for the last three months, while the new boss pledged a turnaround for the troubled aerospace company.

What Ortberg didn’t mention in the call was the Starliner program. Starliner is a relatively small portion of Boeing’s overall business, but it’s a high-profile and unprofitable one.

Mounting losses

Boeing has reported recurring financial losses on the program and added $250 million to the tally with Wednesday’s quarterly report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. This brings the company’s total losses on Starliner to $1.85 billion, recorded in increments over the last few years as the program has faced technical problems and delays.

In its SEC filing, Boeing wrote: “Risk remains that we may record additional losses in future periods.”

Boeing runs the Starliner program under a fixed-price contract with NASA, meaning the government pays the contractor a set amount of money, and the company is on the hook for any cost overruns. These are favorable terms for the government because they divert financial risk to the contractor, usually resulting in lower costs if the program is successful.

Since the last Starliner test flight ended in a disappointing fashion, Boeing has released no updates on its plans for the future of the spacecraft. The company released a short written statement after Starliner landed in early September, saying managers would review data and “determine the next steps for the program.”

A week after Starliner landed, Boeing’s chief financial officer, Brian West, echoed that line. “There is important work to determine any next steps for the Starliner program, and we’ll evaluate that,” he said at a conference sponsored by Morgan Stanley.

A member of the Starliner recovery team removes cargo from the spacecraft after landing in New Mexico on September 6, without its two-person crew.

Credit: NASA/Aubrey Gemignani

A member of the Starliner recovery team removes cargo from the spacecraft after landing in New Mexico on September 6, without its two-person crew. Credit: NASA/Aubrey Gemignani

Starliner concluded its third test flight a little more than six weeks ago, leaving behind the two astronauts the craft ferried to the International Space Station earlier in the year. This was the first time people flew into orbit on a Starliner spacecraft.

NASA, which partnered with Boeing to develop the Starliner spacecraft, decided the Boeing capsule should return to Earth without its crew after the test flight encountered problems with overheating thrusters and helium leaks. The spacecraft safely reached the space station with NASA astronauts Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams in June, but agency officials were not comfortable with risking the crew’s safety on Starliner for the trip home. Instead, the duo will return to Earth on a SpaceX Dragon spacecraft early next year.

Boeing managers had a different opinion and lobbied for Starliner to return to Earth with Wilmore and Williams. Ultimately, the Starliner spacecraft parachuted to a successful landing at White Sands Space Harbor, New Mexico, on September 6, but there’s a lot of work ahead for Boeing to fix the thruster problems and helium leaks before the capsule can fly with people again. This will take many months—potentially a year or more—and will cost Boeing hundreds of millions of dollars, as shown in Wednesday’s SEC filing.

Doing less

In response to questions Wednesday from Wall Street investment firms, Ortberg, who took the CEO job in August, suggested it’s time for Boeing to look at cutting some of its losses and recalibrate how it pursues new business opportunities. Boeing’s previous CEO, Dave Calhoun, said last year the company would no longer enter into fixed-price development contracts.

“I think that that we’re better off being doing less and doing it better than doing more and not doing it well,” Ortberg said. “So we’re in the process of taking an evaluation of the portfolio. It’s something a new CEO always does when you come into a business.”

Most of Boeing’s financial loss in the third quarter of this year came from the company’s commercial airplane business. Beset by safety concerns with its 737 Max aircraft and a labor strike that has halted production at many of its airplane factories, Boeing posted its worst quarterly performance since the height of the COVID pandemic in 2020.

Even before the strike, the Federal Aviation Administration capped Boeing’s production rate for the 737 Max, limiting revenue for the commercial airplane business.

Ortberg didn’t specify any programs that Boeing might consider trimming or canceling, but said the company’s “core” business of commercial airplanes and military systems will stay.

“There are probably some things on the fringe there that we can be more efficient with, or that just distract us from our main goal here. So, more to come on that,” Ortberg said. “I don’t have a specific list of things that we’re going to keep and we’re not going to keep. That’s something for us to evaluate, and the process is underway.”

Kelly Ortberg, Boeing’s new CEO, is pictured in 2016 during his tenure as chief executive of Rockwell Collins.

Kelly Ortberg, Boeing’s new CEO, is pictured in 2016 during his tenure as chief executive of Rockwell Collins. Credit: Daniel Acker/Bloomberg via Getty Images

Apart from technical execution, Ortberg identified Boeing’s errors in cost and risk estimation as other reasons for the company’s poor performance on several fixed-price government contracts, including Starliner.

“We’re not going to be able to just wave the wand and clean up these troubled contracts,” he said. “We signed up to some things that are problematic.”

Ortberg said he is reluctant to ditch all of Boeing’s troubled contracts. “Even if we wanted to, I don’t think we can walk away from these contracts,” he said. “These are our core customers that need this capability. We’ve got long-term commitments to them. So walking away isn’t an answer to this.”

However, Orberg added that Boeing could reassess programs as they shift from one contract phase to the next. NASA’s commercial crew contract with Boeing has a maximum value of $4.6 billion, but that assumes the agency gives Boeing the green light to fly six operational Starliner missions.

So far, NASA has only authorized Boeing to begin detailed preparations for three. The latter half of the commercial crew contract remains a question mark, and could be an opportunity for Boeing to reevaluate the Starliner program without breaking its obligations to NASA. This is especially salient because NASA plans to decommission the International Space Station in 2030, and it’s not clear Boeing could fly all six of its Starliner missions before then while still alternating with SpaceX for crew transportation duties.

“We do have to get into a position where we’ve got a portfolio much more balanced with less risky programs and more profitable programs, and we’re going to be working that,” Ortberg said. “But I don’t think a wholesale walkaway is in the cards.”

This statement makes it sound like Boeing isn’t going to pull the plug on Starliner immediately. Still, Boeing hasn’t laid out its specific plans for Starliner, or even confirmed its intention to keep working on the program. This is puzzling.

Saying nothing

Ortberg was not asked about Starliner in Wednesday’s investor call. After the call, Ars asked a Boeing spokesperson if the company still has a long-term commitment to the Starliner program. The spokesperson replied that the company has nothing to share on the topic.

The Starliner test flight this year was supposed to pave the way for NASA to officially certify the Boeing crew capsule to begin flying in a slate of up to six operational crew rotation flights to the space station. Once certified, Boeing will become NASA’s second crew transportation provider alongside SpaceX, which has now launched nine operational crew missions for NASA, plus a handful more all-private astronaut missions.

NASA still wants to certify Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft to provide the agency with a second commercial option for getting astronauts into orbit. A fundamental goal set out for NASA’s commercial crew program more than a decade ago was to develop two dissimilar human-rated transportation systems for access to low-Earth orbit. The idea here is competition will drive down costs, and NASA will have a backup option if one of the commercial crew providers runs into difficulties.

However, NASA has not announced whether it will require Boeing to complete another test flight to achieve the certification milestone with Starliner. NASA is looking at slots to fly an unpiloted Starliner spacecraft on a cargo mission to the space station next year, perhaps to verify modifications to the ship’s propulsion system really fix the problems discovered on the test flight this year.

NASA is making moves while assuming Boeing will stay in the game. Astronauts are still assigned to train for the first operational Starliner mission, although it’s not likely to happen until the end of next year or in 2026. Earlier this month, NASA announced SpaceX will launch a four-person crew to the International Space Station no earlier than July of next year, taking a slot that the agency once hoped Boeing would use.

Bill Nelson, NASA’s administrator, told reporters in late August that he received assurances from Ortberg that Boeing intends to “move forward and fly Starliner in the future.” At the time, Ortberg was just a couple of weeks into his tenure at Boeing.

Two months later, Nelson’s secondhand assertion is still all we have.

Photo of Stephen Clark

Stephen Clark is a space reporter at Ars Technica, covering private space companies and the world’s space agencies. Stephen writes about the nexus of technology, science, policy, and business on and off the planet.

Boeing is still bleeding money on the Starliner commercial crew program Read More »

in-a-rare-disclosure,-the-pentagon-provides-an-update-on-the-x-37b-spaceplane

In a rare disclosure, the Pentagon provides an update on the X-37B spaceplane

“When it’s close to the Earth, it’s close enough to the atmosphere to turn where it is,” she said. “Which means our adversaries don’t know—and that happens on the far side of the Earth from our adversaries—where it’s going to come up next. And we know that that drives them nuts. And I’m really glad about that.”

Breaking the silence

The Pentagon rarely releases an update on the X-37B spaceplane in the middle of a mission. During previous flights, military officials typically provided some basic information about the mission before its launch, then went silent until the X-37B returned for landing. The military keeps specifics about the spaceplane’s activities in orbit a secret.

This made the Space Force’s announcement Thursday somewhat of a surprise. When the seventh flight of the X-37B launched, there were indications that the spacecraft would soar into a much higher orbit than it did on any of its six prior missions.

In February, a sleuthing satellite tracking hobbyist spotted the X-37B in orbit by observing sunlight reflected off of the spacecraft as it flew thousands of miles above Earth. Follow-up detections confirmed the discovery, allowing amateur observers to estimate that the X-37B was flying in a highly elliptical orbit ranging between roughly 300 and 38,600 miles in altitude (186-by-23,985 miles). The orbit was inclined 59.1 degrees to the equator.

On its previous missions, the X-37B was confined to low-Earth orbit a few hundred miles above the planet. When it became apparent that the latest mission was cruising at a significantly higher altitude, analysts and space enthusiasts speculated on what the secret spaceplane was doing and how it would come back to Earth. A direct reentry into the atmosphere from the spaceplane’s elliptical orbit would expose the craft’s heat shield to hotter temperatures than any of its previous returns.

Now, we have an answer to the latter question.

As for what it’s doing up there, the Space Force said the spaceplane on this mission has “conducted radiation effect experiments and has been testing space domain awareness technologies in a highly elliptical orbit.” The orbit brings the X-37B through the Van Allen radiation belts and crosses several orbital regimes populated by US and foreign communications, navigation, and surveillance satellites.

Military officials have said previous X-37B flights have tested a Hall-effect ion thruster and tested other experimental space technologies without elaborating on their details. X-37Bs have also secretly deployed small military satellites in orbit.

In a rare disclosure, the Pentagon provides an update on the X-37B spaceplane Read More »

in-the-room-where-it-happened:-when-nasa-nearly-gave-boeing-all-the-crew-funding

In the room where it happened: When NASA nearly gave Boeing all the crew funding

The story behind the story —

“In all my years of working with Boeing I never saw them sign up for additional work for free.”

But for a fateful meeting in the summer of 2014, Crew Dragon probably never would have happened.

Enlarge / But for a fateful meeting in the summer of 2014, Crew Dragon probably never would have happened.

SpaceX

This is an excerpt from Chapter 11 of the book REENTRY: SpaceX, Elon Musk and the Reusable Rockets that Launched a Second Space Age by our own Eric Berger. The book will be published on September 24, 2024. This excerpt describes a fateful meeting 10 years ago at NASA Headquarters in Washington, DC, where the space agency’s leaders met to decide which companies should be awarded billions of dollars to launch astronauts into orbit.

In the early 2010s, NASA’s Commercial Crew competition boiled down to three players: Boeing, SpaceX, and a Colorado-based company building a spaceplane, Sierra Nevada Corporation. Each had its own advantages. Boeing was the blue blood, with decades of spaceflight experience. SpaceX had already built a capsule, Dragon. And some NASA insiders nostalgically loved Sierra Nevada’s Dream Chaser space plane, which mimicked the shuttle’s winged design.

This competition neared a climax in 2014 as NASA prepared to winnow the field to one company, or at most two, to move from the design phase into actual development. In May of that year Musk revealed his Crew Dragon spacecraft to the world with a characteristically showy event at the company’s headquarters in Hawthorne. As lights flashed and a smoke machine vented, Musk quite literally raised a curtain on a black-and-white capsule. He was most proud to reveal how Dragon would land. Never before had a spacecraft come back from orbit under anything but parachutes or gliding on wings. Not so with the new Dragon. It had powerful thrusters, called SuperDracos, that would allow it to land under its own power.

“You’ll be able to land anywhere on Earth with the accuracy of a helicopter,” Musk bragged. “Which is something that a modern spaceship should be able to do.”

A few weeks later I had an interview with John Elbon, a long-time engineer at Boeing who managed the company’s commercial program. As we talked, he tut-tutted SpaceX’s performance to date, noting its handful of Falcon 9 launches a year and inability to fly at a higher cadence. As for Musk’s little Dragon event, Elbon was dismissive.

“We go for substance,” Elbon told me. “Not pizzazz.”

Elbon’s confidence was justified. That spring the companies were finalizing bids to develop a spacecraft and fly six operational missions to the space station. These contracts were worth billions of dollars. Each company told NASA how much it needed for the job, and if selected, would receive a fixed price award for that amount. Boeing, SpaceX, and Sierra Nevada wanted as much money as they could get, of course. But each had an incentive to keep their bids low, as NASA had a finite budget for the program. Boeing had a solution, telling NASA it needed the entire Commercial Crew budget to succeed. Because a lot of decision-makers believed that only Boeing could safely fly astronauts, the company’s gambit very nearly worked.

Scoring the bids

The three competitors submitted initial bids to NASA in late January 2014, and after about six months of evaluations and discussions with the “source evaluation board,” submitted their final bids in July. During this initial round of judging, subject-matter experts scored the proposals and gathered to make their ratings. Sierra Nevada was eliminated because their overall scores were lower, and the proposed cost not low enough to justify remaining in the competition. This left Boeing and SpaceX, with likely only one winner.

“We really did not have the budget for two companies at the time,” said Phil McAlister, the NASA official at the agency’s headquarters in Washington overseeing the Commercial Crew program. “No one thought we were going to award two. I would always say, ‘One or more,’ and people would roll their eyes at me.”

Boeing's John Elbon, center, is seen in Orbiter Processing Facility-3 at NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida in 2012.

Boeing’s John Elbon, center, is seen in Orbiter Processing Facility-3 at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida in 2012.

NASA

The members of the evaluation board scored the companies based on three factors. Price was the most important consideration, given NASA’s limited budget. This was followed by “mission suitability,” and finally, “past performance.” These latter two factors, combined, were about equally weighted to price. SpaceX dominated Boeing on price.

Boeing asked for $4.2 billion, 60 percent more than SpaceX’s bid of $2.6 billion. The second category, mission suitability, assessed whether a company could meet NASA’s requirements and actually safely fly crew to and from the station. For this category, Boeing received an “excellent” rating, above SpaceX’s “very good.” The third factor, past performance, evaluated a company’s recent work. Boeing received a rating of “very high,” whereas SpaceX received a rating of “high.”

While this makes it appear as though the bids were relatively even, McAlister said the score differences in mission suitability and past performance were, in fact, modest. It was a bit like grades in school. SpaceX scored something like an 88, and got a B; whereas Boeing got a 91 and scored an A. Because of the significant difference in price, McAlister said, the source evaluation board assumed SpaceX would win the competition. He was thrilled, because he figured this meant that NASA would have to pick two companies, SpaceX based on price, and Boeing due to its slightly higher technical score. He wanted competition to spur both of the companies on.

In the room where it happened: When NASA nearly gave Boeing all the crew funding Read More »

navy-captains-don’t-like-abandoning-ship—but-with-starliner,-the-ship-left-them

Navy captains don’t like abandoning ship—but with Starliner, the ship left them

NASA astronauts Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams wave to their families, friends, and NASA officials on their way to the launch pad June 5 to board Boeing's Starliner spacecraft.

Enlarge / NASA astronauts Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams wave to their families, friends, and NASA officials on their way to the launch pad June 5 to board Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft.

NASA astronauts Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams are no strangers to time away from their families. Both are retired captains in the US Navy, served in war zones, and are veterans of previous six-month stays on the International Space Station.

When they launched to the space station on Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft on June 5, the astronauts expected to be home in a few weeks, or perhaps a month, at most. Their minimum mission duration was eight days, but NASA was always likely to approve a short extension. Wilmore and Williams were the first astronauts to soar into orbit on Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft, a milestone achieved some seven years later than originally envisioned by Boeing and NASA.

However, the test flight fell short of all of its objectives. Wilmore and Williams are now a little more than three months into what has become an eight-month mission on the station. The Starliner spacecraft was beset by problems, culminating in a decision last month by NASA officials to send the capsules back to Earth without the two astronauts. Rather than coming home on Starliner, Wilmore and Williams will return to Earth in February on a SpaceX Dragon spacecraft.

Grateful for options

On Friday, the two astronauts spoke with reporters for the first time since NASA decided they would stay in orbit until early 2025.

“It was trying at times,” Wilmore said. There were some tough times all the way through. Certainly, as the commander or pilot of your spacecraft, you don’t want to see it go off without you, but that’s where we wound up.”

Both astronauts are veteran Navy test pilots and have previous flights on space shuttles and Russian Soyuz spacecraft. Captains never want to abandon ship, but that’s not what happened with Starliner. Instead, their ship left them.

Williams said she and Wilmore watched Starliner’s departure from the space station from the lab’s multi-window cupola module last week. They kept busy with several tasks, such as monitoring the undocking and managing the space station’s systems during the dynamic phase of the departure.

“We were watching our spaceship fly away at that point in time,” Williams said. “I think it’s good we had some extra activities. Of course, we’re very knowledgeable about Starliner, so it was obvious what was happening at each moment.”

NASA’s top managers did not have enough confidence in Starliner’s safety after five thrusters temporarily failed as the spacecraft approached the space station in June. They weren’t ready to risk the lives of the two astronauts on Starliner when engineers weren’t convinced the same thrusters, or more, would function as needed during the trip home.

It turned out the suspect thrusters on Starliner worked after it departed the space station and headed for reentry on September 6. One thruster on Starliner’s crew module—different in design from the thrusters that previously had trouble—failed on the return journey. Investigating this issue is something Boeing and NASA engineers will add to their to-do list before the next Starliner flight, alongside the earlier problems of overheating thrusters and helium leaks.

“It’s a very risky business, and things do not always turn out the way you want,” Wilmore said. “Every single test flight, especially a first flight of a spacecraft or aircraft that’s ever occurred, has found issues …  90 percent of our training is preparing for the unexpected, and sometimes the actual unexpected goes beyond what you even think that could happen.”

Navy captains don’t like abandoning ship—but with Starliner, the ship left them Read More »

boeing-risks-losing-billions-as-33,000-workers-vote-to-strike

Boeing risks losing billions as 33,000 workers vote to strike

Union members cheer during a news conference following a vote count on the union contract at the IAM District 751 Main Union Hall in Seattle, Washington, US, on Thursday, Sept. 12, 2024.

Enlarge / Union members cheer during a news conference following a vote count on the union contract at the IAM District 751 Main Union Hall in Seattle, Washington, US, on Thursday, Sept. 12, 2024.

More than 33,000 unionized Boeing workers went on strike Friday, rejecting what they say were unfair terms of a deal the embattled aerospace company tentatively reached with their union.

The rejected deal tried and failed to win over workers by offering a 25 percent wage increase and promised to build Boeing’s next jet in the Puget Sound region in Washington, which Boeing claimed offered “job security for generations to come.”

But after International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) District 751 president Jon Holden urged the union to accept the deal—which Boeing said was the “largest-ever general wage increase” in the company’s history—hundreds of Boeing employees immediately began resisting ahead of a Thursday vote that ultimately doomed the deal.

Instead of agreeing to a deal that compromised the desired 40 percent wage increases and eliminated workers’ annual bonuses, about 96 percent of workers voted to strike, The Washington Post reported. Rather than take what Boeing offered, workers seized rare leverage amid Boeing’s financial and production woes to pursue better terms.

“We’ve got a lot of leverage—why waste that?” Joe Philbin, a structures mechanic, told the Post ahead of the vote in a Seattle union hall Thursday. Philbin has only been with Boeing for six months but already wants changes in mandatory overtime rules.

An overwhelming majority of the union agreed that the deal was not good enough, so Holden told the gathered workers, “We strike at midnight.”

The statement incited loud cheers from workers who chanted, “Strike! Strike! Strike!”

Boeing workers have not walked out since 2008, when a 57-day strike cost Boeing about $1.5 billion, the Post reported. Analysts told Bloomberg that the current strike is estimated to last about 50 days, too, potentially costing Boeing between $3 billion and $3.5 billion.

The aerospace company cannot afford any work stoppage—let alone a strike from workers playing “a key role in assembling some of the company’s best-selling aircraft,” which the Post said could be the company’s “most disrupting challenge yet.” Analysts told the Post that on top of assembly delays in critical plants in Washington, an extended strike could hurt Boeing suppliers and Boeing’s market share.

Boeing’s spokesperson told Ars that the company is eager to get back to the bargaining table.

“The message was clear that the tentative agreement we reached with IAM leadership was not acceptable to the members,” Boeing’s spokesperson said. “We remain committed to resetting our relationship with our employees and the union, and we are ready to get back to the table to reach a new agreement.”

Why did Boeing workers reject the deal?

Boeing likely anticipated that the deal wasn’t good enough after Holden told The Seattle Times on Wednesday that workers would probably vote to strike.

Two days before that, Holden posted a message to workers after receiving “hundreds of messages and emails” expressing concerns about the tentative deal that he recommended that they accept.

“Emotions are high,” Holden acknowledged.

Holden told workers that it would have been impossible to respond to everyone individually and reassured them that the tentative deal was not binding.

“A Tentative Agreement is not certain or fixed, and it’s certainly not final,” Holden told workers. He further clarified that the deal simply represented the best terms that the union could get Boeing to agree to without a strike.

Boeing risks losing billions as 33,000 workers vote to strike Read More »